Competition policy and resource utilization:
challenging implications for economic development in Nigeria by Adetoro, David Oluwadare
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Adetoro, David Oluwadare (2009) Competition policy and resource 
utilization: challenging implications for economic development in 
Nigeria. PhD thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/950/ 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
                     
 
                               
COMPETITION POLICY AND RESOURCE UTILIZATION: 
Challenging Implications for Economic Development in Nigeria                     
                    
                                   
 
DAVID OLUWADARE ADETORO 
 
 
 
 
 
          Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
                School of Law 
                           Faculty of Law, Business and Social Science 
                                           University of Glasgow 
                         
     July 2009
                                                                                                                                            
 ii
                                          ABSTRACT 
The starting point for this thesis is the established position that in free economies, by 
protecting the operation of demand and supply, competition law and policy (i) maximizes 
consumer welfare and consumer satisfaction, better than by (a) government controls and 
regulation or (b) unregulated competition, and (ii) contributes to economic growth and 
development.  Competition is assumed to apply as a necessity, equally to developed as well 
as developing economies, with Nigeria taken as a proxy for resource-dependent developing 
economies. The contents of the thesis are underpinned by the question: what is   the extent 
to which competition law and policy could be employed to promote the efficient allocation 
of resources in resource-dependent developing economies? The submitted views are partly 
based on an analysis of the objectives of competition law and policy, for  determining 
whether  resource-dependent countries have peculiar problems,  and if the answer is in the 
affirmative, whether the general standards in competition policy are  sufficient to address 
them. This analytic approach  is the same as the one underlying  the draft Federal 
Competition Bill (FCB) in Nigeria, as an example of an appropriate competition 
instrument in a resource-dependent country.  
The thesis examines some of the standards in the United States of America (USA) and 
European Union (EU) competition policies, such as those concerning agreements, abuse of 
dominant position and mergers, to determine whether the same rules could apply in all 
economic regimes, and which competition model could be best adopted by resource-
dependent developing countries, with Nigeria as an example. Competition standards and 
both primary and secondary competition problems that could distort the process of 
competition, as well as constraints which may emerge in the competition process in 
developing countries are explored. Some of these, as problems, include the issue of 
‘resource curse’, rent seeking, corruption, abusive business practices and a few others. 
 iii
Their examination is in the thesis aligned with the scrutiny of the characteristics of 
developing countries in contrast to developed countries; again, the economic circumstances 
of Nigeria, as a proxy for resource-dependent developing countries, are considered for 
determining whether competition law and policy could be used as a tool for addressing 
competition problems that may exist in resource-dependent developing countries.  
The conclusions of the thesis underline the types of economic problems for which 
competition law and policy, with the economic development of resource-dependent 
developing countries in mind, could be used to address, especially restrictive trade 
practices, abuse of dominant position and mergers that could substantially lessen 
competition. Furthermore,  the  (even if limited) role of   regulation  is argued, that is, in 
the face of any expected limitations of competition in certain sectors of an economy 
undergoing liberalization in the wake of  current international merger waves. Not least the 
importance of establishing a competition agency to administer and enforce it is underlined, 
that is, independently from the influence of the government. 
It is argued that for the draft FCB in Nigeria to become an appropriate competition 
instrument, the power and mandate of the Federal Competition Commission must be 
reviewed, with sufficient powers for the task, also for promoting the wide objectives 
anchored in the draft Bill.  It is also pointed out that competition cannot on its own directly 
resolve, in Nigeria, the peculiar socio-economic problems such as rent seeking and 
corruption, but it is argued that with an active engagement of competition advocacy, along 
with the adequate implementation of competition law and policy, the problems could be 
greatly reduced. The thesis highlights, among other recommendations, the need for further 
research on competition problems relating to resource-dependent countries.              
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Part One 
Chapter One 
1.0 Background to the Thesis                                                                                                
1.1 Introduction 
The historical nature of antitrust and competition laws and policies are often influenced by 
social and historical factors, and might respond to quite different objectives. 1  The 
objectives of each competition law regime is conditioned by its peculiar economic 
circumstances and political environment which might change with passage of time, 
changing  circumstances in the global economy or shifts in academic thought.2 Thus as a 
preliminary matter it is important to set down at the outset the exact nature of the 
proposition or problem which is being presented, together with an outline of the broad 
parameters of the study and the methodology adopted in the pursuit of this aim. The 
identification of these elements is the function of this introductory chapter. 
 
1.2 Statement of Objectives 
The main research problem in this thesis is: to what extent could competition law and 
policy be employed to promote the efficient allocation of resources and thereby 
development in resource-dependent developing economies? This problem is to be 
considered within the context of the objectives of competition law and policy and 
characteristics of resource-dependent developing economies. Thus this study aims to 
answer the research question through the following sub-questions: 
 
1 M. Motta, Competition Policy: Theory Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 17. 
Motta’s observation is a re-echo of Bork’s assertion in his book, that for a rational and an effective 
enforcement of any antitrust law, its objectives must be clearly stated. See R.H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 
(Free Press: New York, 1993), 50. 
2 In many cases, like the US and the EU, these objectives are not usually well defined in their competition 
laws and could only be inferred from the broad legislative provisions, although the objectives in the Japanese 
and Canadian laws on competition are clearly set out. 
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A. Can the same competition law standards be employed effectively in resource-based 
developing countries? 
B. What are the peculiar problems in resource-based economies? 
C. Could resource-based economies adopt any model of competition law? 
D. To what extent is the proposed Federal Competition Bill in Nigeria (FCB) a credible 
legislative instrument to promote economic development as set out in Section 2 of the 
Bill?3 
E. Are there other tools or measures that could be included in the proposed FCB to make it 
more effective?  
 
It is generally agreed that inefficient allocation of resources underlines most economic 
problems often referred to as market failures and other economic problems. This thesis 
observes that many resource-based developing countries tend to suffer more economic 
problems despite their high level of resource endowments. It then argues that this could be 
due to absence of appropriate competition law and policy although on the surface it is 
possible to attribute it to other less fundamental factors not directly linked with 
 
3 Since 2002 Nigeria’s proposed Federal Competition Bill has been before its legislature for review and 
eventual adoption. I am not sure whether or not the same Bill or a reviewed version will be enacted 
eventually. However, provisions of section 2 of the proposed Bill is as follows:  
2. The objects of this Act are to promote  
(a) the balanced development of the Nigeria economy; 
(b) the welfare and interests of consumers, and provide them with  price and product choices; 
(c) maintain, and encourage competition and enhance economic efficiency in production, trade and 
commerce; 
(d) expansion of opportunities for domestic enterprises to participate in world markets; 
(e) and enhance the ability of small and medium enterprises to compete effectively; and 
(f) prohibit restrictive business practices which prevents, restricts or distorts competition or constitutes the 
abuse of a dominant position of market power in Nigeria. 
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competition. These other factors typically include fractional politics, corruption and lack of 
transparency in the conduct of government business. Therefore definite answers to the 
research sub-questions could go a long way to resolving the issue of efficiency of 
competition law and resource abundance in these economies. 
 
A comprehensive study into the whole system of competition laws in terms of rules, 
institutions and enforcement is not feasible within the ambit of this thesis. As a result, this 
study must be narrowed down in terms of both the historical antecedents of the subject, its 
basic standards and how it could impact on a resource-based economy. 
 
In very broad terms, competition policy can be described as all governmental measures that 
can have an impact on competition within an economy, by directly affecting the behaviour 
of the economic agents and the structure of an industry.  While competition policy is about 
economics and law, competition law is about legislative intervention in the market aimed 
at anti-competitive economic behaviours and eventually ‘market failure’.4 
 
Competition policy is often aimed at achieving an efficient allocation of resources, 
promotion of industrial, social, and consumer welfare. It is also a measure often directed to 
control the concentration and abuse of economic power detrimental to competition and 
societal welfare.5 Competition policy is comprehensive; it is about economics, law and 
 
4 B.J. Rodger and A. MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the European Community and United 
Kingdom  (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2001), 1. 
5 For detailed arguments on competition and the regulation of concentration of economic power the following 
references provide useful analyses: See G. Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 1997). See also O. Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006) and R. Hewitt Pate,  ‘Competition and politics’ (Speech made by the Assistant Attorney General 
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policy. The comprehensive attributes of competition policy indicate that it could be 
selective and relative to the circumstance of the economy concerned. Thus an examination 
of the provisions of the proposed Federal Competition Bill in Nigeria will be done in 
relation to the relevant research question in this thesis. This point will be further examined 
in the latter part of this thesis. 
 
However, the foregoing description of competition law and policy could be narrowed 
down into two divisions. The first division gives a view of a set of governmental measures 
meant to enhance competition or competitive outcomes in the markets, which include 
industrial policies (such as internal market integration in the EU and promotion of infant 
industries), liberalization and privatization, conducive market access and greater market 
discipline in economic decisions.  The second division is the adoption or an enactment of 
effective competition or antitrust laws aimed at anti-competitive economic behaviours, 
which could either lead to a distortion in a market or restrict competition. These include 
abusive trade agreements, control of market dominance with potential for abuse, mergers 
and acquisitions capable of impacting on a market structure to the detriment of consumer 
welfare. 
 
1.3 Scope of the Study 
Competition policy has important implications for development in developing countries 
and especially in a resource-dependent developing country.6  These include defining the 
goals of competition law relative to the economic circumstance of the country, the theory 
 
Antitrust Division U.S. Department of Justice Presented at the 12th International Conference on Competition 
Bonn, Germany, June 6, 2005). 
6 A. Singh, ‘Competition and competition policy in emerging markets: international and development 
dimensions’ (2002) UNCTAD G-24 Discussion Paper Series, 1. 
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of competition to be adopted, defining the power of a competition agency and the limit of 
competition in relation to other regulatory frameworks. The economies of most developing 
countries were largely subject to government regulation before the present introduction of 
competition principles.7  In terms of the subject-matter, the scope of the thesis will be 
confined to the United States antitrust8 and the European Union (EU) competition models, 
especially since both models share major similarities and are the most expansive models.9  
It examines competition law standards with a view to determine what degree historical 
experience impacts on competition in developing countries. This thesis argues that the 
experiences from these regimes could help to nurture the development of competition laws 
in developing countries. They offer an opportunity to consider the merit of the consensus 
in the developed economies that competition, in the long run, offers better results than state 
regulation considering the current liberalization programs in developing economies.10 
 
In simple terms, resource based economies are economies where natural resources account 
for more than 10 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 40 percent of exports,11 but 
in a resource-dependent economy either a single valuable natural resource or a few 
valuable natural resources account for over 15 percent of its GDP and over 40 percent of 
its exports.12   It is not all resource-based economies that are resource-dependent. The 
United States of America (US), Canada, Australia and Norway are examples of resource-
 
7 See generally, P. Cook et al., Leading Issues in Competition Policy, Regulation and Development (ed.) 
(Gloucester: Edward Publishing Limited, 2004). 
8 Competition law is commonly referred to as ‘antitrust law’ in the US but the present thesis shall adopt the 
former in reference to the two.  
9 Both the US and the EU constitute the largest trading partners of Nigeria. 
10 R. Whish, Competition Law, 5th ed., (London: Butterworths, 2003), 16. 
11R. Ahrend, ‘How to sustain growth in a resource based economy? The main concepts and their application 
to the Russian’s case’ (2004) United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Occasional Paper 7, 3. 
12 K. Chaudhuri, ‘Long -run prices of primary commodities oil prices’ Applied Economics, 2001, 33, 
Published at http://www..tandf.co.uk/journals. Last visited 30th March 2009. 
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based economies that are not resource-dependent. However this thesis focuses on resource-
dependent developing economies, such as Botswana, Angola, Papua New Guinea and 
Nigeria. 
 
It is generally believed that the level of economic development in many of the resource-
dependent economies is not commensurate to their rich level of resource endowments. 
Most of these economies are often plagued by different economic problems, which could 
be classified into primary and secondary problems. The basis upon which this 
classification is founded, resides chiefly on the common consensus that all economies are 
faced with distinct problems peculiar to their circumstances but they could also be affected 
with any of the general problems inherent in all economic relationships. The first 
classification in relation to resource–dependent developing economies includes rent 
seeking, vulnerability to external shocks, high incidence of corruption, resource curse13 or 
the Dutch Disease, while the second classification generally concerns internal and external 
distortions.14 The most prominent external threat or distortion that such economies are 
wary of concerns the issues of  restrictive agreements, merger activities, monopoly and 
abuse of dominant position, weak institutional capability, low level of infrastructural 
development and effects of globalisation.15 
 
13 The presence of a natural resource or wealth may somehow have debilitating effects or result in a sectoral 
misallocation of resources, as well as causing overall macroeconomic imbalances in the economy of a nation 
and this incidence has often been referred to as either a resource curse or a Dutch disease, a term popularized 
in the late 1970s to refer to the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands following its discovery 
of natural gas in the 1960s. 
14 M. Bruno and J. Sachs, ‘Energy resource allocation: A dynamic model of the Dutch Disease’ Working 
Paper No.852 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1982), 3.  
15 ‘Globalization’ is the term for the increased worldwide interdependence of most economies. Integrated 
financial markets, the sourcing of the production of components throughout the world, the growing 
importance of transnational firms and the linking of many service activities through the new information and 
technologies are some of its manifestations’’- R.G. Lipsey & K.A. Chrystal, Economics, 10th edn., (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 677. See also, J. E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontent, (London and 
New York: W.W. Norton Ltd, 2003). 
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 Nigeria is the proxy economy for this thesis. The Nigerian economy is double edged. It 
comprises a modern sector mainly dependent on revenues derivable from its primary 
energy resources (oil and hydrocarbon resources) and traditional agricultural and trading 
sectors.16 At the moment, the energy sector provides well over 75 percent of the federal 
revenue and 95 percent of its foreign exchange earnings.17 It exhibits most of the primary 
and secondary problems associated with resource-dependent developing economies, which 
include low level of economic development, rent seeking, high level of corruption, 
resource curse, collusion between enterprises and concentration and mergers. This thesis 
argues that some of these problems could be due to a lack of an effective competition law 
and policy. It aims to consider whether competition law and policy could solve or mitigate 
these problems. 
 
Primary resources constitute at least 25 percent of global commerce,18 but export of a 
limited number of commodities account for the bulk of the export earnings of most of the 
less developed countries (LDCs),19 especially, resource dependent developing  economies 
or resource based economies (RBEs) 20  whose percentage of dependence on primary 
commodities earnings is greater than the global average figure; in fact manufactured goods 
 
16 See the development data of world Bank,  ‘Nigeria at a glance’   Published at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/nga_aag.pdf  Last visited on 30th March 2009. 
17See, The website of the Bureau of Private Enterprises in Nigeria, one of the organizations responsible for 
advising and implementation of the Nigerian government policies’ on privatization and liberalization.  
http://www.bpeng.org. Last visited on 30th March 2009. 
18 P. Cashin et al., ‘Does the commodity price shock last too long for stabilization schemes to work?’  IMF 
Journal of Finance Development, 1999, vol 36 No 33, Published at, 
http://ww.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/cashin.htm. Last visited  30th March 2009. 
19 Chaudhuri, note 12, 33. 
20 The characteristics of RBEs shall be examined in detail in the later part of this thesis. Nigeria is a typical 
RBE. 
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account for less than 15 per cent of their total export trade:21 they account for 12 percent in 
Nigeria.22 
 
Development policies are often based on economics, with competition policy, politics and 
law being co-drivers of reform agendas, although some commentators, for example, Amato 
and Hewitt Pate have argued that competition should be separated from politics as much as 
possible and rather politics should be taken into competition through competition 
advocacy.23 Although there is no universal definition for competition advocacy, it could be 
described as a process of creating a culture in favour of competition as well as influencing 
government policies aimed at the process of competition. According to the Advocacy 
Working Group of the International Competition Network, competition advocacy could be 
defined as ‘those activities conducted by the competition authority related to the promotion 
of a competitive environment for economic activities, by means of non-enforcement  
mechanisms mainly through its relationships with other governmental entities and by 
increasing public awareness of the benefits of competition.24 The ambit of competition 
advocacy is very flexible and further examination of it will be done in chapter 5 of this 
thesis.  
 
 
21 Chaudhuri, note 12, 531.  
22 See the website of the Manufacturer Association of Nigeria, http://www.manufacturersnigeria.org/eco.htm. 
Last visited on 30th March 2009. 
23 See G. Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997). See also O. Odudu, 
The Boundaries of EC Competition Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) and R. Hewitt Pate,  
‘Competition and Politics’ (Speech made by the Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division U.S. 
Department of Justice Presented at the 12th International Conference on Competition Bonn, Germany, June 6, 
2005).  
24 See www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.  Last visited on 30th March 2009. 
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At present (2009), approximately one hundred economies maintain systems of competition 
based on law and many other countries are at different stages of introducing one.25 They 
operate as part of the structure promoting economic development and growth. It is 
generally argued and broadly accepted that such competition laws can contribute to 
improving market efficiency by promoting and safeguarding competition between firms, 
thus enabling efficient utilization of resources for the public good.26 
 
A further trend is to employ competition law as an instrument of industrial policy with 
defined objectives. This approach is not universally favoured. Some commentators argue 
that this approach distorts the free operation of the market and is as such inimical to the 
true purpose of competition and competition law underscores this. 27   Competition 
regulated by law is expected to enable an economy to achieve objectives at levels of 
competitiveness, that is, not wasteful to economic performance. 
 
In most developed countries competition laws have been accepted and tested as a tool 
serving economic development, hence a growing pressure on developing economies to 
adopt competition laws. Such pressure comes not only from states, such as the US and 
regional groupings like the European Union (EU), but also from international agencies, 
including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade 
 
25 See the website of Global Competition Forum,  http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org.  Last visited on 
30th March 2009. 
26 R. Lane, EC Competition Law (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), 1. 
27 See generally, W.  Saulter, Competition Law and Industrial Policy in the EU (London: Clarendon Press, 
1997). One chapter of the book deals extensively with the compatibility of industrial and competition policy, 
with particular attention on the telecommunications sector in the EC. See also M.S. Gal, Competition for 
Small Market Economies, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
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Organization (WTO).28 Further, whether the same regime or rules of competition can be 
assumed to be or not equally applicable to developed as well as developing economies 
remains an important consideration. 
 
Consequently, the thesis consists of two parts; the first part is divided into three chapters, 
which is from Chapter One to Chapter Three while the second part is divided into three 
chapters, that starts from Chapter Four to Chapter Six. 
 
Chapter one aims at providing background information on Nigeria and the relevance of a 
competition policy within the context of its growth and development in relation to its level 
of resource endowments. The chapter also defines the research question, its parameter and 
scope and methodology. In addition, the chapter presents a brief summary of the 
conclusions and recommendations made in the thesis.  
 
Chapter two aims at examining the problems peculiar to resource-dependent economies 
and how these could be solved. It considers characteristics of developing economies, with 
a view to determining their economic problems and how competition law could be 
promoted and thereby influence economic development. This prompts the question of the 
political sources of institutional change and whether appropriate law and economic reforms 
could be meaningfully implemented without political support and the establishment of an 
appropriate regulatory structure. The position of this thesis is that appropriate law and 
economic reforms are necessary but not sufficient; the determining factor in economic 
 
28 See R. Parakkal, ‘The WTO, competition policy and developing countries: A model of global governance’ 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA’s 49th Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, March 26, 
2008, San Francisco, CA, USA. 
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performance is the state’s capacity to implement its law and reform policies.29 It observes 
that while resource-dependent developing countries share the same or most of the problems 
typical of developing countries, they also have to confront a range of additional issues and 
problems that require tailor-made economic policies and reforms. 
 
 It further argues that these problems are the consequences of Nigeria’s dependence on 
primary resources.  The most critical among these problems include price volatility, the 
Dutch disease, rent seeking, access to energy and corruption. The combination of these 
tends to exacerbate other economic problems particularly restrictive agreements, merger 
activities, monopoly and abuse of dominant position, weak institutional capability and low 
level of infrastructural development. The chapter further states that these problems 
constitute the nucleus of the research problem of this thesis. That is, how competition law 
and policy could be employed to enhance the efficient allocation of resources and thereby 
development in resource-dependent developing economies. The thesis however observes 
that some of these problems, such as corruption and renting seeking, are not peculiar to 
resource dependent economies and therefore not primarily attributable to lack of a 
competition policy, but that competition law and policy via market discipline could 
mitigate their effects. It concludes that an examination and possible resolution of this 
problem is to be considered within the context of the characteristics, problems of 
developing economies and peculiar problems of resource-dependent developing countries. 
Therefore this chapter develops a firm foundation for the analysis in the other remaining 
chapters and the conclusion of this thesis.   
 
 
29 P. Cook et al., note 10, 30. 
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Chapter three examines different theories of competition, economic tools and their 
relevance to the substance of the thesis. This involves an analysis of the aims of 
competition policy. The chapter argues that competition policy could be used to promote 
objectives other than the attainment of market efficiency. In the process the historical 
background of the US antitrust laws, the Sherman Act 1890, is explored in the context of 
the argument for and against a multiple objectives for competition policy. The chapter also 
examines the nexus between competition and development and how this could further the 
maximization of resource utilization in resource-dependent countries.  
 
However, this chapter concludes that a multiple-objective competition law and policy is 
most probably likely to enhance economic development in resource-dependent countries. 
This conclusion is supported by the historical development of the EU Competition Policy.  
Aside from the limitations of economic tools often used in competition, available evidence 
has shown that gaps exist between competition theories and realities. 30  The chapter 
concludes that the success of any model of competition law and policy enacted in any 
economy will be determined by its objective and how well it relates to the economic 
circumstances of the country in question. The chapter concludes further that in some cases, 
using Nigeria an example, it will have to work out a balance between competition and 
regulation, especially since market discipline and regulatory frameworks are yet to be fully 
established in most developing countries.31 
 
 
30 L. Cernat and P. Holmes, ‘Competition, competitiveness and development: lessons from developing 
countries’ UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2004/1, 11. 
31 D.O.  Adetoro, ‘Can the imposition of a regulator in any liberalized energy market be justified by market 
behaviours?’ (2006) 24(3) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 401.  
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Chapter four explores the highlights of the provisions in the draft Federal Competition Bill 
in Nigeria critical to the promotion of efficient allocation of resources and thereby its 
development as a typical resource-dependent developing economy. It gives a brief general 
background of the Nigerian economy as the archetype of the characteristics of resource 
dependent developing countries examined in the preceding chapter. Its focus on Nigeria is 
meant to explore how competition policy could be effectively implemented within 
Nigeria’s current state of legal, economic, and institutional development. It considers 
whether the draft Bill is an effective legislative instrument capable of addressing the 
primary competition problems and other (peculiar secondary economic) problems in 
resource-dependent countries like Nigeria.32  
 
As a result, chapter four examines three standards of competition law - control of 
agreements, monopoly or abusive conduct, and mergers. This will be considered, with 
particular attention paid to the impact that such law might have on resource-dependent 
economies that carry with it particular problems earlier mentioned. This chapter argues that 
the wave of restructuring and consolidation that recently took place within the banking 
industry in Nigeria is a precursor of things to come in the Nigerian market.33 Since there is 
yet to be any relevant merger activities in the Nigerian economy that could be used as a 
guide for the other sectors in the present thesis, then the banking sector is taken as an 
alternative benchmark. This therefore provides a basis for analysing in more depth the 
merger provisions in the draft FCB as it relates to promotion of economic development. 
This chapter argues that restructuring and mergers are bound to increase in Nigeria, and it 
is in its overall interest to enact competition law. The chapter concludes that that the 
 
32 These problems were generally examined in chapter 2, but this chapter considers them within the context 
of Nigeria, surrogate for resource-dependent developing countries. 
33 At the moment there is a Federal Competition Bill before Nigeria’s Federal Parliament. 
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highlighted provisions of the draft FCB is expected to meaningfully contribute to the 
economic development of Nigeria but its effectiveness as a legal framework for these 
developmental objectives will be partly determined by the composition and capability of its 
competition authority, especially its implementation abilities.  
 
Chapter five further explores the importance of competition policy and a competition law 
for the actualisation of its objectives within the socio-political and legal environment in 
Nigeria. Thus it argues that certain administrative structures would have to be put in place 
for its effective implementation.  The chapter argues that the fertile conditions needed to 
grow seeds of competition are a competition culture that places great premiums on both 
competition enforcement and competition advocacy. 
 
Consequently, chapter six concludes that adopting a competition law and policy is in the 
overall interest of Nigeria and many other resource-based economies although this will not 
offer a panacea to their entire economic problems. Rather it will go a long way in 
contributing to their economic development, as the new competition culture often 
characterized by increased market discipline will promote the expected development 
through appropriate regulatory structures. However, the thesis also concludes that while 
enacting a competition law is necessary, this will not be sufficient to ensure any 
sustainable development. Rather, it recommends that its competition policy must include 
and execute the following two goals: 
• Provision of good institutional infrastructure that supports transparency in 
economic conducts, efficient judiciary, clear administrative and regulatory 
procedure plus a mix of different competition prescriptions aimed at mergers, and 
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other restrictive business practices. 
• Strategic diversification of the economy. 
 
It further concludes that adoption of a competition law in Nigeria would provide a 
necessary guide and predictable outcomes for both policy makers and investors involved in 
the Nigerian economy. In addition, while it is hoped that Nigeria will adopt a competition 
law and policy, it is suggested that its proposed competition Bill should be subjected to 
public scrutiny or debates. This would give the public, especially, a decent percentage of 
the stakeholders, an opportunity to contribute to the provisions of the Bill as experienced in 
the US before the passage of the Sherman Act 1890. 
 
This thesis further shows a relative neglect of the research problem despite continued 
promotion of competition culture by different development agencies. There is very little in 
terms of literature on the subject matter of competition policy and resource utilization 
within the context of resource–dependent-developing economies. Most of the available 
literatures focus on developed economies and the competition concerns termed ‘secondary 
problems’ in chapter two. Thus the thesis is important for theory and policy and practice as 
the dearth of literature on research problem calls for further research that could prove 
useful for policy makers. The dearth of literature on competition law and policy that deals 
with resource-based economies is a limitation that the thesis encountered. 
 
1.4 Research Problem and Hypothesis 
The focus of this research is competition law and policy, resource utilization, and 
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development in resource-dependent countries. It investigates how competition law and 
policy could be employed to further the efficient allocation of resources and thereby 
development in resource-dependent developing economies. There are several problems 
associated with resource allocation; they include rent seeking, abusive trade practices etc. 
The research problem is to be considered within the context of the objectives of 
competition law and policy and characteristics of resource-dependent developing 
economies. 
 
Economic reforms informed the evolution of competition law and policy in developing 
countries and since competition is about economics and law, economic principles and 
conclusions are used to build legal framework for considering competition policy. 
Therefore this thesis approaches and examines a number of policy-related propositions and 
legal provisions drawn from theoretical literature and competition policy. These are related 
to resource-dependent developing countries. This is further informed by the broad view of 
the draft Federal Competition Bill in Nigeria. The thesis further observes that the 
objectives of the draft Bill are a mixture of industrial policy, trade related issues and the 
core competition standards like anti-competitive agreements, abuse and dominance and 
merger control. This is evident from the outset of the draft Bill, particularly its preamble 
and in section 2 which sets out the objectives of the Bill.34  
 
The research problem addressed in this thesis is an amalgam of different issues underlined 
by competition policy and resources allocation phenomena in resource-based countries. 
They include growth, development, social responsibility and industrial policy. While trade 
 
34 See note 3. 
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liberalization is globally in the ascendancy and more natural resources are being 
discovered in most developing countries, familiarity with these countries can but confirm 
that these countries are seen to be poor, their population is poor and most of the people are 
impoverished. Although corruption is often cited as a principal cause for the poor state of 
these economies, the present thesis argues that there are more fundamental reasons for the 
current state of low development.  This situation might be interpreted among others by the 
absence of or disregard for pure market discipline and accountability in the widest sense. 
As a consequence, this thesis argues that the issue of allocation of resources significantly 
contributes to the poor state of the economies of the countries under investigation. 
 
Consequently, this present thesis suggests, additionally, that the adoption of a competition 
law and policy is an essential requirement for the smooth operation of market forces if an 
efficient and sustainable economy is to be achieved. It undertakes to explore further the 
issue of competition and the economic problems that arise in a resource-based developing 
country. 
 
Furthermore, it explores the possibility of using competition policy through competition 
laws to address these problems and thereby enhance growth and development in the 
affected economy. Thus the thesis argues that the success of the proposed FCB will be 
partly determined by the creation of an effective competition agency that will implement 
the provision of the Bill but an important task that will need to be handled with tact is how 
to educate the stakeholders, especially the consumers, on the merits and consequence of 
the Bill when it comes into force. This could not be achieved by the enforcement 
provisions in the Bill rather competition advocacy would have to be adopted as a 
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complementary tool with enforcement.  
 
A brief examination of some of the literatures examined in this study is considered 
hereunder. These include literature on objectives of competition laws and its nexus with 
development and resource curse. 
 
1.4.1 Objectives of Competition Law and Policy 
There have been different debates about the goals of competition law.  On the one hand the 
dominant view is that the only legitimate goal of competition law is the efficiency doctrine 
popularised by Richard Bork whose argument forms part of the major arguments analysed 
in chapter three that deals with theories of competition and resource utilisation.  
Proponents of this view suggest that the main objective of competition law should be to 
achieve efficient allocation of resources via the forces of competitive markets.35  They 
argue that allocation and effective coordination of means of production in each industry 
will produce the greatest benefit to society.36  On the other hand there are those who argue 
that competition law could have many objectives. There is some merit in the argument that 
competition law serves different objectives that even the most critical opponents of a 
multiple objective competition law must concede that in some instances competition law 
could accommodate objectives other than efficiency and still contribute optimally to social 
welfare. 
 
 
35 J.F. Brodley, ‘The Economic goals of antitrust: efficiency, consumer welfare and technical progress’ 
(1987) 62 NYUL Rev 1020, 1025.  
36 F.H.  Knight, The Economic Organisation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), 9. 
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Ordinarily the adoption or enactment of any model of competition law will be influenced 
by the circumstances of the economy concerned. In this regard an economy will decide on 
the merit or value whether it want to rely solely on competition law to achieve its target 
goals or whether it should adopt a combination of competition and cooperation to enhance 
its economic development. The latter approach was initially taken by Japan between 1944 
and 1969. 
 
1.4.2 Links between Competition Law and Policy and Development 
Much of the literature from the perspectives of a majority of development agencies37 and 
writers 38  agree that competition contributes to investment 39  and is central to the 
development process in every economy and particularly in developing economies, but 
competition is a process not a state of equilibrium.40 Consequently, competition policy is 
not reducible to a simple-minded concern with the exploitation of market power and the 
search for excess profits. It is in its fundamentals a matter of the creativity of an economic 
system, that is to say, the necessary and sufficient condition for competition and economic 
 
37 R. Sengupta and C. Dube, ‘Competition policy enforcement experiences from developing countries and 
implications for investment’, OECD Global Forum on International Investment VII ‘Best practices in 
promoting investment for development’, 27-28 March 2008, Paris, France. 
38 See L. Lall, ‘Building industrial competitiveness in developing countries’ (1990) OECD Development 
Centre and M. Porter, The competitive Advantage of Nations  (New York: Free Press, 1990). 
39 Sengupta and Dube, note 35, 4.  
40 Although there are two broad concepts of competition but the real world is dynamic and not about 
equilibrium. The first views competition as an equilibrium in which allocation of resource is expected to 
result in price reduction and is depicted by perfect competition at one end and monopoly at the other end, 
while the second theory views competition as a process of rivalry, it is characterized by price and non-price 
forms of competition. For more detailed analysis on concepts of competition, see, J. Vickers, Concepts of 
competition ‘ (1995) Oxford Economic Papers, 47, 1-23   J. Metcalfe, ‘Competing concepts of competition 
and the evolution of competition policy in the UK’ (2002), Paper presented to workshop on regulation and 
government, Manila, The Philippines. 
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development is an open, experiment oriented and innovative economy.41 This is confirmed 
by the increasing level of development in India, which situation reveals that as an economy  
opens to competition or to more competition, its regulation requires a different set of 
resources and capabilities to address issues that could emerge from the new structure.42 
Some of those issues will necessarily involve the need for competition laws to deal with 
anti-competitive trade behaviours like agreements, cartels and emergence of private 
monopolies in replacement of public monopolies that have been privatised, and a number 
of others. 
 
Research into the link between competition law and development is relatively small in 
comparison to research on trade policy reforms, deregulation and privatization.43  Thus it is 
not a surprise that there is a dearth of literature on the developmental consequences of 
competition law in developing countries most of which started to embrace competition law 
lately. Evenett limited his scope to how the enforcement of competition law has influenced 
different agent’s incentives to invest in developing economies rather than the maximization 
of the broader developmental impact of competition on developing countries.44 
 
 
41J.S. Metcalfe et al., ‘Competition, innovation and economic development’, in P. Cook et al., Leading Issues 
in Competition Policy, Regulation and Development (ed.) (Gloucester: Edward Publishing Limited, 88.  
42 T.G. Arun, ‘Regulation and competition: emerging issues from an Indian perspective’ in P. Cook et al., 
Leading Issues in Competition Policy, Regulation and Development (ed.) (Gloucester: Edward Publishing 
Limited, 2004), 415. 
43 S.J. Evenett, ‘Links between development and competition law in developing countries’   Case Study for 
the World Development Report 2005: Investment Climate, Growth and Power, Oct 28, 2003, UK Dept. for 
International Development, 3.  
44 Ibid. 
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While acknowledging that developing countries have some differences, Evenett observed 
that competition law could equally impact positively on economic development in 
developing countries in the following ways; 
1. Greater competition between firms sharpens incentives to cut costs and to improve 
productivity through reform, deregulation, and privatization 
2. The benefit of trade will not be realized without the potential for active and effective 
enforcement of competition law. 
3. The appropriate enforcement of competition law adds transparency to a nation’s 
commercial landscape, which in turn, attracts foreign direct investment (FDI). 
4. Greater competition in product markets stimulates both product and process innovations. 
5. Rivalry in the market for future innovations can be protected by the active and 
appropriate enforcement of merger and acquisition law which prevents, for example, one 
firm taking over another firm which has a potentially strong, but not as yet fully developed, 
range of rival products. 
 
Evenett’s assertions 2, 3, and 5 point invariably to the issue of developing a robust 
competition regulatory and enforcement sector as  a sine qua non for a dynamic economic 
performance in developing countries which in most cases lack well defined markets and 
regulatory structures. This is expected to further stimulate local investment, reduce anti-
competitive business practices, such as bid rigging. However, he concludes that interest in 
competition law is not all about creating a conducive business environment to generate 
economic development.  Rather, competition law is all about the promotion of static and 
dynamic efficiency while the decision on whether to adopt a competition law and which 
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model or degree of combination should be a based on a cost-benefit analysis. This again 
raises the issue of the debate on the objectives of competition law and the likely constraints 
developing countries are likely to encounter if and when they adopt a competition law. 
These issues are further dealt with in chapter five of this thesis, especially where the design 
and management of a competition authority are examined. 
 
1.4.3 Resource Curse 
There is no general agreement yet on the exact cause of the relative poor economic 
development of most developing countries with substantial resource endowments but 
research has shown that majority of these countries have performed poorly since 1980.45 
Rigobon and Hausmann in their study pointed out that based on the gross domestic product 
(GDP) or gross domestic income (GDI), the more resource dependent countries like 
Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela performed poorly compared with those with lower 
levels of dependency on natural resources.46 Examples of countries in the latter category 
include Mexico and Indonesia.47 This lends credence to the concern that natural resource 
or specifically oil could be an impediment to economic development and the concern has 
continued to receive attention which Hausmann and Rigobon examine in their paper. It is 
common to refer to this state of development as an incidence of ‘resource curse’. 
 
 
45 Many writers have conducted research, which show that there is a strong link between resource 
endowments and developing countries. See, J. Sachs and A. Warner, ‘Natural resource abundance and 
economic growth’ mimeo, (1997) Centre for international Development, Harvard University, M. Gavin and 
R. Hausmann, ‘Nature, development, and distribution in Latin America. Evidence on the role of geography, 
climate, and natural resources’,  (1998) Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper -378. 
46 R. Hausmann and R. Rigobon ‘An alternative interpretation of the ‘Resource Curse’: theory and policy 
implications’, (2002) National Bureau Of Economic Research Working Paper No. 9424, 3. 
47 Ibid. 
 23  
While the data in support of the concern has continued to grow, no consensus has been 
reached as to the cause and solutions to the problem. The most popular and persuasive 
explanations given so far include the following: the issue might be a consequence of the 
Dutch Disease, volatility that characterizes resource-based commodity prices, political 
economic forces buoyed by the presence of rents. 
 
Hausmann and Rigobon however assert that the reasons that have been given to explain the 
incidence of resource curse in resource developing countries could not be totally justified 
rather the apparent lack of economic development is more of resource nuances originating 
from inefficient resource allocation.  They attempted to offer alternative interpretation of 
the issue by first rebutting the reasons other writers have given for resource curse. A brief 
examination of their analysis and that of Rudiger Ahrend is given below. 
 
1.4.4 The Dutch Disease 
Increase in resource-based incomes prompts a general increase in economic activity. This 
includes increased demand for import tradable goods and a greater demand for non-
tradable goods that are produced locally. The new development often involves shift or re-
allocation of resources in the concerned economy, especially to the effect that there might 
not be suitable structures or policies to manage the sudden resource abundance or 
specifically oil boom in a case where the resource concerned is oil. This might occasion a 
shift of resources from sectors such as the manufacturing sector to the construction and 
services sectors. This was the case in Nigeria when it experienced an oil boom in the early 
70s and the level of activity in its manufacturing and agricultural sectors began to decline 
relatively to the great increase in its construction and service industries. 
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This type of development is commonly called the Dutch Disease, but this on its own, argue 
Hausmann and Rigobon, should not lead to any efficiency or welfare loss but only 
contractions in some sectors relative to expansion experienced in others. Thus since this 
cannot explain loss in total growth or slow growth, they queried the rationale behind the 
Dutch disease as a credible explanation. However, it could be argued that if the non-
resource tradables play a major role in the growth process then a shift in the allocation of 
resource can cause a significant loss in economic development. This is so because the non-
tradable sector exhibits increasing returns to scale48 and the resource sector does not, then 
specialization in the less dynamic sector as a result of sudden resource abundance can 
strengthen the argument that resource abundance contributes to resource curse. 
 
However, they point out that the argument in the preceding paragraph could be faulted on 
the ground that the converse is not the case, when the oil price is doing well, an oil 
dependent economy will be expected to perform poorly and to perform better when oil 
becomes less dynamic. Rather, most oil dependent economies experienced better growth 
rates in comparison to the economic performance of others during this period, but started 
performing poorly when oil revenues declined after 1980. 
 
 
48 M. Parkin, Economics, 8th edn., (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008) 213. Economics of scale refers to 
the phenomenon where the average costs per unit of output decrease with the increase in the scale or 
magnitude of the output being produced by a firm. Cost of output in the resource sector is not based on the 
cost per unit rather it is influenced by a host of factors. These factors include the reserve ratio of the deposit, 
demand for the product and operational strategies of the producer who might belong to group that influences 
production level in the environment. Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a cartel of 
twelve countries has a very large influence on world oil prices through its allocation of production quotas to 
its members who account for more than three-quarters of 36.5 percent of world oil reserve.-   (See 
http://www.opec.org/home/PowerPoint/Reserves/OPEC%20share.htm. Last visited 30th on March 2008). 
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1.4.5 Rent Seeking Theory 
The second explanation is that resource abundance makes societies less entrepreneurial. 
This leads to an increase in more unproductive rent-seeking activities to appropriate wealth 
rather than to create more wealth. 49  Closely linked with this, are the problems often 
associated with the sudden discovery of new wealth. These are uncertainties over property 
rights, resource income and lack of clear rules on how to deal with them. This may lead to 
slow growth as a result of inefficient prioritising and struggle over resources. 
 
In addition to this is the fact that there might not be appropriate tax measures to regulate 
the resource income. Coupled with increased demand for a share of the resource income by 
all constituencies before the income is depleted or exhausted, which could overheat the 
economy and cause further economic and social problems. Despite this, the authors argued 
that the presence of resource rent is not sufficient to explain the low economic 
development in the affected economies especially that rent seeking generally occurs in 
every economy, albeit at different degrees. 
 
1.4.6 The Volatility Story 
The incidence of volatility has also been seriously canvassed as the most likely culprit 
contributing to the low level of economic development in resource–dependent countries.50 
It is argued that volatility impacts not only on growth but also on investment, education 
 
49 Public procurement is an example of rent-seeking or corruption  activities with competition linkage and 
this is a big source of loss of revenue by the government through rent seeking officials and private persons in 
developing countries. 
 
50 See M. Gavin, and Ricardo Hausmann, (1998) ‘Nature, development, and distribution in Latin America: 
Evidence on the role of geography, climate, and natural resources’ WP-378   and G. Ramey and V.A. Ramey, 
‘Cross-Country evidence on the link between volatility and growth’ (1995) American Economic Review 85, 
1138-1151. 
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and income. Natural resource rents owe their high volatility to the low price elasticities 
they show. However, on the average, the welfare losses often occasioned by high volatility 
are not enough to destabilize an economy due to the possibility that other resources in the 
economy will re-adjust to hedge the risk associated with price fluctuations. Some sectors of 
the economy, particularly household income, might be more affected with volatility in 
comparison to the larger economy. To put it more clearly, they argue that if we assume 
there are three sectors in the economy (a resource or oil sector, a non-tradable and a 
tradable sector), the effects of price volatility will be felt more in the oil sector whose 
prices are determined internationally. As a result, the effects of the volatility should be 
seen more of as a nuisance than a curse, but it must be borne in mind that Nigeria’s 
dependency on oil resources is roughly put as high as 90 percent. 
 
In any case, Hausmann and Rigobon’s alternative explanation for the issue of resource 
curse in resource-dependent countries is premised on the argument that the issue emanates 
from an interaction between specialization and financial market imperfections. They argue 
that resource curse is as a result of increase in resource revenue that leads to inefficient 
specialization and thereby a serious reduction in economic welfare. Inefficient 
specialization used here is what happens in the absence of a large non-resource tradable 
sector, prices are not stable because of price volatility in the resource sector. This leads to 
movement in the allocation of resources and possible disappearance of the non-tradable 
sector. 
 
Consequently, they argue that rather than treat resource curse as a necessary consequence 
of resource abundance, a careful consideration of it will reveal this should not impede 
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economic development. What is required is the use of appropriate policy to improve 
efficiency and productivity in the market. This policy will include fiscal policies like 
stabilization and saving policies (first best policies). Trade and financial policies (second 
best policies) were also advocated as possible panacea to the incidence of resource curse or 
the low level of economic development in economies faced with resource abundance. 
Competition policy arguably will be part of the first best policies, which is a range of 
economic reform policies with competition law and policy as a necessary complement. 
 
In addition, another writer whose research has become significant in the examination of 
economic development in resource dependent economy is Ahrend. While he acknowledges 
other works which conclude that there is a link between natural resource endowments and 
economic development, commonly referred to as a curse, he asserts firmly that the 
incidence is not fatal and is redeemable by right economic policies and appropriate 
political structure. According to him, ‘resource based development obviously presents 
important challenges.51 These challenges are indeed serious, but they can be overcome or 
at least very substantially mitigated with the aid of appropriate institutions and policies. He 
cites the example of Canada, Australia and the Scandinavian countries where natural 
resource abundance have been effectively used to promote successful economic 
development. Thus his argument is predicated on the use of appropriate resource-based 
development strategies. These strategies must also enjoy the support of a strong civil 
society and especially in developing countries where in most cases the political structures 
are yet to mature. 
 
51 A. Ahrend, ‘How to sustain growth in a resource based economy? The main concepts and their application 
to the Russian case’ (2006) OECD Working Paper 478, 2. 
 Published 
http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,2546,en_2649_37451_36074861_119684_1_1_37451,00.html Last 
visited on 30th March  2009. 
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Ahrend also points to the need to have an exhaustive resource- based strategy for efficient 
resource allocation which must cut across all the sectors. This will provide a good mix with 
appropriate legislative provisions capable of creating a level playing field and reduce 
anticompetitive behaviours in the market. While the economies of most resource-
dependent countries used to be under state control before the present wave of privatization 
and liberalization policy, the need to develop appropriate competition policy in relation to 
their economic circumstances and national goals strongly underlies the focus of this thesis. 
 
In fact, this position aligns with the argument of other writers like P. J. Loung who attempt 
to explain the correlation between resource abundance and the negative economic 
outcomes in developing countries.52  He too concludes that the problem lies mostly in the 
relationship between ownership and regulatory structure specifically whether the resource 
income is concentrated or dispersed. If the proceeds are highly concentrated within the 
state apparatus, like the central government or national parastatals, then the state as the first 
beneficiary might politicise the allocation of the resource abundance. He argues for a 
dispersed form of ownership as a way of mitigating any negative economic consequence 
that might result from resource abundance. Thus this thesis argues the dispersed form of 
ownership advocated by Lounge could be well promoted with the enactment of a 
competition law. 
 
 
52 P.J. Loung, ‘Rethinking the resource curse: ownership structure and institutional capacity’  
Paper prepared for presentation at the Conference on Globalization and Self-Determination, Yale University, 
May 14-15, 2004.   
Published at http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/globalization/jones_luong.pdf. Last visited on 30th March 2009. 
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1.5 Historical Background and Theories of Competition Policy 
The historical antecedent of competition law in the US and EU impacts on the focus and 
analysis of the issues in this thesis to a large extent. This is for two reasons. First, the US 
competition laws have a chequered history and this have also impacted greatly on the 
development of the EU competition law and policy. Second, this offers an opportunity to 
consider the merit of the consensus in the developed economies that competition, in the 
long run, offers better results than state regulation considering the various current 
liberalization programmes in developing economies.53 
 
Consequently, an examination of the competition law standards will allow the 
determination and to what degree these standards could be adopted in resource-dependent 
developing countries. Thus there will be an analysis of the provisions of the proposed 
Competition Bill in Nigeria as it relates to the research problem of this thesis. 
 
1.6 Parameters of the Present Study 
To set up the context for the forthcoming research, it is necessary to define in more detail 
the parameters within which the analysis will be conducted. As pointed out earlier, the 
boundaries of this research are defined by the following: 
a. resource-based economy and characteristics of developing    countries, 
b. competition standards, 
c. whether competition law could be employed to solve problems peculiar to resource-
dependent countries, and 
 
53  Whish, note 10, 16. 
 30  
d. if the preceding question is answered in the affirmative, then what are the conditions that 
could  enhance an effective competition law and invariably development in a resource-
dependent country. 
 
Defining these parameters will provide a proper foundation for establishing a competition 
policy for a resource–dependent country. An understanding of the competition standards 
will provide a robust yardstick for analysing some of the essential structure for a 
competition agency and also some provisions of the proposed Competition Bill in Nigeria. 
 
1.7 Methodology 
The theoretical literature concerning competition law and policy in resource-dependent 
developing countries is still growing compared to its long history in developed countries. 
Much of the approach in this thesis use economic analysis to highlight the (primary) 
competition problems and (secondary) socio-economic problems indirectly linked to 
competition, with attention to policy design. Essentially, the thesis examines the relevance 
of competition standards in addressing the problem of resource allocation and development 
in resource-dependent countries; while the link between economics and law will be alluded 
to in order to analyse the research problems and question, the focus is on the application of 
economic theory to competition problems within a defined legal framework. This involves 
the examination of competition standards and principles, and examination of some of the 
provisions of the proposed Nigerian competition Bill. The fundamental question 
considered is the effectiveness of the application of competition law and policy to 
economic problems in a resource-dependent developing economy and how this could 
impact on its economic development.  
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Furthermore the study focuses on analyzing both primary and secondary sources in regard 
to the nexus of competition law and policy on resource utilization, particularly on how 
competition law can affect economic growth and development in Nigeria.  The methods 
chosen to carry out this research include the use of primary and secondary sources - The 
primary sources in this thesis comprise mainly US antitrust laws (such as, the Sherman Act 
of 1890, Clayton Act of 1914, the Robinson- Patman Act of 1936, and the Celler- Kefauver 
Merger Act of 1980), the EC competition rules contained in Articles 81 to 89 EC and in the 
Merger Regulation,54 the proposed Nigerian Federal Competition Bill, cases, and other 
national legislation relevant to competition policies. The secondary sources include 
competition law textbooks, textbooks on industrial economics and monographs on 
competition law, comments from government policy makers and journals. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
Theoretical literature concerning competition law and policy, development and resource 
allocation in resource-dependent countries is still in its infancy. Most of the available 
literature has focused on competition policy and development generally in developing 
countries without any special attention to the macroeconomics of development and 
competition in resource-dependent economies. Thus this thesis aims to explore and draw 
attention to the need for more research on competition law and policy within the context of 
economic circumstances of resource dependent-developing economies. 
 
54 See Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings [2004] O.J. L24/1 and Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] O.J. L133/1, as amended by Commission Regulation 
(EC) No. 1033/2008 [2008] O.J. L279/3.  
 
 32  
 
In conclusion, it is not possible to ascertain with certainty when the Federal Competition 
Bill in Nigeria will be enacted into law. This thesis argues that if some or the conclusions 
and recommendations contained this thesis could be adopted in  the draft Bill before it is 
passed into law then  it  is likely to  become a more credible legislative instrument capable 
of actualising the wide objectives of the Bill.  
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Chapter Two 
2.0 What are the Problems in Developing Countries and in Resource-Dependent 
Developing Countries?  
2.1 Introduction  
It has been shown in Chapter One that the research problem of this thesis concerns how 
competition law and policy could be employed to enhance the efficient allocation of 
resources and thereby enhance development in resource-dependent developing economies. 
In this chapter, this problem will be considered within the context of the characteristics and 
problems of developing economies and the peculiar problems of resource-dependent 
economies. It is broadly recognised that developing countries face quite a lot of issues and 
problems that impact on their development. These are often an amalgam of political, social 
and economic issues, but in relation to this thesis it is the economic issues that are more 
relevant. This thesis classifies the issues into primary and secondary problems. The first 
classification in relation to resource–dependent economies includes rent seeking, 
vulnerability to external shocks, high incidence of corruption, access to land, access to 
energy, resource curse or the Dutch Disease, while the second classification generally 
concerns restrictive agreements, merger activities, monopoly and abuse of dominant 
position, weak institutional capability and low level of infrastructural development.1 
 
The basis upon which this classification is founded resides chiefly on the common 
consensus that all economies are faced with distinct problems peculiar to their 
circumstances but they could also be affected with any of the general problems inherent in 
 
1M. Bruno and J. Sachs, ‘Energy resource allocation: a dynamic model of the Dutch disease’ Working Paper 
No.852 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1982), 3.  
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economic relationships.2 This might require different approaches and instruments to deal 
effectively with the problems.  This is premised on contemporary development in legal-
economic thought on the relationship of law and economics; since the 80s there has been 
shift a from a predominant view of law as an instrument of state policy to achieve 
economic development to a vision of law as a framework for market operation and 
constitutive part of development.3 
 
Neoclassical economists argue that the efficient working of a resource market is dependent 
on two possible factors as follows: prices must reflect market conditions and resources 
must move relative to changes in these conditions, particularly changes in price. The 
question now is – does this view explain the problem of economic growth and 
development faced by the majority of developing countries, especially in the African 
continent? Economic development could be described as the process of increasing the 
degree of utilization and improving the productivity of available resources which leads to 
an increase in the economic welfare of a country by stimulating the growth of its national 
income.4 
  
Most developing countries share similar characteristics and also face similar problems, 
particularly those relating to economic growth and development. However, circumstances 
 
2 An economy encompasses all the financial structures and systems of organisations that govern commerce 
and commercial transactions. From early times, societies have continued to develop structures and 
institutional frameworks within which their economic transactions take place. 
3 D.M. Trebek and A. Santos, ‘Introduction to the third moment in law and development theory and the 
emergence of a new critical practice’ in D. Trebek and A. Santos, (eds.), The New Law and Economic 
Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2006), 1. 
4 E. Eshag, Fiscal and Monetary Policies and Problems in Developing Countries (Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 2. 
  
35
n 
place.  
 
issues, 
like their economic structure and why some of them have only a small growth rate.  
 
                                                
have started to change in the last decade, especially for Africa and Asia (India and China in 
particular).5 In the 1960s and 1970s Africa experienced a higher economic growth rate 
than Asia, for instance Nigeria and Indonesia shared similar oil booms in agricultural-
based economies6. During this period, Nigeria’s economic performance was superior to 
that of Indonesia but its performance began to fall drastically from the early 1980s.7 This 
change in fortune could be explained on the basis of the economic structure and policy i
From the perspective of Adam Smith (the classical economist) and some neo-classical 
economists, economic growth necessarily follows a logical process. 8  They both use 
economic laws and generalizations to analyse and arrive at conclusions. It is also 
interesting to note that the growth of China has not really corresponded to the classical 
economists ‘expectation.9 Prior to the twenty-first century, and to date in most developing 
African countries, governments have been big businesses, and this partly accounts for the 
way resources are allocated and managed in these countries. It also explains other 
 
 
5 For instance, at the moment China is rapidly embracing free market discipline, and empirical evidence will 
reveal that the situation in China ten years ago is different from what obtains there now. In fact, the recent 
gradual embrace of some principles of market-based economies by China partly accounts for its remarkable 
growth and emergence as a world economic power. - See generally, D. Guthrie, China Globalization, (Oxon: 
Routledge Publishing, 2006). 
6 G. M. Meier and J.E. Rauch, Leading Issues in Economic Development (New York: Oxford University 
Press, Inc., 2005), 63. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 77.           
9 The Chinese government has been directly heavily involved in steering the growth and pattern of the 
Chinese economy. 
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 2.2 Types and Characteristics of Resources  
Resourced-dependent economies are defined as economies in which 10 per cent of their 
gross domestic products (GDP) and 40 percent of their exports are constituted by natural 
resources.10 Resources are basically the factors or means of producing goods and services. 
They can be grouped into two, namely, labour, or human resources and capital or non 
human resources.11 Every society or economy is ‘afflicted’ with the problem of resource 
scarcity. However, societies differ both in terms of the degree of resource scarcity and in 
the approaches that governments often use to treat the impact of the scarcity.12 Some are 
more endowed with either one or the two types of resources. Some have multiple resource 
endowments ranging from oil to metallic deposits (for example Canada) and some are even 
landlocked, a feature that could pose special further economic problems. 13   In some 
countries, the level of scarcity is mainly affected by the availability and level of natural 
resources. Nature remains the principal determinant for the location of natural resources, 
while their definition and use are greatly determined by man.14 While physical features 
could greatly influence how a capital resource is defined, man is the planning agent that 
continually appraises the usefulness of the physical constituents or elements of his 
environment in order to achieve certain results.15 The effectiveness of his influence could 
 
10 R. Ahrend, ‘How to sustain growth in a resource based economy? The main concepts and their application 
to the Russian case’ (Feb 2006) OECD Working Paper 478.  Published at 
http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,2546,en_2649_37451_36074861_119684_1_1_37451,00.html. Last 
visited on 30th March 2009.  
11R.O. Eckert and M.D. Leftwich, The Price System Resource Allocation, 10th edn. (Chicago: Dryden Press, 
1988), 6. 
12Australia, Canada, Norway, Nigeria and South Africa are some examples of countries that could offer a 
comparative treatment of the issue of resource scarcity. 
13 L. Mackellar et al., ‘Economic development problems of landlocked countries’ Transition Economic Series 
(2000) 1. Published at http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/tec/te-14.pdf. Last visited on 30th March 2009. 
14 J. Rees, Natural Resources: Allocation, Economics Policy, 2nd edn. (London, New York: Routledge, 
1990), 12. 
15 S.V. Ciriacy–Wantrup, Resource Conservation Economics Policies, (Berkley, C A: University of 
California Press, 1952), 28. 
  
37
                                                
also be determined with the available regulatory framework and its enforcement 
mechanism. 
  
However, there is no absolute definition of what constitutes a ‘resource’, and definitions 
vary over time, and human development.16 Nonetheless, there are two essential elements 
that influence how a resource is defined rather than the physical components of the 
resource in question. 17  These are the availability of knowledge and technical skill 
necessary for its extraction and utilization, and the need for the materials or their end 
products. Both the passage of time and human developments such as technological 
advancement, and cultural changes have continued to impact on what constitutes a 
resource.  
 
As a consequence, this difference in valuation has heightened conflicts over the use and 
management of resources, to the extent that issues like environmental sustainability, 
corporate responsibilities and other human rights themes now are important contentions 
wherever the concept of a ‘resource’ is being discussed. For example in Nigeria, prior to 
the discovery of its offshore hydrocarbon minerals, particularly in the Niger Delta, there 
were no agitations for resource control by the local population as is now the case. 18  
 
16 E.B. Barbier, Natural Resources Economic Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
11.  For instance, according to Ross the general opinion on the issue of welfare through production of goods 
and services used to hinge mainly on two factors, the accumulation of physical human and capital but some 
economist now argue that for a proper functioning of the economic system achievement of total welfare then 
the list should be widen to include the natural environmental resource endowment, to wit, natural capital.   
See- M L. Ross, ‘Does oil hinder democracy?’  (April 2001) 53 World Politics, 325. 
17 Rees, note 21. 
18 T.E. Mbeke-Ekanem, ‘Understanding the clamour for resource control in Niger Delta region of Nigeria’, 
Published at http://www.iseg.giees.uncc.edu/INCEED2005/Abstracts/Abstract_ID_330.pdf. Last visited on 
30th March 2009.The scenario changed with the discovery of oil, the concerns of the indigenes now include 
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Primary resources include fuels and base metals, and some agricultural products, but this 
thesis is mainly concerned with primary tradable resources, which are mainly stock 
resources.19 The importance of primary resources cannot be overemphasized, especially to 
resource-dependent economies or resource-based economies (RBEs).20 
 
Primary resources constitute at least 25 per cent of global commerce.21 The export of a 
limited number of commodities account for the bulk of the export earnings of most of the 
less developed countries (LDCs), and in Africa, in particular, the percentage of dependence 
on primary commodities earnings is greater than the global average figure; in fact 
manufactured goods account for less than 15 per cent of its total export trade.22  Primary 
resources generally, are very important for their economic growth, development and 
overall welfare of developing and emerging economies, but a continuous dependence on 
them seems to have some debilitating effects. It has also been argued that a relative 
significant resource endowment could lead to war and other social upheavals.23   Thus 
resource dependence has political, social and economic implications, which if not well 
managed could impact negatively on development and growth in any particular economy. 
This in essence might boil down to the features or problems often associated with primary 
 
sustainable development for a larger share of the income accruing from the exploitation of the mineral 
resources. 
19 D. Sapsford and W. Morgan, ‘Introduction’ in D. Sapsford and W. Morgan (eds.), The Economics of 
Primary Commodities: Models, Analysis Policy (Hants: Edward Elar Publishing Limited, 1994), 1. 
20 The characteristics of RBEs shall be examined in detail in the later part of this thesis. Nigeria is a typical 
RBE 
21 P. Cashin, et al ,’Does the commodity price shock last too long for stabilization schemes to work?’ (1999) 
vol 36(33) IMF Journal of Finance Development.  
Published at, http://ww.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/cashin.htm. Last visited on 30th March 2009. 
22 K. Chaudhuri, ‘Long -run prices of primary commodities oil prices’ Applied Economics, 2001, 33, 531. 
Published at  http://www..tandf.co.uk/journals. Last visited on 30th March 2009. 
23 M L. Ross, ‘Does oil hinder democracy?’  (April 2001) 53 World Politics, 325.  
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resources or commodities. The impact of these features can be exacerbated, especially 
when a country is solely dependent on them.  
 
Irrespective of any definition that might be adopted, capital resources are generally 
classified into two groups: stock or non-renewable resources and flow or renewable 
resources.24 Stock resources consist of all substances that have been formed after a long 
process of formation, which often runs into millions of years,25 and are generally taken as 
being fixed in supply. Examples of these include all fossil fuels and land. These resources 
could be further divided into another two categories: those that are consumed by use (for 
example oil, gas and coal), and recyclable (for example metallic minerals like gold and 
copper).26  The distinguishing mark between the two categories is that with the aid of 
technology, the latter could be used several times without much loss in quality, while the 
former cannot. As a result, this has generated much debate on how they could be optimally 
used in order not to jeopardize future use or availability.  A flow resource could be defined 
as a naturally renewable substance; examples of these include air, water and solar energy. 
 
Given that resources are the essential ingredients or factors for the production of goods and 
services required to meet human needs and desires, one thing that is generally accepted is 
that at any moment or given time, an economy, a firm or an individual can only satisfy a 
limited number of needs. Why is this so? Human wants are unlimited; the means of 
 
24 Rees,  note 21, 14. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid.,15 
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satisfying them are relatively limited or scarce. This is the most notable characteristic of 
resources but there are two other distinguishing characteristics of resources. 
 
First, resources are versatile. This means that they can be adapted to different uses and 
could be used for numerous tasks. Labour, for instance, can easily be adapted for different 
skilled or unskilled functions, though some limitations might be involved or could later set 
in as the particular resource or labour becomes specialized. For instance, a civil engineer 
can perform different engineering tasks, albeit to a limited extent, thus the more skilled or 
specialized a resource becomes then the more limited are its uses. 27  The issue of 
opportunity cost is also very relevant here with regard to development and resource 
specialization. At the moment in the UK, it is common knowledge that both medical and 
computer technology personnel are in great demand, compared with other professionals. 
As a result, these professions have continued to attract more entrants and many resources 
are employed to train them. Once they are trained, social prestige and ease of flexibility 
affect labour mobility. The cost of a particular resource specialization over time will 
always be at the expense of other kinds, which implies a hindrance or a limitation to the 
extent to which these resources could be combined. 
 
Second, for any given product, resources can be combined differently. A firm can always 
use its resources to produce different types of products, depending on the structure of its 
equipment and the prevailing economic circumstances. The two characteristics jointly 
 
27 Eckert and Leftwich, note 18, 7. 
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allow substitution possibilities, which allow a firm or a factory to switch production factors 
to meet changes in demand or market circumstances with minimal loss or no loss at all. 
 
2.3 Developing Countries: Characteristics of Development; Resource Attention 
Ordinarily, it could be dangerous to assume a blanket generalization for developing and 
emerging countries because of their wide and diverse cultural backgrounds, political 
differences and religious inclinations.28 Other common characteristics among them will 
allow them to be grouped together for the purpose of analysis without the danger of 
making any category mistake, especially since these characteristics are tantamount to some 
of the problems broadly recognised as their defining attributes.  Common attributes among 
developing countries allow them to be grouped together for the purpose of analysis in this 
thesis. These commonalities include: 
1. Low living standard 
2.Low productivity level 
3.High rates of population growth and dependency burdens  
4. High rates of unemployment and underemployment 
5.High dependency on primary product exports. 
 6. Inadequate infrastructure 
 
 
28 M.P. Todaro, Economics for a Developing World (Essex: Longman Group Limited, 1982), 65. 
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2.3.1 Low Levels of Living Standard 
In most developing and emerging economies the levels of living standards are very low 
relative to those of developed countries. Even among these countries, their citizens also 
tend to have different levels of living. A small percentage are significantly well off in 
comparative standard to those that exist in developed economies. These are evidenced both 
quantitatively and qualitatively in different forms that include low income or poverty, high 
infant mortality rates, poor levels of infrastructural development and distribution, low life 
expectancy, high degree of import and high unemployment rates.29 Most of the countries in 
this category are also grouped as part of the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC).30 
While it is true that available information on these countries is not absolute because they 
are based on national aggregates that could contain some serious errors, partly as a result of 
poor data collection or measurement errors, yet they remain the best estimates for analysis 
and policy formulation. For instance, there have been different population censuses in 
Nigeria yet the results have never been devoid of allegations of distortions or inadequate 
representation in many quarters. 
 
2.3.2 Low Productivity Level 
One of the problems present in many developing countries is that they are characterised by 
relatively low levels of labour productivity. It should be recalled that a feature of resource 
allocation is how to combine available resources for optimum production that is, the 
maximization of the available resources, of which labour is one; thus low labour 
 
29 Ibid. 
30 See generally the World Bank website for discussion papers on HIPC, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/0html Last visited on 30th 
March 2009. 
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productivity is a serious economic problem. In comparison with developed countries, most 
of the developing countries have relatively low levels of labour productivity. 
 
The reason for this can be explained by different economic concepts.31 First, is the concept 
of diminishing productivity which explains that a constant increase of an amount of a 
variable factor of production like labour to fixed amounts of other factors (like capital, land 
etc.) will continue to generate an increase in the level of production. Nevertheless, beyond 
a particular point, the extra or marginal increase being generated as a result of the increases 
in the amount of the variable factor will start to decline. However, long run productive 
growth could be achieved and sustained only by capital accumulation and improvement in 
total factor productivity via a provision of factor inputs, such as physical capital and 
proactive management thinking.32 
 
Second, if domestic savings could be increased along with a substantial increase or 
injection of foreign investment, then the productive sector will receive a boost that will be 
manifested in acquisition of new and modern machines and equipment that could improve 
production rate and techniques. Since the focus will now be on total factor productivity, 
further investment in continuous training for both technical or production staff and 
management might further improve levels of production. 
 
 
31  Todaro,  note 28, 73. 
32 D. Mills and A. Scott, Macroeconomics: Understanding The Wealth of Nations, (West Sussex: John Wiley 
and Sons, Ltd., 2005), 50.  
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Third, the work environment and level of income affect the degree of productivity in 
developing countries. Regulatory authorities need to adhere to rules and be consistent with 
how they exercise their powers in order to be efficient and also achieve their regulatory 
targets. 
 
2.3.3 High Rates of Population Growth   
The world population in July 2005 has been estimated at 6.5 billion persons. Less 
developed countries account for 88 per cent, while the developed countries account for 12 
per cent.1 It is also projected that by 2050 the world population will reach 9.1 billion; 86 
per cent of this is expected to be in developing countries. That is, most of this growth – 
around 2.1 billion persons - would be absorbed by the developing countries, but the 
developed countries would not be significantly affected.  Some of the major reasons for 
these are the decline in infant mortality and advances in health that have resulted in 
increased fertility ratio and a significant reduction in the death rates. As a result, most 
developing countries have a higher dependency burden to bear compared with developed 
countries. The developing countries have both the under-aged and the aged population to 
fend for while the developed countries have just the older age group to maintain.33 In 
essence, the UN and other developing agencies have continued to argue that the large and 
growing population of the developing countries constitutes a barrier to their sustainable 
development. However, this view could be challenged, on the ground that the African 
continent is not in any way overpopulated in relative terms when compared with most 
countries in Europe, considering their land mass and resource endowments. 
 
33 J. Mbwana, ‘Transport infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa’, Africa Notes, November 1997. Published at 
http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/africa/outreach/pdf/Transport_infrastrucuture.pdf. Last visited on 30th March 
2009. 
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2.3.4 Inadequate Infrastructure 
Most developing countries have either an inadequate infrastructure or a relatively 
inefficient infrastructure. The basic infrastructure services include transportation and 
communication networks. The state of their infrastructure is below the UN minimum 
standards.34  These are akin to the oil that lubricates a machine in order to ensure an 
optimum use or production, so an absence of an efficient infrastructure  or the presence of  
an inefficient infrastructure in an economy tend to hinder development, and, in particular, 
might deter or discourage both domestic and foreign investments. Businesses will be 
discouraged if they have to provide an infrastructure network because this could impact 
negatively on their profits and competitiveness in case they decide to transfer the cost 
burden for providing the infrastructure to the consumers. 
 
2.4 Economic Growth, Development and the Multiplier Effect 
The level of economic growth and development among countries in the world underscores 
the distinction between developed and developing countries. In relative terms, some are 
getting richer while others are getting poorer. This disparity has continued to be a 
disturbing issue among stakeholders, and various reasons have been given for this. Some 
of these include behavioural and structural deficiencies, which breed corruption and 
inefficient utilization of resources. The issues of growth, development and the multiplier 
effect are expected manifestations of every economic system. While the positive impacts 
of these are often assumed to tilt favourably towards a market economy, it could do better 
when supported by a robust competition policy. An open economy is meant to be 
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competitive, and therefore the rules of commercial transactions and competition policy 
within and outwith such an economy will be expected to impinge positively upon it. That 
this will effect some changes both in the short term and in long term should not be in doubt 
because both structural and behavioural changes would occur.  
 
Moreover, it could be argued that growth is predicated on several factors outwith 
macroeconomic stability, trade liberalization or labour market flexibility.35 Some of these 
other factors consist of the role of institutional structures, along with transparent 
governance of the market forces that demand more consideration. This will be considered 
in the section that deals with the nexus between competition policy and regulation. 
 
In addition, before all the issues raised earlier could be reasonably dealt with, this thesis 
will examine briefly the issues of growth, development and multiplier and their 
significance in resource allocation and economic policy. This will provide a background to 
the examination of the concept of ‘resource curse’, often viewed as a consequence of the 
misallocation of resources in resource-dependent countries such as Nigeria.  According to 
Ross, 'resource curse' literature implies that oil has a negative multiplier effect36 and, in 
support, this thesis argues that the issue of competition policy should feature prominently 
in any remedy that might be applied to correct the situation.  
 
 
35 H. Bhorat and R. Cassim, ‘The challenge of growth, employment poverty, in the South African economy 
since democracy: an exploratory review of selected issues’ (2004) 21 Development South Africa, 7. 
36 M.L. Ross, ‘Nigeria’s oil sector and the poor’ Paper prepared for the UK Department for International 
Development Trade, May 2003.  Published at http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/ross/NigeriaOil.pdf. Last 
visited on 30th March 2009. 
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2.4.1 Economic Growth 
Economic growth has been defined ‘as an increase in the real terms of the output of goods 
and services that is sustained over a long period of time, measured in terms of value 
added’. 37  There have been different theories on economic growth, from the classical 
economists to the neo-classical economists. David Ricardo, a classical economist, stands 
out as one of the notable writers on growth theories. He postulated that growth is terminal; 
that is, it is not likely to continue ad infinitum.38  The neo-classical position is that a 
growing economy is not inherently terminal or unstable, but with a given technology, an 
economy would tend to grow with full employment, which could only be limited by the 
rate of growth of its labour force.39  
 
Amidst the different positions on growth theory, the consensus is that economic growth is 
the major catalyst for achieving long-term increases in living standards.40 Gains from long-
term growth are said to be more beneficial and significantly larger than gains from 
stabilising business cycles.41 It is important not to confuse business cycle with economic 
growth; the former is concerned with the short term fluctuations in an economy, while the 
latter is concerned with a steady pattern in positive measures which focuses on long-term 
trends in the economy.42 Of importance are small differences in growth rates that could 
also have a strong impact over long-term periods.43 Since welfare in common parlance is 
 
37P. Chaudhuri, Economic Theory of Growth (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), 35. 
38 Chaudhuri, note 37. 
39 Chaudhuri,  note 37, 66. 
40 R.G. Lipsey and K.A. Chrystal, Economics  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 380. 
41 Miles and Scott, note 32, 36. 
42 Lipsey and Chrystal,  note 40, 388. 
43  Miles and Scott,  note 32, 50. 
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simply viewed in terms of living standards, this would be the easiest measure of economic 
growth for a layperson. This underscores the reason why the present and future levels of 
growth will continue to either excite or worry everyone. Why should it be so? It is partly 
because a small increase in the growth rate could really have a significant effect on an 
economy. What might appear as a small economic growth rate could really have a 
significant effect in raising living standards over a long period, because growth can 
continue indefinitely and its impacts could be cumulative.44  
 
2.5 Peculiar Problems in Resource-Dependent Economies 
Although there is nothing like excess resource endowment, a growing perception among 
some economists is that rich natural resource endowments are both inimical to 
development and a hindrance to economic growth.45 This perception has contributed to the 
development of concepts such as ‘resource curse’ and ‘precious bane’, which are often 
used in relation to mineral resource endowments and utilization. 46  This seems like a 
paradox, because abundant resource deposits should be seen as a precursor to positive 
developments rather than negative concerns. 
 
Arguments remain whether a ‘resource curse’ exists at all or whether a ‘resource curse’ is 
only a consequence of imprudent economic management. This could be because there are 
attendant risks and rewards in resource management; be they primary resources or 
secondary resources, there would always be risks at all levels of their utilization. 
 
44 Lipsey and Chrystal, note 40, 380. 
45 Ahrend, note 10, 1. 
46 Ibid. 
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Nevertheless, no matter which approach and economic policy is in place, it could 
significantly affect the ratio of risk to reward in resource utilization.47 
 
Given that all developing countries are not alike, either in terms of level of resource 
endowments or utilization, it could still be argued that most of them that are heavily 
dependent on earnings from export of primary resources still suffer from the same 
ailments. These ailments, in particular include price and income volatility, low level of 
development, internal crises, poor manufacturing sector, civil war, social unrest, rural 
energy, land tenure, corruption, rent seeking market access and so on. This is as a result of 
the peculiar features of primary commodities, physical characteristics of developing 
countries, existing regulatory structures and a few others. For example, some are deplete-
able or non-renewable and some are renewable, which twin characteristics present different 
concerns such as resource scarcity, optimal depletion, sustainability, external vulnerability, 
economic volatility, Dutch disease, high level of risk and uncertainty. An attempt will be 
made to examine the most serious among these problems. 
 
2.5.1 Volatility 
One of the consequences of relying on primary commodity is the issue of volatility, that is, 
demand and price fluctuations. Volatility refers to the feature of a commodity or market 
which defines how the market fluctuates within a time frame, usually in the short run.  
Generally the pattern of demand for primary commodities is not stable, which leads to 
unstable prices and price shocks with grave consequences for development. They make 
 
47 See generally, G. Vinter, Project Finance (London: Sweet Maxwell, 2005). 
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development plans more difficult and also generate adverse short-term effects on income, 
investment and employment. 48  The instability affecting demand and prices of primary 
resources is otherwise referred to as economic volatility and it impacts on all countries, but 
it is felt more by countries that are heavily dependent on income from the export of 
primary commodities.49 
 
The result of a study involving 92 countries shows that there is a negative relationship 
between growth and volatility.50 Natural resources like oil, gold and platinum have low 
price-elasticities of supply and as a result are prone to volatility. For example, within first 
quarter of 2004 and the last quarter of 2005 the price of crude oil was very volatile, 
although exhibiting a high price to the benefits of export countries and detriment of 
importers. This resulted in a major shift in the budget balances of most developing and 
emerging economies that are resource-rich. This prompted the argument that their 
relationship with international creditors would have to be redefined in order to reflect 
changes in economic circumstances. 51  They have had to pay high premiums for their 
borrowings, but with the increasing oil prices, their fortunes have started changing. If the 
reverse was the case and price of oil starts to fall drastically, this will affect the economy 
negatively. This underscores why resource revenue could be less attractive to risk-averse 
international credit lenders. The impact of volatility would be felt more by a country that 
depended largely on resource revenue; Nigeria is a typical example here. It has been 
 
48 Food Agriculture Organization (FAO), ‘Dependence on single agricultural commodity exports in 
developing countries: magnitude trends’  Published at 
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y3733E/y3733e0d.htm. Last visited on 30th March 2009. 
49 Ross, note 23. 
50 G. Ramey and V.A. Ramey, ‘Cross -country evidence on the link between volatility growth’ (1995) 
American Economic Review, 1138-1151. 
51 P. Munter, ‘Oil revenues lift debtor nations’ fortunes,’ Financial Times, 25 June 2005, 21. 
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established that 95 percent of Nigeria’s foreign income comes from the proceeds of its oil 
and gas trade, which stands as the most primary resource-dependent country in the world.52 
 
Nevertheless, because of sophisticated financial devices like hedging, future contracts and 
many others, it is possible to guide or manage the impacts of resource price volatility. 
Hausmann and Rogobon53 argue that the issue of volatility is an affordable nuisance that 
could not reasonably be called a curse and might not be fatal as was initially feared.54 In 
brief, it could be argued that, with the increasing globalisation of the world economy and 
its antecedent impacts, it might be difficult to sustain the argument that any significant 
welfare loss would result from resource price volatility. This might apply to economies 
which are well defined and supported by the necessary market structure and political 
discipline, but it is unlikely to expect  the same result  in most developing and emerging 
economies that lack the necessary economic and legal framework to manage the shock. 
 
Commodity price movement in the international market largely determines the incomes 
accruable from primary commodities. This is influenced not only by the level of present 
demand and supply but also by global politics. For instance, the price of oil since 2006 has 
been on a record increase, following the war in Iraq and production disruptions in places 
such as Nigeria and Venezuela. This instability affecting demand and prices of primary 
resources is otherwise referred to as economic volatility, and it impacts on all countries, 
 
52 Ross, note 23. 
53 R. Haussmann and R. Rigobon, ‘An alternative interpretation of the resource curse: theory policy 
implications’ Working Paper No.9422 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1982), 
10. 
54 Ahrend, note 17, 1. 
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particularly those that are heavily dependent on income from export of primary 
commodities. 55  Nevertheless, the severity of the impacts varies from one country to 
another, depending on the level of that country’s dependence and other factors that could 
help to cushion the effects. These effects could be either negative or positive, or both in 
some instances. These are often manifested in the quality of governance and the delivery of 
governmental obligations in the affected societies. Notable examples include various 
incidences of abandoned projects and projects that took much longer to complete than 
should have been the case. A common explanation for this has always been that the 
governments have been unable to meet their obligations because of cash constraints 
occasioned by continual falls in government revenues. This supports Ross’s assertion that 
‘the volatility of the oil sector also produces volatility in government revenues.’56  
 
Volatility affects welfare, and the poor in particular are the most vulnerable to it because 
they are affected most by all the changes in an economy and governmental policies. Even 
when the impact of economic volatility is positive in the form of increasing commodity 
prices for an exporting nation, this could still translate into serious economic problems 
unless the shocks are prudently managed. In most cases, the windfall or extra revenues 
could be wasted for one reason or another. One of the reasons is that some governments 
find it difficult to be effective in the face of increasing revenues because there is a limit to 
which they can grow in the short run, and the presence of the windfall could lead to laxity 
in managerial compliance as well as an increase in rent seeking,57 which could manifest 
itself in malpractices such as bid rigging, inflation of contract prices and so on. The 
 
55 Ross, note 23. 
56 Ross, note 23, 4. 
57 Ross, note 23.  
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windfall could also encourage political patronage and corruption in an economy system 
lacking transparent guidelines that monitor its fiscal and monetary policies. 
 
2.5.2 The Dutch Disease 
 The presence of a natural resource or wealth may somehow have debilitating effects or 
result in a sectoral misallocation of resources, as well as causing overall macroeconomic 
imbalances in the economy of a nation.58 This is often called the ‘Dutch disease’ and it 
could be compared with the ‘sudden wealth syndrome’. The Dutch disease could happen 
when the export of natural resources is increasing at a great rate without a corresponding 
increase in exports from the other sectors of the economy. It has been observed that, since 
1980, countries that were dependent mainly on oil or other natural resources have poor 
economic performance compared with countries that are less dependent on oil or other 
natural resources.59 Table 1 below lists some countries in the former group. Saudi Arabia, 
Nigeria, Venezuela and Zaire are examples of resource –dependent countries on one hand 
and Indonesia and Australia example of resource-rich countries but with less dependence 
on resource revenues on the other hand. The economies of the latter group are much more 
diversified.  
 (Fuel Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports) 
1 NIGERIA 99.6 
2 ALGERIA 97.2 
 
58 Bruno and Sachs, note 2, 1.  
59Haussmann and Rigobon, note 53, 4. 
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3 SAUDI ARABIA 92.1 
4 IRAN, ISLAMIC REP 88.5 
5 VENEZUELA, RB 86.1 
6 AZERBERJAN 85.1 
7 OMAN 82.5 
8 TURKMENISTAN 81.0 
9 SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 76.3 
10 BAHRAIN 71.0 
11 TRINIDAD and TOBAGO 65.3 
12 NORWAY 65.3 
13 KAZAKHASTAN 53.9 
14 RUSSIAN FEDERATION 51.3 
15 ECUADOR 49.4 
16 COLOMBIA 41.4 
17 PAPUA NEW GUINEA 28.8 
18 INDONESIA 25.4 
19 AUSTRALIA 21.9 
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20 LITHUANIA 20.9 
Table 1: Twenty Most Oil-Dependent Countries, 2000. 
Source: UNCTAD-TRAINS database (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development Trade Analysis and Information System).60  
 
An increase in resource-based revenues or a tradable asset, for example oil, will lead to an 
increase in demand for all goods including both tradable and non-tradable goods.61 That is, 
it would be necessary to import more tradables and to satisfy the demand for non-tradables 
by domestic production.62 By implication, this will generate an increase in demand for 
both types of goods, and the resultant increase in non-tradables will lead to a shift in the 
home-market equilibrium.63 In addition, to accommodate the changes, there would have to 
be a reallocation of resources, factors would be moved out of the tradable sector for 
utilization in the non-tradable, which will partially meet some rise in demand for non-
tradables, while the remaining rise in demand would be offset by a likely rise in the 
relative price of non tradables. However, the rise in demand for tradables would have to be 
satisfied by increased imports. This is expected to have a multiplier effect on the economy, 
particularly as it would lead to a contraction in the non-resource tradable sector as a result 
of expansion of production for the non-tradable demand increase.64 This is what has been 
termed the Dutch disease, and dissenting opinions abound warning us not to refer to the 
 
60This is available at http://www.unctad.org/trains/index.htm.  Last visited on 30th March 2009.  See Ross, 
‘Nigeria’s oil sector and the poor’, note 36. 
61Haussmann and Rigobon, note 53. 4.  
62 Bruno and Sachs, note 1, 4.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Bruno and Sachs, note 1, 4. 
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phenomenon as a disease.65  Rather, a careful analysis will reveal this is a consequence of 
inefficient resource utilization.                                                      
 
2.6.3 Rent Seeking Theory 
Another explanation or theory that has been proffered for the slow rate of growth among 
many resource rich countries is that the emergence or sudden discovery of resource wealth 
tends to make societies less entrepreneurial. 66 When a society becomes less 
entrepreneurial, it is not unlikely that its businesses become les innovative, less 
competitive and are wont to engage in certain types of behaviours that will undermine 
consumer welfare. It could be argued that, because there is a large amount of new wealth at 
the disposal of the government, businesses and individuals tend to be become less prudent, 
less management conscious and will engage in rent seeking activities that are debilitating 
to the economy; ‘appropriating wealth rather than creating wealth’. 67  Some practical 
examples of this include inflating contract costs, an increase in the incidence of 
uncompleted projects, engaging in money consuming activities that do not bring 
commensurate economic value to the economy,68 having lax regulatory authorities and 
increasing the commissioning of large capital projects that are often called elephant 
projects.69  
 
 
65 Sweder Van Wijnbergen, ‘The Dutch disease: A disease after all?’ (1984) The Economic Journal, 41-55. 
66 Hausmann and Rigbon, note 53, 7. 
67  Bruno and Sachs, note 1, 7. 
68Examples of this include hosting of large sporting events primarily to showcase the wealth and splendour of 
the country and socio-cultural events like the Festival of African Arts Culture in Nigeria in 1977. 
69 They are called ‘elephant projects’ because of the enormous costs involved the argument that they are not 
really necessary to be undertaken. 
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Further, another problem that has been associated with this issue of rent seeking is ‘the 
presence of common-pool problems or uncertainty over property rights over the resource 
income’. 70   It should be recalled that one of the problems that could affect resource 
allocation is the lack of clear and defined property rights which could lead to conflicts, 
social unrest and unnecessary agitation. One significant effect of this is that it tends to lead 
to low growth as a result of inefficient utilization of precious time and resources that will 
be diverted to conflict management and propaganda in order to keep stakeholders happy. A 
vivid example of this is the ongoing derivation formula debate on resource income 
allocation in Nigeria. The inhabitants of the oil producing regions, particularly in the Niger 
Delta of Nigeria, have for a long time been asking for a larger share in the oil income and 
for more infrastructures.71 They claim that the area has been neglected by the government 
and that the oil firms involved in the area have neither carried out any meaningful 
corporate responsibilities in the area nor followed the best standard practice in their 
operations, the effects of which they argue have continued to impact negatively on their 
environment and lives. 
 
In fact, between November 2005 and March 2006, there was a series of violent acts in the 
area culminating in the abduction of some of the oil companies’ expatriates by some 
militants groups in the area. On economic terms, the loss is enormous and might not be 
easy to quantify. One should consider various cases of intentional destruction of pipelines 
by restive militant youths, revenue losses occasioned by the various disruptions, loss of 
 
70 Bruno and Sachs, note 1, 7. 
71 See for general background I.  Oguine, ’Nigeria’s Oil Revenues the Oil Producing Areas’ CEPMLP 
Journal Vol 4, 1999, Published at http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol4/article4-10.html. Last 
visited on 30th March 2009. 
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time in contract execution, which could lead to serious pecuniary damage claims and loss 
of lives. While this thesis agrees that rent seeking is a distortion that leads to inefficiency 
in resource allocation, it refrains, however, from subscribing to the notion that rent seeking 
in this instance portrays an underlying curse; rather, the thesis argues that it is  political 
will and discipline that are lacking. Although this is not peculiar to resource-rich countries 
only, it is an ill that could affect any society, but the presence of political will and 
discipline that takes into cognisance prudent managerial and sustainability issues will do 
well both to protect against and cushion the effects of probable future losses from resource 
income, and also be able to contend against any root cause of unrest or social discontent 
towards resource income allocation formulae among stake holders. 
 
2.5.4 Corruption 
Corruption is often defined as ‘a behaviour which deviates from the normal duties of a 
public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary 
or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence’.72  This definition views corruption as a misuse of public power for private 
benefit and is a global problem but in developing countries this is seen as one of the major 
causes contributory to their levels of low economic development.73  The role actors in 
corruption in resource-dependent countries comprise the resource field operators, 
government officials and some members of the public. 74  Although there is no formal 
statistic to support this assertion, this is a common knowledge shared by many people in 
 
72 J.S.  Nye, ‘Corruption and political development: a cost-benefit analysis’ (1967) LXI American Political 
Science Review, 26. 
73 G.J. Yadav, ‘Corruption in developing countries: causes and solutions’ Published at 
http://www.patelcenter.usf.edu/assets/pdf/IPSA-Yadav.pdf. Last visited 30th March 2009.  
74 Thisday Newspapers,  ‘Nigeria and other oil-producing countries: A comparative report’  Published at 
http://www.thisdayonline.com/OILREPORTNEW.pdf. Last visited on 4th May 2009. 
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these areas like Nigeria. Amongst many other cases, a notable incidence in relation to this   
concerns tax evasion/fraud allegations against Chevron Oil l Company in Nigeria.75 The 
problem of corruption is endemic in many of the developing countries that it is not difficult 
to see its correlation with economic efficiency and development.  
 
A positive correlation of this is a great impediment to economic development, but this 
thesis argues that there is an urgent need to pay less attention to the economic and political 
personae involved rather effort should be geared towards building an economic policy 
system that will promote competitive market discipline and transparency. Achieving a 
competitive economy requires not just appropriate economic policy that promotes 
competition but appropriate laws and an effective judicial system are required, else 
enforcement of contractual rights and sanctions against deviation from the rules would 
prove difficult in presence of official and judicial corruption. This will invariably impede 
development. In support of this view is the assertion by Adam Smith that ‘a factor that 
greatly retarded commerce was the imperfection of the law and the uncertainty in its 
application’.76 
 
2.5.5 Land Tenure  
The issue of land tenure is one of the major problems in many resource-dependent 
developing countries because this defines access to land and the utilization of the resources 
attached to land. This is also particularly problematic because many of the developing 
 
75 M. Oduniyi, ‘Unveiling Nigeria’s $10.8bn tax saga’ Published at 
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/cna53526.htm. Last visited 30th March 2009. 
76 A. Smith Lectures on Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 528. 
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countries do not have well defined property rights that are at a balance with the traditional 
rights people are wont to exercise over land. 77  This has continued to be a source of 
economic, political and social friction in many resource-dependent countries. The political 
problems in the Democratic Republic of Congo have continued to be defined by the issue 
of access to land and the mineral attached thereto. Efforts to modernize land tenure and 
ownership in many of the resource-dependent developing economies have met with little 
success in the last two decades.  
 
However, for developmental purposes, there must be easy access to land which makes it 
marketable and enhances its utilization by which it can contribute to economic 
development, especially since small landholdings might not allow entrepreneurs to acquire 
land at a scale that allows maximum utilization of the other factors of production. As a 
result every land tenure reform must seek to achieve a balance in access to and use of land 
by the masses especially for agricultural and industrial use, recognition of traditional land 
tenure and uniformity in the application of the rules.78  This will then make land only 
marketable but allow its maximum utilization. 
 
 
 
 
77 L. Armitage, ‘Land resource management and customary title in Papua New Guinea: issues and prospects, 
in M. Al-Dabbagh and P. Buschenhofen  (eds.), Proceedings of the 2nd Huon Seminar – Resources for 
Science and Technology in Development, PNG University of Technology, Lae, PNG., 194.  
78 In Uganda land marketability was one of the key driving forces in its land reform process in the 90s. 
Chapter 15 of the Constitution of 1995 on Land and Environment and the Land Act 1998 were developed 
with one of the major objectives being the enhancement of land in order to promote investment and thereby 
contribute to the value of the area involved.  
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2.5.6 Access to Energy 
The energy markets in many developing countries do not function efficiently and a 
considerable portion of their rural population does not have access to electricity, oil and 
gas. 79  This has continued to impact negatively on the economies of most developing 
countries because inefficient energy markets hinder economic growth and development, 
and thereby lead to low living standards. The inadequacy of energy is compounded by the 
continual growth in the population of developing countries and their heavy dependence on 
biomass (such as wood and charcoal) which are less efficient than other energy sources 
such as petroleum and gas. Any desire for a robust competitive economy with active 
industrial sectors requires an efficient modern energy sector, which can only be sustained 
with a well-articulated energy policy, efforts are still lagging behind in most developing 
countries in this regard. How to sustain energy security remains a defining issue in the EU 
despite the sophistication of its energy markets.80   
 
2.6 Other Problems 
Given the peculiar problems discussed in the preceding section, resource-dependent 
countries are more prone to anti-competitive practices. The combination of these problems 
will aggravate other economic problems particularly restrictive agreements, merger 
activities, monopoly and abuse of dominant position, weak institutional capability and low 
level of infrastructural development.  Although there is little or no literature to support this 
claim, the link between the two sets of problems constituting the bane of the low economic 
 
79 D.F. Barnes et al., Tackling the rural energy problem in developing countries’ (June 1997) IMF- Finance 
and Development, 11. 
80 See P. Belkin, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges (CRS Report for Congress, January 
2008). 
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development in resource-dependent countries could be deduced from the foregoing 
examination. 
 
2.7 Alternative Explanation and Remedies 
Although there are still other consequences that can arise from a strong dependence on the 
export of primary commodities, yet there are other remedies or alternative explanations for 
these consequences. For instance, Hausmann and Rigobon offer an alternative 
interpretation of the resource curse. They argue that ‘it will arise from an interaction 
between specialization and financial market imperfections’.81 The basis of their argument 
is that on one hand a specialized economy with volatile resource revenue would be prone 
to a volatile real exchange rate, and on the other, a diversified economy will have a 
constant real exchange rate. This is because a diversified economy with a significant non-
resource tradable sector will be able to withstand shocks more than a specialized 
economy.82Adjusting the structure of production in the former could be a way out, while 
the latter would have to resort to expenditure switching to absorb the shocks. This 
explanation reflects to some extent what happened in Nigeria till the late 2006. However, 
this argument could still run into some problems. One is that the law of comparative 
advantage could be a reasonable basis for specialization in some economies. Thus 
achieving the right balance might be what is required to ensure optimal utilization and 
equilibrium in the economy concerned. Another problem is that, while Hausmann and 
Rigobon recognise that financial imperfections could lead to the problem of resource curse, 
they failed to acknowledge in the formulation of their model that there are other factors 
 
81 Hausmann and Rigobon, note 53, 14. 
82 Ibid., 32. 
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that could lead to imperfections in an economy, which would invariably lead to inefficient 
allocation of resources and thereby cause serious budget imbalances, and also deter growth 
and development. 
 
In essence, it could be argued that the lack of a clear market regulatory structure and focus 
on competition policy as a means of driving the economy towards constant level of growth 
and development seems to account for at least some of the ills associated with natural 
resource endowment. There must be a clear goal to improve consumer welfare with the 
available resources. Porter’s position aligns with this argument. He argues:  
The principal economic goal of a nation is to produce a high and rising 
standard of living for its citizens. The ability to do so depends not on the 
amorphous notion of “competitiveness” but on the productivity with which a 
nation’s resources (labour and capital) are employed…It depends on both the 
quality and features of products (which determine the prices they can 
command) and the efficiency with which they are produced. 83  
 
Consequently, promotion of national competitiveness in an economy has been advocated 
as another way to manage effectively a country with a large resource base. National 
competitiveness implies promotion of national productivity.84  National competitiveness 
requires that businesses in an economy develop capabilities in more and more sophisticated 
industrial sectors (like pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, manufacturing of high precision 
 
83M.E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (With a new introduction, New York: Palgrave, 1998), 
6. 
84 Ibid., 11. 
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materials, mechanical devices, etcetera) and not to concentrate in maximizing the 
advantages available in the most endowed sector only.   It is not difficult to imagine the 
likely reasons for this. One, economic conditions are not static. Two, sustainable growth 
and development demand that an economy must regularly upgrade itself. 85  Thus 
productivity must cut across all sectors of an economy. Germany’s success as a developed 
and rich economy seems to be a result of the productivity of its highly diversified 
economy.86  
 
A further justification is that common empirical evidence will reveal that economic 
conditions are not static; an economy richly endowed with a particular resource might only 
be able to enjoy its position of advantage for a relatively limited period.  If new 
technological advances bring about either cheaper methods of exploiting resources that 
were difficult and earlier considered uneconomical to exploit, or production of synthetic 
alternatives, then this relative advantage could be lost. This will then have grave 
consequences, as the literature on resource curse or the Dutch disease suggest, especially 
among developing countries that rely heavily for a large percentage of their national 
income on export earnings from primary commodities or natural resources.  
 
Nevertheless, the factual reality of competition laws and policies as either an alternative or 
remedy to the consequence of resource abundance involves serious implications and 
challenges for shaping competition law and policy in an a resource-dependent developing 
economy like that of Nigeria.  One such is that the different economic structures and tools 
 
85  Ibid., 6. 
86  Ibid , 16. 
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often used as bases for antitrust or competition analysis (that is, perfect competition, 
monopoly and oligopoly) are subject to certain limitations.87  The EC competition policy 
and USA antitrust law have largely been driven by governmental control of business 
concentration and economic power, changes in both the economic and legal spheres of life 
of the affected societies are bound to be reflected in competition law developments. For 
instance, in the USA, antitrust laws have undergone, since 1890, varying levels of 
interpretations.88  Judicial interpretation of competition matters can be consequently be 
fraught with grave difficulties when the applied interpretations are not situated in an 
appropriate empirical and economic context or in a context appropriate to them.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
Resource-dependent developing countries, while sharing the same or most of the problems 
typical of developing countries, also have to confront a range of additional issues and 
problems that require tailor-made economic policies and reforms. The most critical among 
these problems include price volatility, the Dutch disease, rent seeking, access to energy 
and corruption. These problems will further provide fertile soil for other core competitive 
concerns such as anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance and merger related 
problems especially given that many of these countries have either privatised or begun the 
liberalisation of their economies. Thus this chapter  observes that there is a strong nexus 
between competition policy and many  foundation of economic development and therefore  
concludes that the particular problems of resource-dependent countries constitute a great 
 
87 The use of economic tools in competition modelling or analysis cannot be accepted unconditionally, that is, 
without some degree of caution. For instance, different economists can analyse and interpret the same set of 
data in many different ways ;  as a consequence,  economic generalization can obviously lead to mistakes. In 
fact, one should be careful not to stick overly to categorization of the Harvard and Chicago school in 
competition policy jurisprudence. 
88 E.T. Thomas and H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law Policy Procedure: Cases, Materials, Problems, (Virginia, 
U: Lexis Law Publishing, 1999), 1.  
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hindrance to their ability to achieve economic development which undoubtedly calls for a 
more pragmatic approach that targets not only actors and behaviours inimical to 
development, rather an approach that focus on a balance between the economic systems 
and process, and the actors as well as behaviours.  
 
As a consequence, the thesis argues that enacting a competition policy as a complement to 
other economic reforms is a major requirement toward building a competition culture 
capable of enhancing sustainable economic development in resource-dependent developing 
economies.  However, this chapter also recognises that enactment of competition law and 
policy in a resource-dependent country will result in different political and economic 
challenges which are not unusual as experiences in other matured competition regimes will 
reveal.89 
 
Finally, given that competition law and policy is yet to be fully enacted and practised in 
any resource-developing country, there is yet to be any formal empirical attempt to assess 
how effective competition law and policy will impact on their economic development, so 
this chapter along with the remaining part of this thesis aim to provide some insights into 
how competition law, and policy will evolve in   practice  especially in terms of  the focus 
of the laws, institutions involved and policies.  
 
89 Ibid. 
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Chapter Three 
3.0 Theories of Competition and Resource 
3.1   Introduction 
This chapter aims at exploring different theories and objectives of competition law and 
policy with a view to determining whether a multiple objective or a single objective 
competition law and policy is the appropriate legislative instrument within the context of 
its circumstances and development objectives as highlighted in the research problem. Since 
it is generally accepted that competition does not create markets but promotes efficient 
allocation of resources in markets, the question arises as to whether the same standards of 
competition could be applied in resource-dependent economies and specifically, whether 
the efficiency goal should be the sole focus of such legislation or should it have a multiple-
objectives competition law and policy especially in the absence of efficient markets. 
 
Chapter two has shown that resource-dependent countries have some particular economic 
problems which contribute to market imperfections and invariably could exacerbate 
different anticompetitive behaviours that could arise in any economy. As a result, bearing 
in mind the circumstances of resource-dependent economies and the impact these 
imperfections, along with other anticompetitive concerns, have on their development, they 
require specific economic reforms or solutions. Amongst these economic solutions is 
competition law and policy.  
 
The previous chapter also concluded that in view of the characteristics of these economies 
it will not be suitable to adopt any standard competition model; rather they must enact 
competition law capable of fitting into their economic circumstances. This might involve 
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enacting a broad based competition law and policy, with multiple objectives. Despite the 
growing importance of competition law and policy globally, there still remains a lack of 
consensus about its objectives among developing countries. Even among countries with a 
well established tradition of competition law and policy this issue has continued to elicit 
further arguments. 1  This provides a basis for a detailed analysis of standards of 
competition law using Nigeria as a proxy for resource-dependent developing countries. 
However, an examination of the highlights of the proposed Federal Competition Bill in 
Nigeria shall be done in the next chapte
 
In addition, rather than offer definite conclusions at this stage, it aims to explore different 
approaches to the  issue of resource utilization and price system as a platform to both 
discussing, generally, economic problems and, specifically,  competition law and policy as 
it relates to different objectives within the context of resource-dependent developing 
countries and  their quest for economic development. Thus it examines objectives of 
competition law and policy from different perspectives  and then tries to see how the 
particular problems of resource-dependent countries could be addressed by any of these 
objectives especially that a ‘one size fits all approach’ will not produce the desired result.2 
 
Furthermore, this section describes and evaluates the major conceptual linkages between 
the objectives of competition law and policy, the factors that are thought to influence 
particular objectives and theories of competition. This will show how economic, political 
and constituted regulatory factors will interact to define the path of competition in Nigeria. 
 
1 OECD, ‘The objectives of competition law and policy and the optimal design of a competition agency’ 
(2003) 5(1) OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy, 4.  
2 Ibid. 
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Thus from the political perspective, this examination will assist in determining whether 
competition law and policy should mainly be concerned about promoting economic 
welfare in such a way that the behaviour of firms guarantee allocative and productive 
efficiency or that competition law and policy can be used to achieve a multiplicity of goals, 
such as promotion of employment, promotion of national champions, protection of small 
firms, amongst others. Often found between these two positions of competition law and 
policy, it not unusual to find other discrete intermediate positions such as consumer 
welfare, corruption and transparency issues.3  From the economic perspective is the issue 
of those who see competition as being determined either by the structure of the market and 
those who takes a less deterministic approach; that is, those that argue that the structure of 
the market is not sufficient to determine how firms will act rather there are other factors to 
be considered. These groups are often categorised as the Harvard and Chicago school 
respectively. 4  The last factor is the regulatory factor, the shape and substance of a 
country’s competition agency will go a long way in determining how effective the 
enforcement of its competition goals will be. This particular issue will be examined in 
more detail in Chapter Five.  
 
 
3 G. Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5. 
4 The crux of the Chicago school argument is that efficiency, that is allocative efficiency, subject to the 
dictates of the market, should be the sole goal of antitrust. The Chicago school argues that the efficiency goal 
is non-political and ideology-free: as such it is in the first place rooted in microeconomics. This has been 
attacked as an ideological claim; not devoid of non-economic concerns but underpinned, as to purpose, by an 
endeavour to achieve balance of various welfare concerns, such as employment and protection of infant 
industries. The position of the Chicago school has been additionally criticized for relying overly on too many 
assumptions and unprovable facts, on preference more on long-term   than on short –term effects and for not 
seeing competition. In contrast the tenets of the Harvard school are concerned with structural rather than 
behavioural remedies. This is conceptualised as what has been called the S—C---P paradigm, according to 
which, the structure of the market (S), determines the firm’s conduct (C) which in turn also determines, at the 
level of the market, the performances (P) focusing on   profit, efficiency, growth and many  others. While the 
position of the Chicago school has become the most preferred view, the S→C→P paradigm continues to 
remain an important tool in antitrust analysis. 
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 Before examining theories of competition and its objectives, it is in order to define, 
describe and consider some of the key concepts and terms relevant to the theme of this 
thesis. These include resource utilization, efficiency as an objective of competition policy, 
the price system and a few others.  
3.2   Definitions, Descriptions and Justifications  
An early clarification of definitional matters can help to prevent what Bork has identified 
as a ‘fruitless discourse of men talking past each other as a result of the different ways 
judges have used the word competition’.5  Cook et al., lend support to this argument, 
explaining that:    
Despite the centrality of the notion of competition in economic theory and its 
practice, its meaning and the ways in which it is perceived to work and 
contribute to development, differ widely among theorists, policy-makers, 
bureaucrats and business people.6  
 
Clarification provides a guide for the form and contents of competition law to be enacted. 
In addition, it is not least important to set properly the ambit of the definition of 
competition and other concepts such as efficiency, because the depth and weight carried by 
statutory provisions or rules on competition are not easily discernable, despite the fact that 
competition rules are usually brief and easily readable compared with clauses in other 
statutes or enactments. 7  The elimination of theoretical or other probable ambiguities 
concerning the definition and nature of competition helps prevent confusion in debates as 
 
5R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself (New York, 1978, reprinted with a new 
Introduction and Epilogue: Free Press, 1993), 7. 
6P. Cook et al., ‘Competition, regulation, and regulatory governance in developing countries: An overview of 
the research issues’ Published at 
 http://competition-regulation.org.uk/downloads/cooketal.pdf. Last visited 28th March 2009. 
7R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 1. 
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to what should be the goal(s) of competition. Some of the goals in question will be 
examined in detail after a brief introduction of the concepts in this part of this chapter. 
 
3.2.1 Resource Utilization 
 Resources are generally recognised as the basis for national security, power and wealth8 
and at the most basic level, food production depends on energy resources.9 As economies 
develop, the role that resources play becomes more significant, as was the case, for 
example in Europe during the industrial revolution, and in contemporary China. 10  
Resources on their own neither serve any use nor give any utility; they need to be 
combined towards the production of certain goods and services, but this utilization process 
is associated with some basic problems. 
 
The first problem is that in every economy  either the government or the economic actors  
determine what it wants and what it can produce, given the level of resources and 
aggregate demand in that particular economy. The basic issue again revolves around 
scarcity, since it is recognised that there would never be enough resources to produce or 
meet the demands. For example every government must prioritise its demands and choose 
among competing alternatives. The Federal Government of Nigeria may want to decide 
whether it is better to embark on a rural road network construction in order to open its 
 
8 A.V. Kneese, ‘The economics of natural resources’, in A.V. Kneese, Natural Resource Economics, (Hants: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 1995), 3. 
9 The opening paragraph of the G8 Declaration on Global Energy Security titled ‘Global energy challenges’ 
made on 16th July 2006, lends credence to this argument. The declaration starts as follows :( 1) Energy is 
essential to improving the quality of life opportunities in developing nations. Therefore, ensuring sufficient, 
reliable environmentally responsible supplies of energy at prices reflecting market fundamentals is a 
challenge for our countries for mankind as a whole.’ Published at  http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/11.html. Last 
visited on 30th April 2009. 
10 M. Dutta, ‘China’s industrial revolution: challenges for a microeconomic agenda,’ Published at 
http://econweb.rutgers.edu/dutta/FinalPekingUniversityLecture8-10.pdf. Last visited 30th April 2009. 
 72
hinterland for further development, or it might opt to modernise the transport system in the 
cities and large towns as a way of boosting infrastructure for tourist attraction. The two 
options will definitely contribute to the economy, but at different levels, and they might not 
satisfy the same welfare and political objectives. 
 
Arriving at a decision involves a value system, and an economic agent must be able to 
measure this value based on an objective or a predictable standard. The price system is a 
big component in this mode of measurement. The price system determines the relative 
value that is attached by the people to those projects or desired products; generally, price 
levels determine demand levels. 
 
The second problem which is linked with the first is the determination of what to produce 
at any point in time, the decision on how to organise available resources to achieve the 
desired production targets that will satisfy the market will also have to be taken. The 
decision takes different things into cognisance. For example, it accepts that resources are 
scarce. While taking into consideration areas requiring more attention the needs would be 
prioritised and resources shifted or moved among the areas.  
 
The third economic problem or economic decision that is usually considered is how to 
organise production in an efficient manner, which will maximize the resource inputs. Since 
profit is a primary focus in production this could only be reasonably guaranteed by 
efficient production of goods and services. According to Eckert and Leftwich, ‘resources 
are to be valued in the market according to their contributions to the production of goods 
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and services’.11  
 
The fourth problem concerns the distribution of goods and services. This is a key issue that 
underlies economic conduct in every economic system. An inefficient distribution system 
could adversely affect the profitability of a firm. The price system determines the decision 
of what to produce, how to produce it and for whom a product would be produced all 
together. For instance, for an individual or a firm, distribution of products will be hinged 
on two factors; these are how these resources could be combined (both in terms of quantity 
and quality) and the probable price to be paid. 
 
Finally, if resource allocation impinges on profitability, then it will necessarily impact on 
income distribution. Income distribution depends heavily on resource ownership and 
efficient utilization of the resources. The issue of resources ownership also has a 
fundamental relationship with property rights. Ownership could pose a serious problem 
whenever it is not properly defined; for example many secession problems in international 
law could have been averted, had property rights been well defined and opened to 
competitive forces.12 In a situation where rights and control of the use of natural resources 
are well defined, this will give room to more transparency and accountability in the 
exercise of those rights. Since every member of the society is not able to exercise these 
rights individually they act as control valve to the exercise of those rights by either a few 
elected officials or un-elected government officials.   Thus competition policy could reduce 
 
11 R.O. Eckert and M.D. Leftwich, The Price System Resource Allocation, (Chicago: Dryden Press, 1988), 
20. 
12 P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, ‘The political economy of secession’ (2006) Published at 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0144/self-
det.pdf#search=%22The%20Political%20Economy%20of%20Secession%E2%80%99%2C%22. Last visited 
30th April 2009. 
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the incidence of rent seeking as a result of problems like common pool and resource 
income allocation formulae. These will be further examined in the latter part of this thesis. 
 
3.2.2 Price System and Welfare 
Since welfare is recognised as being essential for the growth, development and sustainable 
stability of every society, it follows that to achieve an efficient synergy of these factors, the 
available resources in any given society must be utilized in such a way as to yield 
maximum contributions or outputs. Yet human history does not tell us that achieving that 
target is quite simple. There remain forces that might or might not make them realisable. 
Man has not been known to always follow prudent management agenda independently; 
rather scarcity, time and necessity have continued to be the conditioning forces.  
 
Common understanding suggests that every economic agent faces challenges in an attempt 
to make rational choices in the process of resource allocation, which process involves 
weighing up marginal costs and marginal benefits. However, the issue goes deeper than 
how choices are made. The consequences of those choices are very important as well. For 
instance, it is generally accepted that one of the functions of the price system is the 
resolution of the problem associated with externalities.13 It is accepted that markets work 
well when costs and benefits of goods are well reflected in their prices, but this is not 
usually the case. Thus an ‘externality exists when the production or consumption of a good 
directly affects businesses or consumers not involved in buying and selling it and when 
those spill-over effects are not fully reflected in market prices’. 14  This is a common 
problem in most developing countries because of heavy involvement of governments in 
 
13 R. Dorfman, The Price System (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), 7. 
14 D. Begg, et al., Economics   (Berkshire: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 2000), 48. 
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business operations and the fact that many state owned companies enjoy government 
support in form of grants and final subsidies which allow cross-subsidization and 
invariably inefficient resource allocation. For instance the problem of energy access in 
Nigeria is due more to the former culture of government support rather than the energy 
sector being operated on a fully commercial principle that could sustain investment and 
consumer expectations in the sector. 
 
Moreover, another problem that comes into consideration along with the issue of 
externalities when dealing with resource allocation is the problem of social cost. Different 
studies have shown that the rational approach of weighing the effect and the cost of one 
party’s action against that of another person might not give a desirable welfare result.15 
According to Coase, a desirable option will involve considering the total effect which 
might comprise various social arrangements within the context in which decisions and 
choices have to be made.16 
 
Some of these problems are interwoven and the resolution of one might offer a partial 
solution to the resolution of the rest. It is not possible that all of these   problems could be 
totally resolved at one point in time, but the price system will go a long way in offering 
solutions to them, especially when ‘bargaining, contracting and enforcement costs are 
relatively low’.17  
 
Those aforementioned problems in essence constitute the first hurdle necessary to be 
overcome in resource utilization in every economic system and how well they are handled 
 
15 R.H. Coase, ‘The problem of social cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law Economics, 1. 
16 Ibid., 23.  
17  Eckert and Leftwich, note 11, 6. 
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will also influence the level of productivity in any economy, thus the need for a system or 
framework that favours free market operation. If this is lacking, competitive and other 
economic problems are likely to come up and especially in resource-dependent countries 
with their peculiar characteristics and particular problems. As earlier stated these problems 
are inimical to economic development. For example, bid rigging, rent-seeking and 
corruption and so on are hindrances to productive investment which is meant to contribute 
to economic development. According to Lewis, ‘it is the habit of productive investment 
that distinguishes rich nations from poor nations, rather than differences in the respect 
accorded to wealthy men.’18 This assertion supports the argument of this thesis that an 
abundant or high level of resource endowment is not sufficient for growth and economic 
development, but a successful operation of the price system, sound economic structure and 
a vibrant competition policy might be the keys required to open the road to growth and 
development for developing countries.19 Lewis went further to say that: 
The really significant turning point in the life of a society is not when it begins 
to respect wealth, as such, but when it places in the forefront productive 
investment and the wealth associated therewith. 
 
It could be argued that most of the extractive industries around the world have always been 
serious scenes of economic and competition activities in both developed and developing 
countries, but to date only a few resource-dependent developing countries could be seen to 
be displaying a commensurate level of economic development. Consider for instance the 
early stages of hydrocarbon exploration and development in the US and Europe as 
 
18 W.A.  Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth (London: George Allen Unwin Ltd., 1953), 28. 
19 A brief incursion into the rise of Japan especially from its war ruins to its bubbling status among developed 
countries could throw more light on this issue. See generally, V. Argy L. Stein, The Japanese Economy 
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997). 
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evidenced in Yergin’s book, The Prize.20 The book also highlights some of the competition 
issues and political schemes often involved in natural resource allocation. There is ample 
evidence to suggest the positive impacts of the resource abundance in these places. 
 
However, wealth creation is not automatic while one is engaged in production. To succeed 
in adding value to a combination of resources, strategic steps have to be pursued. Although 
on a small and subsistence level, individuals could manage to utilize or allocate resources 
to take care of their needs, but this is subject to changes, especially with regard to a whole 
economy, in circumstances such as population increase and environmental changes. This 
method has some shortcomings which include increased pressure on available resources as 
a result of which other problems might arise. Some of these other problems will include 
how to define and protect individual property rights, anticompetitive business practices and 
resolution of disputes. The same might be said for societies at large; this problem might 
have influenced the substance of an article by Hardin.21  He observed that in order to 
accommodate the reasonable expectations of the members of a society, along with the need 
to sustain available resources the same basic rights to or hold on these resources must be 
given up for more pragmatic methods. 
 
To this extent, it can be argued that the price system alone is not enough to guarantee an 
effective resource allocation, especially since certain behaviours incidental to the operation 
of the price system are inimical to the economy or the welfare of the society. 
 
20 See generally, D. Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money Power (New York: Simon Schuster, 
1990). The novel won a Nobel award for its contribution in showcasing the economic and political impact of 
the oil and gas endowment on both the resource countries and multinational companies involved in the field.  
21 G. Hardin, ‘The tragedy of the commons’ (1968) 162 Science, 1243-1248. 
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3.3 Theories of Competition Law and Policy 
 There is a rich literature concerning the theories and enactment of competition law and 
policy but it is possible for the purpose and interpretation of competition policy to change 
without any significant change in the law itself. This is due to the flexible nature of the 
legislation which permits an open ended interpretation.22 As a result competition matters 
could be said to go beyond the legislative texts and its interpretation but the specific 
economic and political policies that is behind the law at the time of its enactment. This 
informs the consideration of theories and objectives of competition law and policy in this 
chapter. Further at the outset it is necessary to emphasise that competition policy and 
competition law are not to be mutually confused in policy debates.23 Competition policy is 
economic, concerned with economic goals, structures, conduct, effects;24 certain tools or 
instruments for its successful implementation are available. 25 One of them is competition 
law; which is about legislative intervention in the market, aimed at controlling and 
eliminating anti-competitive economic behaviour and possible ‘market failure’.26  It is like 
regulation, another subset of one of the instruments of competition policy. Competition law 
has been described as ‘a complex and often highly technical subject, which does not lend 
itself to easy summary or concise clarification’.27 Competition law focuses in the first 
 
22 Monti, note 3, 3. 
23 S. J. Evenett, ‘What is the relationship between competition and policy and economic development’ (2005) 
Published at www.evenett.com/chapters/competitionlawandeconomicdevelopment150305.pdf. Last visited 
on 30th March 2009. 
24 J. Faull and A. Nikpay (eds.), The EC Law of Competition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 4. 
25 The nomenclature adopted in any case should not be a limitation to the achievement of the law rather the 
focus should be how to make the law effective. 
26 B.J. Rodger and A. MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the European Community and United 
Kingdom 3rd ed. (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2004), 1. 
27 D.G. Goyder, EC Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3. 
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place on the behaviour of private economic agents while competition policy deals more 
with both private and governmental action
 
The requirements of ‘pragmatic’ enforcement and proper management of competition 
policy underscores the importance of due regard to economics in competition law 
implementation. Competition policy or antitrust is not primarily concerned with economics 
but market power.29 Competition policy is mainly concerned with the manner and effect of 
using economic power by private persons on one hand, and the role of competition regimes 
on the other hand. This informs the need to consider various definitions that have been 
given to the subject and the intended effects of the goals of competition in some 
competition regimes. 
 
Introducing antitrust law, Richard Posner highlighted the concern about the definition of 
competition law and its impact on judicial interpretation:  
There are federal antitrust statutes, and they are brief and readable compared to 
the Internal Revenue Code. But their operative terms ‘restraint of trade,’ 
‘substantially to lessen competition,’ ‘monopolise’ – are opaque; and the 
congressional debates and reports that preceded their enactment and other 
relevant historical materials cast only a dim light on the intended meaning of 
the key terms.30 
 
28 B. Hoekman and P.M Holmes, ‘Competition policy, developing countries and WTO’ (Sep.1999) FEEM 
Working Paper No.66-99. 
29 F. Ross, Principles of Antitrust (New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1993). 
30 Posner,   note 7. 
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He has additionally argued that courts in the USA have spent many years interpreting or, 
perhaps more accurately, supplying their own meanings.31 Posner’s argument that statutes 
require to be interpreted by courts is in line with the common view that prevailed until the 
end of the 1990s, to the effect that the ongoing debate on competition policy, though it 
might appear overheated, is unlikely to cease, rather the debates on competition’s ideology 
reduced in developed countries.32 Such observations necessarily raise queries and serious 
concerns. Posner’s argument could possibly be supported by the fact that competition 
issues have phenomenally deep economic roots 33 which constitute a major part of the 
fabric of every society; which in effect impacts on the allocation of resources.   
 
Competition has also been defined as ‘a body of law that seeks to assure competitive 
markets through the interaction of sellers and buyers in the dynamic process of 
exchange’. 34  The form of ‘assurance’ implied in this definition is what Rodgers and 
MacCulloch also regard as an ‘intervention’ of competition in the market place in order to 
fix any problem affecting the competitive process or when market failure arises. 35  
 
Therefore, if could be argued that competition symbolises the fundamental and essential 
principle of the modern industrial order (capitalism) which, if removed, could either 
destroy or significantly transform an economic system. If this applies to developed western 
countries then it will apply to resource-dependent developing countries bearing in mind 
 
31 Ibid. 
32 H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2005).  
33 R. Whish, Competition Law (London: Butterworths, 2004), 91. 
34 E.T. Sullivan and J.L., Harrison, Understanding Antitrust and Its Economic Implications (Newark: 
Matthew Blender and Co.Inc. Lexis Nexis Group, 2003), 1. 
35 Rodger and MacCulloch, note 26. 
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their particular economic circumstances that have contributed into their low level of 
economic development.36 It is of particular importance to examine theories and description 
of competition in the next sub-sections. This will allow us to determine whether it is every 
aspect of competition policy that should be enacted and also to allow us to form a 
reasonable degree of certainty or predictability necessary in any analysis on competition 
matters, especially by competition and enforcement agencies.  
 
3.3.1 Competition as a Process of Rivalry  
A popular theory of competition is that it is a process of rivalry.  Competition is generally 
understood as the act or action of seeking to gain what another is also seeking to gain at the 
same time, usually under fair or equitable rules and circumstances: business people may 
define it as a common struggle or rivalry against other businesses or firms for patronage; it 
may be envisaged on the basis of other strategies and not necessarily as the basis of 
strategic price differentials. 37  This aligns with the definition given by Adam Smith 
describing competition as rivalry in a race to get limited supplies, 38 effective competition 
has been defined as a rivalry process-taking place for patronage among independent sellers 
in a market.39 
 
The theory of competition by Smith sees competition as a law of nature, which implies, 
among other consequences, survival of the fittest in a struggle involving individuals as well 
as groups. A probable consequence of the two forms of struggle or rivalry (between (i) 
 
36 I.W. Howerth, ‘Competition, natural and industrial’ (1912) 22(4) International Journal of Ethics 399-419. 
37 F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, (Chicago: R and McNally and Co, 
1970), 16 
38 A. Smith, An Inquiry to the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations of Adam Smith, 1776, Published at 
http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-index.htm. Last visited on 30th March 2009. 
39 Scherer, note 37, 15. 
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individuals and/or (ii) groups) can be the elimination of competition resulting in possible   
cooperation expected from intelligent market participants in order to achieve success in a 
common struggle against nature.40 On the face of it, this theory fails to provide any criteria 
that could be used to gauge the level or intensity of the rivalry and its consequences, all 
considered to be necessary for effective competition under the given circumstances. 
 
As a point of critique, the absence of clear criteria or benchmark invariably leads to ‘the 
erroneous conclusion that elimination of rivalry must always be deemed anti-competitive 
or restrictive to competition law’.41 This has led to a wrong interpretation of ‘competition’ 
in the US in the not too distant past.42 While market share may be of prime importance, in 
the EU cases involving mergers and acquisitions, would not be blocked outright, that is, 
without a normatively binding economic and legal analysis.43 The result of the analysis 
may be to unveil that the merger involves positively convincing benefits for the consumers 
parallel to better economic performance and less distortion in competition.   
 
The process of rivalry may not be taken as an adequate description of an ideal theory of 
competition, because economic processes involve, inter alia, research and development (R 
and D) and the emergence of economies of scale; these generally tend to promote 
consumer welfare and competition. Such a development may result in the elimination of 
rivalry as a consequence of competition; legitimate competition is present in every 
 
40 Howerth, note 36, 403. 
41 S. Bishop and M. Walker, Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts Application and Measurement, 
1st ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell), Para 2.10. 
42 Bork, note 5, 58. According to Bork this occurred in the case of White Motor Co v United States 372  US 
253 (1963). 
43 See, Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004; (2004) O.J.L 24/1.    
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economic intercourse between productive and able-to-compete enterprises.44 A resource-
dependent economy might want to exclude certain sectors like the labour market, 
agriculture and R and D from the effects of competitive system, as these sectors are often 
neglected in preference of other sectors directly related to the resource sectors which also 
offer a higher rate of dividends on investment.45 In essence, if the process of rivalry is 
accepted as a logical part of effective competition, its consequences presuppose then the 
elimination of some form of rivalry and the promotion of results in the form of advantages. 
The advantages need not be sanctioned so long as they lie within the limits of established 
rules and regulations. Rivalry is not an end in itself so it is important not to wholly 
identified competition with rivalry, a position enhanced by the writings of the Chicago 
School, the school debunked the old position before the 80s in the US antirust that 
concentration is always bad.46 
 
3.3.2 Competition as an Absence of Restraint 
Effective competition has been defined as the absence of restraints, which is synonymous 
with absence of any commercial restraints imposed by law, regulations or any form of 
contract on a firm’s economic ventures.47 However, such a conceptual approach reflects 
the presence of a flaw, because all contracts, on which economic activities are hinged, 
necessarily involve one or another form of restraint. Therefore, an absence of commercial 
 
44 Bork, note 5, 58.    
45 Articles 32 to 38 of the EC Treaty subject agriculture to a special regime. 
46  Bork, note 5, 58. 
47 Chicago Board of Trade v United States 246 US 231 (1918). In fact this was not the general attitude of the 
courts during the infancy of the Sherman as the court took a different approach in  Standard Oil Co of New 
Jersey v United States 221 US 1 (1911). In this case the court recognised that all commercial contacts impose 
some form of restraints on trade and so it had to devise ’a rule of reason’ to determine whether any specific 
action was legal under its antitrust laws.  An action will be adjudged legal if it only had an ancillary 
consequence of reducing competition. 
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restraints would not be an acceptable definition of effective competition.48 Many of the 
decisions of the Court of First Instance (CFI) show that there are other standards apart 
from an absence of restraints determining what constitutes effective competition.49  
 
3.3.3 Competition as a State of Perfect Competition 
Another approach to the theory of competition has been to equate it with a situation 
whereby a single firm is unable to influence the market price independently. 50  This 
obviously fits the economic model or scenario of perfect competition. The model 
envisaged is that in a particular market there are many buyers and many sellers; the 
product is homogeneous; there is access to perfect information by both buyers and sellers; 
and there are no barriers to entry and exit from the market. The implications of this model 
can be valid only to the extent that the assumed characteristics of the market exist as real in 
the real world. It is however not the case that such conditions are obtainable in the real 
world;51 therefore, a theory of competition based solely on the analysis of the model in 
question would not prove to be very useful and practical for purposes of competition 
policy.  
 
3.3.4 Competition as a State of Affairs that Maximizes Consumer Welfare 
The most popular theory of competition is that which sees competition as designating a 
state of affairs in which consumer’s welfare cannot be increased by moving to an 
alternative state of affairs through the intervention of competition law, which is a state in 
 
48 Bishop and Walker, note 41, para 2.09. 
49Bishop and Walker, ibid.  See Case C-234/89 Delimitis V Henninger Brau AG [1991]ECR 1-935 
50 G.J. Stigler, The Theory of Price, 3rd edn.  (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 87-88 
51 Although it is possible to have one or two of the conditions present in a setting, it is unusual to have a 
convergence of all those features. 
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which none of the parties could be made better off without someone being made worse off. 
This state is often referred to as Pareto optimal, which is solely premised on the concept of 
productive and allocative efficiency in welfare economics.52  The types of efficiency make 
up the total efficiency that determines the level of society’s economic wealth otherwise 
called ‘consumer welfare’ by the Chicago School.53 Consumer welfare is often argued to 
be optimised or maximized by efficient resource allocation.  The whole essence of antitrust 
can mainly be described as an effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing 
productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or net loss to consumer.54 
 
However, consumer welfare is not tantamount to ‘consumer well-being’ as this suggests 
ordinarily that it is for the enhancement of consumer interests. Consumer welfare envisage 
here is economic efficiency and is not concerned with protection of consumer interests. A 
close look at many of the competition statutes will reveal that consumer welfare theory 
does not constitute the only foundation of their statutes.  
 
Consequently, it  is very difficult to advocate an ideal competition law based on just one of 
the above cited definitional perspectives or theories; yet it is clear that competition is based 
on factors, forces and outcomes all produced by a market characterized by certain features 
that lend themselves to real life situations and possible regulatory intervention. However, 
bearing in mind the circumstances of the resource-dependent countries any competition 
theory or theories favoured must address at least four cardinal issues as follows: First, it 
 
52 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Case, and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004) 10 
53 See note 4. 
 
54 Bork, note 5. 
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must address the need to prevent firms from entering any vertical or horizontal agreements 
which are likely to restrict competition between themselves or with other parties. Second, 
it will need to prevent the abusive use of market power by either a private or government 
monopolist. Third, it will need to ensure that where perfect competition is not attainable 
there is an alternative workable competition.55  Fourth, it will need to pay attention to 
mergers and acquisitions that may affect its market structure. In short these issues will 
need to be clarified within the context of other issues , which is the need to settle the 
definite goals or objectives a competition law and policy intend to pursue leaving them to 
what Bork calls ‘a cornucopia of social values, all of them rather vague and undefined but 
infinitely attractive. 
 
 3.4 Objectives of Competition Law 
Objectives of most competition law regimes are not often stated expressly in the statutes 
rather they are often inferred from the legislative provisions and judicial decisions 
consequent to them.56  There are often many inter-country differences in the substance and 
scope competition law and policy. 57  These are usually revealed by the objectives as 
contained in the legislative text across countries and the judicial interpretation of these 
texts. The importance attached to a competition law’s main objective depends on two 
considerations. The first involves the intermediate and ultimate goals of the law, which is 
also conditioned by the expected benefits.58 The intermediate goals are often based on the 
promotion of efficiency, it could be short term and related solely to economic principles 
 
55 For a general review see, J.M. Clark, ‘Toward a concept of workable competition’ (1940) 30 American  
Economic  Review, 241-256; S.H Sosnick ‘A critique of concepts of workable competition’ (1958) 72 
Quarterly Journal of  Economics,  380-423 
56 C.D. Ehlermann and L.L. Laudati, (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 1997: Objectives of 
Competition Policy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), ix. 
57 R. Adhikari and M.Knight-John ‘What type of competition law and policy should a developing country 
have?’ (2004) South Asia Economic Journal, 3 
58 Ehlermann and Laudati, note 56. 
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while the ultimate goals often comprise economic and non economic factors aimed at 
general development of an economy and the focus or approach it wants to take. The second 
consideration is the approach that competition law takes to pursue its objective. This could 
be a consumer well-being approach or a public interest approach or a total welfare 
approach. The first approach, consumer well-being approach, prohibits the exercise of 
market power through collaboration, conducts or transactions that lead to reduction in 
output and price increase.59  This model considers seriously and argues against wealth 
transfer, especially from consumers to producers. The public interest approach is the model 
that gives consideration to other non-economic factors along with economic efficiency in 
its assessment and promotion of consumer welfare or competition policy. The last, which 
is the total (economic) approach, considers the main goal of antitrust as the maximization 
of wealth by allocating resources primarily based on the market forces. This has become 
the most dominant model of competition and is exemplified by the EU and the US 
competition law regimes.  
 
The different variation in the objectives of most countries’ competition law suggests that it 
will be inappropriate to isolate a country’s competition legislation from its overall public 
policy. Thus a country’s background and vision will play a significant role on the form and 
substance of its competition law and policy.60 For example the historical and political 
background is very much reflected in the South African Competition Act, the law among 
other economic concerns aims to promote employment and spread of ownership for the 
benefit of the historically disadvantaged people. Any policy based on well-articulated goals 
and objectives will lend itself to easier administration and implementation, in addition to 
 
59 R.S. Khemani and R. Schone, ’Competition policy objectives in context of a multilateral competition code’ 
in C.D. Ehlermann and L.L. Laudati, (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 1997: Objectives of 
Competition Policy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), 187. 
60 The Competition 89, 1998 South Africa.  
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being amenable to reforms as circumstances may dictate.  The issue of goals and objectives 
of competition law are part of the major difficulties likely to confront a developing country 
intending to enact competition law. 61  Furse’s argument agrees with this view on the 
challenging role of competition policy and competition law in emerging national 
economies. He says that ‘competition policy being a complex interplay of positive 
economic theory and normative social–political considerations may result in a policy that 
may be more or less clearer than alternatives’.62 
 
This observation matters for several reasons: (1) it is necessary to know and understand the 
goal of competition policy in order to know and recognize its consequential benefits; (2) a 
knowledge of competition policy goals will provide a basis to determine the level of 
performance or success of the policy , without which it might prove difficult to suggest or 
carry out any reasonable reform(s) ; (3) as empirical records on developing countries show, 
when knowledge about the competitive process increases, the success of the 
implementation of most policies is partially dependent on the degree of patronage or 
support from the average citizens who are often suspicious of the motives of their 
governments; (4) the importance attached to objectives of  competition policies has 
continued to evolve.  
 
Therefore, policy makers in developing countries have to be careful to ensure that the goals 
and objectives of competition law and policy are well articulated, in a manner that could be 
easily appreciated by the stakeholders. A balance needs to be struck between the present 
 
61 B.A. El Dean and M. Mohieldin, ‘On the formulation and enforcement of competition law in emerging 
economies: the case of Egypt’ (September 2001), Working Paper 60, The Egyptian Centre for Economic 
Studies, Cairo. 
62 M.  Furse, ‘The role of competition policy’ (1996) 4 ECLR 250. 
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economic status of developing countries and their long-term objectives for sustainable 
development. The importance of ensuring this balance cannot be overemphasized, as 
shown by several debates before and since the passage of the American Sherman Act in 
1890. 
 
 There is broad agreement that the major role of competition law and policy is to advance 
competition as a factor that delivers benefits to society, but in most jurisdictions there is no 
unanimity on the goal(s) of competition laws.63 Thus, Bork’s assertion that: 
Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a firm answer 
to one question: What is the point of the law - what are the goals? Everything 
else follows from the answer we give. Is the antitrust judge to be guided by one 
value or by several? If by several, how is he to decide cases where a conflict in 
value arises? Only when the issue of goals has been settled is it possible to 
frame a coherent body of substantive rules.64  
 
With reference to the preceding paragraph, the present section proposes to examine the 
different goals and objectives of competition policy. Some of the arguments that have been 
used either in support or against different objectives of competition policy will be 
additionally considered, as particularly important points related to the  definition that 
‘competition law concerns intervention in the market place in order to correct some 
problems or rectify a market failure’. 65  A related issue is whether market failure, as 
 
63 R.H. Lande, ‘Wealth transfers as the original primary concern of antitrust: the efficiency interpretation 
challenged’ (1982-1983) 34 Hastings L.J. 67. 
64 Bork, note 5, 50. 
65 Rodger and MacCulloch, note 26. 
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experienced in developed economies, is generically the same as that in developing 
economies, especially in a resource-dependent or resource-based developing economy 
(RBE): it will be investigated whether all systems of competition policy have or should 
have, as common, the same objectives and standards. Rodgers and MacCulloch argue that, 
at a basic level, competition policy systems do not start with the same objectives and 
standards. A position confirmed by the World Bank and OECD report.66  
 
It is generally agreed that the objectives of competition law are to deliver and maintain 
benefits accruable from competition in a market, but which are not obtainable from an 
economy that is not subject to free operation of the laws of supply and demand. According 
to Vickers and Hays, ‘competition policy is to promote and maintain the process of 
effective competition so as to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources’.67 One may 
be quick to agree with this view and infer from this assertion that the goal of competition 
policy is primarily economic, but this might not necessarily be so, as submitted below: the 
phenomenon of resource allocation in resource-dependent developing countries involves 
political, legal and social considerations as much as economic considerations and goals 
meant to preserve the competitiveness of the markets.68  
 
As a result competition policy would be required to address other secondary and particular 
problems in resource-dependent countries. These will include the problem of corruption, 
rent seeking, access to energy, employment, protection of small firms and a few others. 
 
66 World Bank and OECD, A Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy 
(Paris: World Bank and OECD, 1997), 2. 
67J. Vickers and D. Hay, Economics of Market Dominance, in J. Vickers and D. Hay (eds.), The Economics of 
Market Dominance, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987,) 2. 
68 Ibid., 2. 
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Whether a competition law and policy will be able to address all or some of these problems 
is dependent on the robustness of its provision and the efficiency of its regulatory agency.   
 
3.4.1 Economic Goals 
There is a consensus that the primary aim of competition law is always geared towards 
economic welfare, which could be used as an economic yardstick for measuring of 
performance in an economy. 69  Generally, welfare can also be defined as the sum of 
consumer surplus and producer surplus; economic welfare is also referred to as consumer 
welfare that can be described as an aggregate of allocative efficiency and productive 
efficiency.70 The combination of these two types of efficiencies leads to maximization of 
the total wealth of a society.71 Many writers, notably Bork, have argued that the sole or 
primary aim of competition law is economic efficiency that is to enhance consumer 
welfare.72 Bork argues that: 
The only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of 
consumer welfare; therefore competition for the purposes of antitrust analysis 
must be understood as a term of art signifying any state of affairs in which 
consumer welfare cannot be increased by judicial decree.73 
He also emphasized the importance of economics in the realization of the only legitimate 
goal of antitrust. This view has gained significance and primacy in competition policy 
 
69 M. Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 18. 
70 Whish, note 33, 2. 
71 Ibid., 3. 
72  Bork, note 5, 51. 
73 Ibid., arguing in the same direction, Posner agrees with Bork’s position that although populist thoughts run 
through the vein of almost all the federal antitrust law in the US, the motive and meaning of legislation are 
different things. He concludes that ‘after a century and more of judicial enforcement of antitrust statutes there 
is a consensus that guidance must be sought in economics’- R.A. Posner, Antitrust Law (2nd edn.) Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001), 26.  
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jurisprudence.  Although the debates about the goal(s) of competition policy have largely 
disappeared in developed countries, they could still be resurrected in developing and 
emerging economies still burdened with some vestiges of a planned economy. The debates, 
probably on a low key, might continue to be subject to changes and developments. 74  
Earlier, the debates about the goals of competition law were given both serious academic 
and media coverage, for example the Fortune Magazine in 1965 initiated a dialogue on the 
goals, objectives and methods by which the specific goals may be realized.75 The debates 
were however influenced by the positions of the two dominant antitrust schools of thought, 
namely the Chicago and Harvard schools of competition. At the beginning of the debate, 
Bork and Bowman raised the alarm that antitrust law and policy were facing a crisis caused 
by the promotion of considerations other than economic efficiency in antitrust policy and 
implementation. They argued then that the elevation of these other considerations was a 
‘protectionist trend’ favoured by ‘anti-free market forces’ traceable to widespread 
economic misconceptions as a pretext and welcome  opportunity for groups with political 
power to extract reward from consumers  not disposed to command(s)  in the market 
place.76 
 
In response to the arguments of Bork and Bowman, Blake and Jones have countered that 
Bork and Bowman have been using for their argumentation and conclusion, not more than 
a wrong implement that could not promote access to the right conclusion.  They suggest 
that: 
 
 74 See generally, J. J. Flynn, ‘Antitrust jurisprudence: a symposium on the economic, political and social 
goals of antitrust policy’ (1976-1977) 125 University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 1182. 
75R. Bork and W. S. Bowman Jr. ‘The goals of antitrust: a dialogue on policy: the crisis in antitrust’ (1965) 
65 Columbia L. Rev.365. The dialogue involved Professors Bork and Bowman pitched on one side and 
Professors Blake and Jones on the opposite side. 
76 Ibid.,, 376. 
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Trying to measure a three dimensional world with a one-dimensional yardstick 
must be terribly frustrating. Professors Bork and Bowman measure their way 
across the antitrust terrain with a rigid ruler of economic efficiency. The trail 
turns to the right. But their ruler will not bend and snaps in their hands.77 
Blake and Jones accordingly concluded that   there was no crisis in antitrust: law and 
policy, but rather the reality  of  antitrust law and policy with  multiple objectives,78 as 
shown and underlined in the part on legislative history of antitrust laws, in the latter part of 
this thesis.79 
 
However, the maximization of consumer welfare or the attainment of economic efficiency 
remains the most distinct goal of competition policy among competition authorities. Thus, 
in the Epilogue of the recent version of his book on antitrust, Bork goes further to say that: 
No matter what policy goals or combination of goals one attributes to antitrust, 
the effectiveness of the law in forwarding those policies will be diminished by 
other public policies. 80 
One can infer that Bork seems to appreciate lately the potency of criticism of a sole goal 
for competition law as well as criticism of the level of authority behind arguments for 
multiple-objectives in competition policy. The arguments for a multiple-objectives 
competition law will continue to gain support because of the likelihood of policy conflict 
 
77 H.M. Blake and W.J. Jones, ‘Towards a three dimensional antitrust policy’ (1965) 65 Columbia Law Rev. 
422. 
78 Ibid., 376. 
79 E.M. Fox and L.A. Sullivan, ‘Antitrust-retrospective and prospective: where are we coming from? Where 
are we going?’ (1987) 62 NYUL Rev 936. Fox and Sullivan argue that the objectives of legislation for 
antitrust include not only consumer welfare in the notion of just ‘economic efficiency’ but comprise other 
objectives meant to protect consumers from the exploitive exercise of market power by power trusts and 
businesses at that time. Both commentators belong to the post–Chicago School of antitrust, while Bork 
belongs to the Chicago School. 
80 Bork, note 5, 429. 
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between consumer welfare (as the sole goal of competition law) and other government 
policies. Such an attitude may be expected mainly from emerging economies in developing 
countries. This does not foreclose the probability of the occurrence of conflicts of opinions 
in developed countries too, such as in Australia and Japan.  At least in the EC, efficiency as 
a sole goal has not always been the prevailing standard.81  
 
Since economic or total welfare is commonly defined as the aggregate of consumer welfare 
and producer welfare, the argument that consumer welfare should be the primary or sole 
goal of competition law has prevailed, not surprisingly, over justifications for other goals 
of competition policy. Nevertheless, advocates of multiple goals for competition policy 
have been unrelenting in their arguments and conviction. Thus, Grandy, referring to 
antitrust in the USA, observes that ‘the legislative history of the Sherman Act failed to 
support the consumer-welfare hypothesis,’ and suggests that the ‘congress focused its 
concern on producer behaviours’.82 He has re-examined the prevailing consumer-welfare 
hypothesis, making use of American legislative history to build a case for welfare. His 
arguments rest essentially on the congressional debates preceding the passage of the 
Sherman Act, particularly the debates on monopolization, price regulation, resort by the 
Congress to the use of common law language which raised concern on just producers and 
the economic implication of the American federal political structure.  
 
In the first instance, Grandy conceded that since the inception of the debates on the 
Sherman Bill, the American Congress has shown preference for consumer welfare as a 
 
81 Other policy considerations drive the EC competition policy; this will be examined later. See Jones and 
Sufrin, note 52, 25. 
82 C. Grandy, ‘Original intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act: a re-examination of the consumer – welfare 
hypothesis’ (June 1993) 2(53) The Journal of Economic History, 373. 
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major goal of antitrust, but he went further to argue that as debates progressed, this 
preference was abandoned in favour of other goals.83 This point suggests that, in the light 
of Grandy’s assertion, Bork may have been selective in his use of the legislative records, to 
advance the argument that promotion of the efficiency objective has been the intention of 
the legislators and the same should remain the only legitimate goal of antitrust. In fact, 
Grandy forcefully argues that both the Bills and the debates preceding the Sherman Act 
clearly show an independent concern for the preservation of free and fair competition or 
trade, as a point tantamount to producer-welfare.  To support his argument, Grandy relied 
extensively on Kitner’s work.84 
 
Grandy has pointed out that the legislative history of the Sherman Act shows that most 
Congress members were not convinced by the argument that the efficiency of large-scale 
organizations would promote consumer welfare through an achievement of lower 
production costs. In fact some legislators have argued for the introduction of an 
amendment to the original Sherman Bill; the amendment would have permitted 
combinations to justify their actions directed at eliminating destructive competition, 
control of output, regulation and maintenance of price on the ground that this would lead to 
lower production costs. According to Grandy, this argument agrees with Bork’s position on 
productive efficiency.85 As the route to this ‘efficiency’ goal would obviously involve 
price or output regulation, it was ultimately necessary to refer to the Judicial Committee.86 
The final Act, as contained in Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, as argued by Grandy, 
 
83 Ibid., 362. 
84  See, E.W. Kitner, The Legislative History of the Federal Antitrust Law and Related Statutes (New York 
and London, 1978). 
85 Ibid., 365. 
86 Ibid.,  367. 
 96
                                                
suggested a desire to ‘regulate’ business conduct and to promote fair competition in trade 
and production. 
 
Moreover, Grandy argues that the phrase ‘restraint of trade and commerce’ found in 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is a common law concept  referring  to activities that prevent 
the unlawful methods of others from producing or selling their goods. He argues that the 
employment of this common law phrase shows that the Sherman Act is intended to target 
producer welfare rather than consumer welfare, as advocated by Bork and other 
commentators.87 
 
In support of his position, an examination of the debates on the Sherman Bill,   related 
particularly to Section 2 of the Sherman Act, would reveal that the Congress had more 
concern for producer welfare than for consumer welfare. The emphasis of the section on 
the definition of monopoly, according to Grandy, was to show how the activities of one 
producer would affect another producer. Bork argues that the exemption granted under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act is for a monopoly gained as a result of superior skill or 
efficiency that will promote consumer welfare, although this might also hurt rival 
producers. Grandy disagrees with Bork’s argument, drawing support from the legislative 
history’s treatment of the definition of a monopoly. He has submitted that an examination 
of the debates and the history would reveal that the position of Congress was for the 
concept ‘monopoly’ to bear a technical meaning, 88  that is, an exclusion of other 
competitors from the market. The argument of Grandy is supported by other writers, such 
as Peters, who have also stressed that competition policy in the USA grew out of the 
 
87 W.K. Viscusi et al., Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 57. 
88 Kitner, note 84, 315. 
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concerns and agitations of the populist movement of the 19th century, with arguments on 
the side of farmer and small scale businesses against the growing powers of large 
businesses and trusts.89  
 
Grandy went further to argue that Section 2 is concerned with the process of competition 
and the means of acquiring market power with impact affecting other competitors, and not 
with efficiency which may hurt some competitors. Concerning the phrase ’restraint of 
trade’, Grandy has argued that Congress meant “restraint of trade” to stand for ‘’restriction 
of output’’ because the phrase has an established common law origin and involves 
restriction of output. However, Bork denies that the Sherman Act has any real common law 
basis. Grandy observes that Bork’s denial of this basis is understandable, because 
originally, common law agreements or combinations in restraint of trade had, for state 
courts, a meaning irreconcilable with the consumer-welfare hypothesis.90  In common law, 
the phrase ‘restraint of trade’ referred to relations among competitors or producers. 91  
Grandy also alluded to the fact that the Judicial Committee that drafted the final Sherman 
Act was composed of legal experts who knew what restraint of trade in common law 
exactly means and so its inclusion in the act was intended for pointing to producer welfare. 
 
Lastly, it has also been argued that the jurisdiction concern raised by the Sherman Act 
called for an antitrust law with a national coverage, because corporations and trusts were 
hitherto subjected to state legislation and there was no federal law to coordinate or regulate 
 
89  B.G. Peters, ‘United States competition policy institutions: structural constraints and opportunities’ in G.B 
Doern and S. Wilks   Comparative Competition Policy, (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
90 Grandy, note 91, 369. 
91 H. B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition (London: George Allen 
&Unwin Ltd., 1954), 17.  
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economic activities that cut across state borders. There was therefore a reliance on 
common law approaches by the states, making it possible to regulate inter-state economic 
activities. Consequently, Grandy concludes that ‘the common law basis for the Sherman 
Act undermines the consumer–welfare hypothesis because the common law addressed the 
behaviour of producers without reference to consumers.92 
 
Another perspective is the economic goal of competition law that further queries the 
wisdom behind the promotion of efficiency considerations as being either the ‘primary or 
only (advocated) legitimate goal’. This viewpoint expanded the scope of the debate on the 
goals of competition law. It is credited to Lande, although he recognizes that the USA 
Congress passed antitrust laws to promote economic objectives, he argues that the primary 
objectives of the antitrust laws are primarily distributive rather than efficient in nature.93  
 
The target of distributive goals canvassed by Lande is to prevent an unfair transfer of 
consumer wealth by firms with market power. He has additionally explained that this goal 
does not mean a process or method of securing the overall fair distribution of wealth in 
society or to assist the poor, as that would not have any basis in competition law; he says 
rather that, ‘the Congress merely wanted to prevent one transfer of wealth that it 
considered inequitable and to promote the distribution of wealth that competitive markets 
would bring.’ 94  Lande also explored American legislative history in order to find 
justification for his position. He has argued that the relevant legislative history shows what 
Congress in 1890 had in mind was not the economic notion of consumer in the form of 
 
92  Grandy, note 82, 373. 
93 R.H. Lande, ‘Wealth transfers as the original and primary concern of antitrust: The efficiency 
interpretation challenged’ (1982-1983) 34 Hasting Law Journal, 65. 
94 Ibid., 32. 
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efficiency but consumer well-being in the form of protection of consumers against the 
exploitative practices of the big businesses and trusts at that time.95 
 
However, his argument did not gloss over the central theme of the efficiency goal 
advocate. It revealed that in the long term consumers stand to benefit more if the goals of 
antitrust are analysed properly by taking cognizance of the distributive goal as the primary 
intention of Congress. He puts his argument forcefully into focus as follows: 
Incorporation of Congress’ distributive goals into antitrust analysis would use 
the antitrust laws to reach many more mergers and other monopolistic practices 
than does the present quest for efficiency in antitrust.96  
This brings back into focus the arguments regarding a monopoly. Concerning its 
disadvantages, one may recall that the USA Congress has been particularly concerned 
about the growing power of trust and the effects of monopoly power, eventually prompting 
the adoption of the Sherman Act.97 
 
 
95The creation of trusts and businesses that copy monopoly at this time created resentment and agitation 
among the consumers that big business were against the interests of the consumers. They rightly reasoned 
that trusts and monopolies (in the transport, petroleum, sugar and steel sectors) led to price increases 
perceived to be unjustified. This gave room for political ‘trust busters’ like Senator Sherman and President 
Roosevelt who seized on the opportunity to launch an attack on the growing power of big businesses. See R. 
Liefmann, Cartels, Concern and Trusts, (London: Methuen, 1932). 
96 Lande,  note 93, 87. 
97 J. Fejo, Monopoly Law and Market: Studies of EC Competition Law with US Antitrust Law as Frame of 
Reference and Supported by Basic Markets (Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, 1990) 30. The basic understanding among economists and competition policy makers on one 
hand is that monopoly pricing reduces consumer’s wealth and value through output and price control, and on 
the other hand, monopoly could positively or negatively impact on the economy without any sound economic 
reasons or the forces of demand and supply. These attributes of a monopoly are regarded as a misallocation 
of resources, but there remain many controversies on the latter attributes because of their dual nature. In any 
case, the latter attributes are more of a subjective judgment. 
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The crux of Lande’s position is that antitrust is more concerned with the unfair transfer of 
wealth from consumers to monopolists than efficiency preference to consumers, an 
argument that Bork has said has neither legislative support nor any rational economic 
justification. Unperturbed about the wave of authorities or opinions in support of Bork’s 
efficiency interpretation of antitrust laws, Lande has pointed out that, at the time the 
Sherman Bill was introduced in 1890, many economists and legislators did not have any 
idea of the possible impact or ills of monopoly power and its consequential redistributive 
effects, a point which raises serious questions.98 
 
Moreover, in support of his argument, Lande has referred to several pieces of legislative 
evidence that condemn trust and monopolistic overcharges in strong moral terms, instead 
of their efficiency implications.99 This means that moral consideration too has played a 
significant role in the craft and intention of the antitrust laws in the USA. A conclusion that 
could be drawn from Lande’s argument is that the paramount consideration in antitrust 
analysis should not be ‘technical efficiency’ but rather efficiency in broad perspective 
hinged on consumer welfare and should be protecting consumers from exploitation in 
varying degrees. He recognises the importance of ‘technical efficiency’ as promoted by the 
Chicago School, but has argued that in the case of conflict between technical efficiency 
and efficiency in the broad sense encompassing consumer well being, the latter should be 
upheld.100     
 
 
98 Lande, note 93, 87. 
99 Lande, note 93. 
100 E.M. Fox, ‘Consumer beware Chicago’ (1985-86) 84 Michigan Law Review 1714. Fox also criticised the 
argument that antitrust is mainly concerned with efficiency and argued that what congress meant is economic 
welfare which is the sum of producers’ and consumer’ profits, that is total welfare that protects consumers’ 
interests as well as the producers’ interests . 
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3.4.2 Social and other Goals  
Several other goals-cum-visions still motivate competition policy under different regimes.  
Although most of these goals have largely been relegated to the background in countries 
with a longer-established history of competition law, it is still relevant to discuss these 
goals and to examine the merits and demerits of the arguments for and against them, 
especially in the context of EU competition policy. Unlike competition rules in the US, EU 
competition rules arose out of ‘situations somewhat different’ from the populist movement 
that gave impetus to the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890.101  A discussion of the goals 
in question will contribute to a better understanding of the challenges to meet in emerging 
and developing economies when envisaging the adoption of a competition policy for 
addressing not only the issue of efficiency but other trade-related issues, such as market 
access and protection of new industries.  
 
In general, competition law and policy goals include protection of small firms, industrial 
policy, promoting market integration, environmental policy, various   socio-political 
objectives. These goals naturally will, and tend to, influence competition law analysis and 
resolution of disputes arising from enforcement of competition law. For example, in the 
EU the Commission, obviously on social/political grounds, cleared the joint venture of 
Ford/ Volkswagen.102 Some of these other goals of are examined hereunder.  
 
 
101 Frontier-Free Europe, (May 51993)- In 1993, Van Miert, then Competition Commissioner, stated that ‘the 
aims of the European competition policy are economical, political and social. The policy is concerned not 
only with promoting efficient production but also with achieving the aims of the European treaties: 
establishing a common market, approximating economic policies, promoting harmonious growth, raising 
living standards, bringing Member States closer together etc. To this must be added the need to safeguard a 
pluralistic democracy, which could not survive a strong concentration of economic power’.    
102 OJ 1993 L20/14. This horizontal agreement was exempted by the Commission on other considerations 
other than economic efficiency  
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3.4.2.1 Protection of Small Firms 
The desire to promote small firms or start-ups has been recognized by both law and policy 
makers as one of the goals or roles that a competition law should achieve and play, 
respectively. Start-ups are often viewed as very vulnerable in the business world. The 
legislative history of the US antitrust laws reveals a deep concern for preserving business 
opportunities for small firms.103 Similar sentiment towards or treatment of small firms 
existed in Germany prior to the enactment of Articles 81 to 89 EC which deals with the 
implementation of competition policy.104 Small firms have long been thought to deserve 
some level or form of protection105 against the competitive and market power of larger 
firms; the former are seen to be vulnerable to likely predatory activities of the latter. This 
view has been given judicial support in the USA, in the famous ALCOA case by Judge 
Learned Hand; he says: 
Congress in passing the Sherman Act was not necessarily actuated by 
economic motives alone. It is possible, because of its direct social or moral 
effects, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his success 
upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those 
engaged must accept the direction of a few.106 
 
It has been argued that this favourable disposition to small firms is not ‘inconsistent’ with 
the objectives of economic welfare if it is limited to protecting the small firms from the 
abusive practices of large firms, or giving them some support against the pressure of the 
 
103 Lande,  note 93, 102. 
104 See A.D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1990). 
105 See, Chicago Board of Trade v United States 246 US 231 (1918). In this case Justice Brandeis espoused 
the multiple goal of antitrust and amongst other issues gave support to the idea that competition is meant to 
promote small businesses. 
106 United States  v  Aluminium Co. of America, 148F 2d (2 Cir.1945). 
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economic power of large firms.107 This is not to suggest that firms not operating on an 
efficient scale should be given ‘artificial support’. Such support would amount to 
misallocation of resources, distortion of the market,108 possibly resulting in high prices. 109 
The objective of promoting or defending small businesses is encouraged in the EU with 
programmes and policies to support small and medium enterprises (SMEs). This support is 
predicated upon the reasons that SMEs are seen to be more dynamic, quick to innovate and 
capable to contribute more to employment growth rates than large firms. 110  Such support, 
as an objective,  will most likely be given priority by  emerging economies and developing 
countries,  because of the preponderance of small entrepreneurs in  the state of the 
development of their economies. 
 
In addition, the defence of small firms with the aid of competition policy is just an extra 
measure that will find strong appeal in developing and emerging economies with markets 
prone to both internal and external distortions. The most prominent external threat or 
distortion that such economies are wary of concerns the issue of globalisation as a high 
priority discussion issue in many economic meetings.111 
 
 
107 Motta, note 69,  23.  
108 Ibid. 
109 Bork, note 5, Bork argued that the judgement in the ALCOA case was not strictly based on the issue of 
promoting consumer welfare but on unarticulated social values that led to the breaking down of the firm 
involved despite its strong position having been achieved through efficiency methods that guaranteed lower 
practices, which obviously was to the benefit of the consumers rather than the dissolution of the firm.  
110 Innovation is now generally acknowledged to be the major driver of competition in many markets, 
particularly the high technology sector and biotechnology sectors. This is not an absolute fact because the 
level of research studies and results on this issue are neither unanimous nor conclusive 
111‘’Globalization is the term for the increased worldwide interdependence of most economies. Integrated 
financial markets, the sourcing of the production of components throughout the world, the growing 
importance of transnational firms and the linking of many service activities through the new information and 
technologies are some of its manifestations’’- R.G. Lipsey and K.A. Chrystal, Economics, 10th edn., 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 677. See also, J. E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontent, 
(London and New York: W.W. Norton Ltd, 2003). 
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3.4.2.2 Industrial Policy 
There is a neo-classical school of thought which argues that competition law and industrial 
policy are diametrically opposed to each other.112 This school regards competition policy 
as one related to economic law characterized by transparent rules, procedures, judicial 
precedents; a policy normally managed by an independent body mandated to balance 
individual interests with economic competition by applying those characteristics.113 For 
this neo-classical school industrial policy is not principle- and rule-based, concerned only 
with the structure of the economy and its international competitiveness. It is a policy 
aiming at achieving different objectives, such as growth, economic integration, and 
employment. 
 
Another school of economic thought, the post-Chicago school, asserts that   competition 
policy and industrial policy do not conflict; it argues that competition policy is part of 
industrial policy. 114  The roots and essence of the controversy between the schools in 
question can be traced to the lack of a general definition of ‘industrial policy’. The 
conceptual dispute is further complicated by the fact that different countries modelled their 
respective national industrial policies in accordance with the peculiar circumstances and 
needs of their individual, non-identical national economies. The resulting situation is 
reflected by the existence of an assortment of mixed ideas, policies and arrangements using 
a limited stock of technical terms used for referring to a variety of meanings. 
 
 
112 W. Sauter, Competition Law and Industrial Policy in the EU (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1997), 1. 
113 Ibid. 
114 B.T. Bayliss and A.M. El-Agraa (ed.), ‘Competition and industrial policies with an emphasis on 
competition policy’ in A.M. El-Agraa (ed.), The Economics of the European Community (3rd edn.), (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 137. 
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In the overwhelming majority of economies, the most obvious example of industrial policy 
as a basic concern underlying  competition law and  policy is the idea of promoting or 
encouraging the development of ‘national  economic and/or industrial champions’. They 
can be state parastatals or trading companies or private undertakings. The essential policy 
objectives can be to provide incentives or financial support to help jump-start the activities 
of infant industries, or place them in a privileged economic position to enable them to 
compete with other firms on domestic as well as foreign or international markets.  The 
rationale for such a policy could be based on the following three considerations:(1) 
markets are global, (2) the targeted enterprises need to rise to a level of particular capacity 
to compete effectively at the international level, and (3) certain key sectors are considered 
by the state to be in need of development on the way to competitive security and 
prosperity. Within the framework of such considerations, it might have been that  
enforcement of the EC competition policy would have been impracticable without regard 
to and coordination of other EC’s economic, industrial and commercial priorities.  
 
A different way of looking at industrial policy within the framework of competition law 
and policy is offered by application of anti-dumping laws. Its rules can help protect 
domestic firms from the operation of foreign companies trying to exploit the competitive 
advantages of their low production costs compared with the higher production costs of less 
efficient domestic firms. It is worth observing that even in the USA, where rigorous 
antitrust laws apply, and an industrial policy is still in place. For example, the Webb-
Pomerene Act 1918 is underpinned by considerations of industrial policy. 115  The Act 
provides special latitude for export cartels in the USA. 
 
11540 STAT 516(1918), 15 U.S.C No 61-65 (1941). The Act provides a limited antitrust exemption for 
formation and operation of associations of otherwise competing businesses to engage in collective export 
sales. 
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3.5 Competition Law and Policy and Economic Development 
To achieve a viable and sustainable economic development in any economy at all demands 
serious planning and strategic consideration; this is especially true for resource-dependent 
developing countries such as Nigeria. Its peculiar economic, political characteristics and 
problems have earlier been examined in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Further there is a need for 
the correct economic reforms and political will to embark on such reforms to fix these 
problems. It was also earlier argued that the reforms have to be complemented with an 
effective competition law and policy to guarantee optimal results. Even when the political 
will is marshalled, it is not advisable to just copy or adopt any competition law and policy 
model from those countries with the longest traditions in this field because the field of 
competition policy in most cases is national.  Rather one has to take full cognizance of the 
affected country’s peculiar characteristics, position and relationship with other trading 
nations apart from other local issues that could affect the success of any policy reform 
might need to be factored in.116 
  
To achieve this, it has been suggested that a thorough comprehensive reform that includes 
the establishment of all necessary regulatory institutions complementing whatever existing 
regulatory structure will need to be undertaken. In further support is the need to promote 
‘competition advocacy’.117 The relevance and importance of this to a developing country 
like Nigeria shall be examined in the latter part of this chapter. This is predicated on the 
 
116 See N. Theron, ‘The economics of competition policy: merger analysis in South Africa’ 2005 (69) 4 South 
African Journal of Economics, 654. 
117 A popular definition of competition advocacy is that given by the Advocacy Working Group of the 
International Competition Network, as follows: Those activities conducted by the competition authority 
related to the promotion of a competitive environment for economic activities, by means of non-enforcement 
mechanisms mainly through its relationships with other governmental entities by increasing public awareness 
of the benefits of competition. See the website of International Competition Network- 
http://ww.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org. Last visited 30th March 2009. 
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premise that competition law will thrive only in a conducive environment, especially 
where the competition agency is proactive and recognizes the need to ensure that both the 
private and public bodies are subject to its rules, and this can only be done meaningfully 
via competition advocacy. From the conclusions reached in the preceding chapters it has 
been demonstrated that competition policy is a condition precedent towards a viable and 
sustainable developed economy. 
 
The effective implementation of any form of competition law and policy that is adopted in 
any developing country must take account of its potential impact or contributions towards 
the country’s development. To date there is a lack of data on the actual developmental 
gains and costs of implementing a competition regime in developing countries, but 
research results have revealed that anti-competitive practices impose heavy costs on 
developing countries. 118  Other evidence from some developed countries supports the 
conclusion that competition law and policy has a significant contribution to economic 
development.  There is ample literature to draw from in this instance, particularly the 
experience of the US, the European Union countries, Japan, Australia and South Korea.119  
 
However, against this body of literature, is an important guidance for competition law and 
policy founded on the economic theory of second best, originally advanced by Laffont as 
follows: 
 
118 R. Anderson and F. Jenny, ‘Competition policy, economic development and the role of a possible 
multilateral framework on competition policy: insights from the WTO working group on competition’ in E. 
Medalla and P. Drysdale, Competition Policy in   East Asia Pacific Region, (London: Routledge, 2007) 61-64 
119 See D. H. Brooks, ‘Competition policy development’ (2005) ERD Policy Brief no. 39 Published at 
http://www.asiandevbank.org/Documents/EDRC/Policy_Briefs/PB039.pdf. Last visited on 30th March 2009. 
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Competition is an unambiguously good thing in the first-best world of 
economists. That world assumes large numbers of participants in all markets, 
no public goods, no externalities, no information asymmetries, no natural 
monopolies, complete markets, fully rational economic agents, a benevolent 
court system to enforce contracts, and a benevolent government providing 
lump sum transfers to achieve any desirable redistribution. Because developing 
countries are so far from this ideal world, it is not always the case that 
competition should be encouraged in these countries.120 
As valid as Laffont’s argument above appears, his pessimism should not be taken as 
absolute for all developing countries; in fact it is debatable whether any developed country 
could or actually does satisfy all the conditions for a competitive equilibrium; rather, a 
second best that involves restriction on the competition approach backed with strong 
regulatory structure is used to enforce competition law along with other policies.121  
 
Furthermore, in support of Laffont’s position, different alternatives to competition law and 
policy have been offered as viable options for developing countries where there is a 
probable lack of ability to implement laws because of some endemic institutional 
deficiencies such as rent seeking and corruption, most of these problems were examined in 
chapter two.122  One of these options is that trade liberalization may act as a proxy for 
domestic competition policy. 123  Different commentators have argued that trade 
liberalization can be a fit substitute for domestic competition law in small economies, 
 
120 J. Laffont, ‘Competition, information, development’ (1998) Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development Economics, 237. 
121 A. Singh, ‘Competition policy in emerging markets: international developmental dimensions’  (2002) 
ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 246, 15. 
122  Singh, ‘Competition competition policy in emerging markets’ 15. 
123 L. Cernat, ‘The role of competition in the promotion of competitiveness development: Experiences from a 
sample of  less developing countries’ (UNCTAD) Paper prepared for the 3rd
 
International CRC Conference, 
Pro-poor Regulation Competition: Issues, Policies Practices, Cape Town, South Africa, 7-9 September 2004). 
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because when trade barriers are lowered this process should necessarily increase 
competition from imports for local firms engaged in the production of tradable goods and 
services reliant on the domestic market.124 It is assumed that the competitive pressure from 
these imports will drive the local firms to be more efficient and thereby lead to a reduction 
in prices to the benefit of their consumers. It could also be argued in this respect that the 
reduction of trade barriers and restrictions, such as reduction in tariffs, elimination of 
quantitative restrictions on exports and imports, afford producers and businesses the 
opportunity to expand and compete beyond their local jurisdictions or markets with the 
resultant effects in reduction in prices and improvement in quality of goods and services. 
 
However, as valid as the argument in the preceding paragraph appears, it still stands to 
reason that it might not be possible to obtain the full benefits of trade liberalization without 
instituting a competition policy. This is due to many reasons. One obvious reason yet rests 
on the Adam Smith's famous admonition concerning the need to embrace and protect free 
competition.125 He argues that: 
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or in 
some contrivance to raise prices.  
Businesses are wont to take advantage of the situation and would try to engage in anti-
competitive practices unless there are clear rules designed to caution and penalise them 
outside the normal trade regulations which are often insufficient to deter anti-competitive 
 
124 See R. Blackhurst, ‘Trade policy is competition policy’ in ‘Cooperation Economic Development’ (1991) 
OECD.  
125 A. Smith, An Inquiry to the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations of Adam Smith, 1776, Published 
at http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-index.htm. Last visited on 30th March 2009. 
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practices like cartels, abuse of dominant positions and restrictive agreements.126 Thus in 
jurisdictions such as Nigeria, reliance on trade liberalization might not yield optimum 
results as concessions under trade liberalisation are easily susceptible to abuses from both 
public officials and businesses, but market discipline offered and likely to be impacted by 
competition law could mitigate these abuses.  For instance following liberalisation, some 
sectors with concentration, like the energy sector, are susceptible to high mark-up prices 
and other anti-competitive behaviours like collusion and cartel. However, the enactment of 
a competition law and policy will offer some reasonable level of prevention against these 
anti-competitive practices. 
 
In addition, it could be argued that the existence of competition law or a competition policy 
in an economy gives an assurance of a commitment to ensure a level playing field to both 
local and foreign firms, and therefore, when faced with many choices of states to invest in 
and the states (especially developing countries) rank relatively on the same level, then an 
investor will more likely be persuaded to choose a country that has a competition law and 
policy.127 
 
Moreover, it could be argued that benefits accruable from trade liberalization might easily 
be diminished or even eroded as a result of export cartels organised by the local importers 
 
126 High market concentration will continue to be viewed with special attention for the singular reason that 
this concentration could be used to easily facilitate market abuse, although it does not automatically translate 
to restriction of competition and lower welfare. Rather, firms will most likely engage in anticompetitive 
activities where there is restriction on entry barriers, since an indication of higher profits is an incentive for 
new entrants that could lead to a reduction in the incumbent’s market power and lower prices. 
127 M. Gestrin, ‘A policy framework for investment: competition policy’ Paper presented at an OECD 
Conference, Investment for Development: Making it Happen, 25-27 October RIO DE Jainero, Brazil. 
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or foreign importers.128 Unofficial reports in Nigeria abound about price fixing involving 
cement, iron, sugar, rice and the mobile telephone tariffs by some notable companies in 
Nigeria, but due to lack of any competition law or an empowered consumer agency to 
investigate and regulate such activities these reports have gone unconfirmed or checked for 
a long period. The final consumers will be made to bear the brunt via excessive prices 
which could affect total welfare and ultimately affect economic development. Most of 
these developing countries are reliant on imports to sustain a larger part of their economies, 
especially those that have become resource dependent and have also neglected to develop 
other sectors of their economies, as was the case in Nigeria before 2000. This prompts the 
question about the political sources of institutional change, and whether appropriate law 
and economic reforms could be meaningfully implemented without political support and 
the establishment of an appropriate regulatory structure in Nigeria. This thesis shows 
below that appropriate law and economic reforms are necessary but not sufficient; 
however, the determining factor in economic performance is the state’s capacity to 
implement them.129  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter shows that a random examination of objectives of competition laws will point 
to the conclusion that, along with other objectives, economic objectives are part of the 
basic foundations of competition law and policy. However, commentators are not unified 
about the wisdom of enacting pro-competition economic system and thereby advocate 
 
128 See N. Dimgba, ‘The urgent need for anti-trust law’ Published at 
www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Nigeria/antitrust%20article.pdf. Last visited on 30th March 
2009. 
129 R. Hilton, Small Countries, Big Lessons: Governance and the Rise of East-Asia, (New York: Oxford 
Press, 1996), 5.  
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different approaches for the economic problems of resource-dependent economies. 130    
This conclusion in turn introduces other concerns, prompting, not least the question: as to 
what economic standard(s) should be adopted in the substance of competition law and 
policy?  Should a consumer surplus standard or a total welfare standard be allowed to 
dominate? When resolving the question, an issue to consider concerns the type of approach 
to adopt; for instance, when concentrating on a resource-dependent developing country like 
Nigeria: should the enforcement of the legislative instrument be the main focus or 
competition advocacy should be adequately combined in furthering the objective  of 
competition law and policy to be adopted?  
 
Since competition law is broadly concerned with three spheres (that is, (i) agreements, (ii) 
dominance and (iii) mergers.) and disregard to the presence of any of them can  threaten 
competition, this  chapter further concludes that the enactment and implementation of 
competition law and policy  would not have the desired developmental impacts on 
resource-dependent developing countries if they are not considered within the particular 
context of the economic circumstances involved and the effectiveness of  the  impacts 
could reasonably be determined  by the approach  and  types of  goals competition is meant 
to achieve. Thus this thesis argues that for resource-dependent countries their competition 
laws and policies should be wide enough to include industrial, employment, and other 
trade related objectives that could either lead to or promote economic development. This 
approach will give the law or policy a wider public acceptance and opportunity for it to be 
effectively enforced bearing in mind that enactment of competition law and policy will 
lead to changes in the market and will probably face some level of opposition at the outset.  
 
130 R.D. Cooter, ‘The theory of market modernization of law: economic development through decentralized 
law’ in J.S. Bhandari and A.O. Sykes (ed.), Economic Dimension in International Law: Comparative and 
Empirical Perspective (London: Sage, 1998), 225.  
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The changes envisaged involve an increase in the transparency in the market, reduction in 
corruption and rent seeking activities along with the requirement to comply with other 
standard competition principles. Opposition should be expected from erstwhile 
monopolistic firms and economic agents that have either abused or ignored the principle of 
free market economy. 
 
A further conclusion is that all the three competition standards might not be appropriate in 
any particular resource-dependent country; at most it may be sufficient to focus only on 
restrictive agreements and dominance which are capable of restricting competition. This is 
because for a market to work effectively the particular political and economic conceptions 
of competition must first be translated into law. 131   This will then form the legal 
framework for market operation and development. This is part of the analysis in the next 
chapter where the appropriateness of standards is considered within the context of the 
provisions and objectives of the proposed Federal Competition Bill (FCB) in
 
In addition, while rent seeking and corruption are not the main thrust of competition law 
and policy, it will not be totally out of place to attempt to address them by the instrument 
of competition law and policy in resource-dependent countries because introduction of 
competition standards will enhance market discipline and promote transparency in the 
economy concerned. The mere fact that stakeholders in both the public and private sectors 
are conscious of the provisions of the law and possibility of being sanctioned for breach of 
competition policy will promote the drive for market efficiency and invariably lead to 
more transparency in the market.  
 
131 G. Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)15. 
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Having recognized that competition law and policy is necessary for efficient resource 
allocation and achieving economic development in resource-dependent countries, a likely 
concern is the question of what type or mode of competition policy would be suitable for a 
developing country like Nigeria, caught in the twin throes of national economic reform and 
effects of globalization.  At least, such competition policy must be able to cater for or 
guide against three things. First, it must have the power to restrain anticompetitive 
behaviours by domestic privatized firms or undertakings listed for privatization; second, it 
should be able to limit the abuse of monopoly power by multinational companies or large 
corporations brought about by international mergers and acquisitions, and third, it should 
promote economic development.132 
 
Finally, this chapter concludes further that in some cases, using Nigeria an example and the 
probability of it adopting a multiple objective competition law and policy, there might be a 
need to strike a balance between competition and regulation. This will help to effectively 
foster its economic development, especially since the economy is at its formative period of 
embracing a competition culture following its privatisation and liberalisation policies.133 
 
 
132 These firms include African Petroleum PLC,, National Oil and Chemical Marketing Co. PLC., Unipetrol 
Nigeria PLC., Eleme Petrochemicals Company Limited, Nigeria Gas Company Limited, Port Harcourt 
Refining Company Limited, Warri Refining Petrochemicals Company Limited, Pipelines Products Marketing 
Company (PPMC), Delta Steel Company, National Iron Ore Mining Company Limited, Nigeria Uranium 
Mining Company, Oshogbo Steel Rolling Mill Company National Electric Power Authority. 
133 D.O. Adetoro, ‘Can the imposition of a regulator in any liberalized energy market be justified by market 
behaviours?’ (2006) 24(3) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 401.  
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Part Two 
Chapter Four  
4.0 Competition Policy and Highlights of the Nigerian Federal Competition Bill 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to examine some of the provisions in the draft Federal Competition Bill 
(FCB) in Nigeria critical to the promotion of efficient allocation of resources and thereby 
its development as a typical resource-dependent developing economy. It considers whether 
the draft Bill is an effective legislative instrument capable of addressing the primary 
competition problems and other (peculiar secondary economic) problems in resource-
dependent countries like Nigeria.1 
 
 The importance attached to, and interest, in competition law and policy has continued to 
grow rapidly in most resource-dependent developing countries. In part, it is logically 
linked to pressure from international agencies on developing countries to enact competition 
laws and also the countries’ desires for efficient competitive markets. 2  Some of the 
international agencies include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).3 Most of the developing countries are characterized 
by lower degrees of market competition than most of the developed countries. The interest 
in competition policy is also being driven by the need to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI) which partly underpins the proposed FCB in Nigeria. 4  Competition policy is 
 
1 These problems were generally examined in chapter 2, but this chapter considers them within the context of 
Nigeria, surrogate for resource-dependent developing countries. 
2 T. Stewart et al., ‘Competition Law in Action: experiences from Developing Countries (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, 2007), 4. 
3 See R. Parakkal, ‘The WTO, competition policy and developing countries: A model of global governance’ 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA’s 49th Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, San 
Francisco, CA, USA, March 26, 2008. 
4 C.S. Schatan and E. Riveria (eds), Competition Policies in Emerging Economies: Lessons and Challenges 
from Central America and Mexico (Canada: A co-publication with the International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC) and the UN, 2003) 2. 
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expected to create an enabling environment for growth and economic development. As a 
result, a large number of resource-dependent and transition economies have adopted some 
forms of competition laws and policies in recent times.5 These are targeted at solving 
various competitive and macro-economic problems. Further, the ability of economic agents 
in these countries to influence public policy through different conduct and practices 
constitutes barriers to entry which hinder development of market competition, a situation 
made possible by the peculiar problems of resource-dependent economies. 6  These 
problems are often a combination of political, social and economic issues (micro-economic 
and competition concerns), but in relation to this thesis it is the economic issues that are 
more relevant. These are classified into primary and secondary problems. The first 
classification includes restrictive agreements, merger activities, monopoly and abuse of 
dominant position, weak institutional capability and low level of infrastructural 
development while the second classification generally concerns rent seeking, vulnerability 
to external shocks, high incidence of corruption, access to land, access to energy, resource 
curse or the Dutch Disease.7 
 
Consequently, this chapter focuses on three areas of regulation (as provided in the draft 
Bill) that may impact on competition and other particular problems in a resource-
dependent country. The areas are restrictive agreements, abuse of dominant position and 
 
5  See, generally the website of Global Competition Forum, Published at   
http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/gcfpaper.htm. Last visited on 4th April 2009. 
6 Riveria and Schatan, note 4, 9.  
7 The presence of a natural resource or wealth may somehow have debilitating effects or results in sectoral 
misallocation of resources, as well as causing overall macroeconomic imbalances in the economy of a nation 
and this incidence have often been referred to as either a resource curse or a Dutch disease, a term 
popularised in the late 1970s to refer to the decline of the manufacturing sector in Netherlands following its 
discovery of natural gas in the 1960s. See, M. Bruno and J. Sachs, ‘Energy resource allocation: a dynamic 
model of the Dutch disease’ Working Paper No.852 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1982), 3.  
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mergers and acquisitions. Thereafter, it further seeks to answer whether the inclusion of 
micro-economic goals in the draft FCB will lead to any inconsistencies in the application 
of competition law and policy. 
 
4.2 Background and History to Competition Policy in Nigeria  
In order to fully understand the approach to competition policy in Nigeria, a brief 
examination of some of its political and economic antecedents is considered necessary.  
The Nigerian economy between the 1950s and 1980s, like most Latin American countries, 
enjoyed an economic growth that was sustained by state control of prices, interest rates, 
subsidized and easy access to essential services for consumers and generous banking 
credits to producers.8 Additionally, it was boosted by the abundance of energy resources 
first discovered in 1956. However, enormous fiscal deficits, rent seeking, restrictive 
business practices and other associated problems with over dependence on income from its 
oil resources have brought to a close the growth it attained between this period (1950s and 
the 1980s) and thereby slowed down its economic development since the late 1990s.9 Its 
attempts at different fiscal policies and economic reforms such as privatisation and 
liberalisation have not been effective in transforming its economy to a truly competitive 
one.10 
 
In addition, empirical evidence from international experience confirms that while 
economic reforms, particularly trade liberalisation and privatisation, will contribute to 
improve the competition process in domestic markets, they provide no guarantees that 
 
8 P.M. Lewis, Growing Apart: Oil, Politics and Economic Changes in Indonesia and Nigeria (Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 2007), 129 
9 N. Okonjo-Nweala and P. Osafo-Kwaako, ‘Nigerian economic reforms: progress and challenges’ (2007) 
Working Paper No 6 Brookings Global Economic and Development, 7. 
10C. Schatan and E. Riveria, ‘Markets in Central America and Mexico: what is happening with competition? 
in Schatan and Riveria, note 3, 9. 
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these markets will function effectively without the need for any further regulatory controls 
against anti-competitive business practices.11 Therefore, it is not surprising that criticism 
has followed the liberalisation and privatisation of most of the public enterprises in 
Nigeria. These exercises were embarked upon in expectation of improvement in the 
performance of the sectors concerned and an improvement of Nigeria’s economic 
development. For instance, the energy sector has been subject to a very low level of 
operational and pricing inequalities while significant improvements have been recorded in 
the telecommunication sectors, but the overall effect has increased the potential conducive 
to collusion and other anti-competitive behaviours. This is because the larger percentage of 
ownership and control of the former public enterprises are now concentrated in a few 
private hands giving them significant economic and political powers to possibly influence 
competition and the regulatory process. The tendency by private enterprises to create 
private barriers to entry and exit and other anti-competitive agreements will not be 
automatically corrected by free market forces; rather there is an urgent need to address 
these. Otherwise the markets will not function effectively; market failures will become 
rampant and total welfare will not be maximized. In a situation like this economic 
development will be greatly hindered or unachievable. 
 
As a consequence, there have been calls by different groups, including development 
agencies like the World Bank, WTO, IMF, local policy makers, like the Consumer 
Protection Council of Nigeria and some academics in Nigeria, for the introduction of 
competition law and policy in Nigeria. 12 They expect this will complement other reform 
 
11 L. Cernat, ‘The role of competition in the promotion of competitiveness and development: experiences 
from a sample of developing countries’ (September 2004) Paper prepared for the 3rd International ICR 
Conference Pro-Poor Regulation and Competition Issues, Policies and Practices, Cape Town, South Africa, 
15. 
12 S.N. Ibeabuchi et al., ‘Liberalization and privatisation of public utilities in Nigeria’ in O.J.Nnanna et al., 
(ed.) Contemporary Economic Policy Issues in Nigeria (Abuja: Central Bank of Nigeria, 2003), 57. 
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programmes and also curb or mitigate some of the competitive problems and thereby 
stimulate or enhance economic development.13 These reforms were generally aimed at 
improving conditions of markets, maximizing the utilization of resources and supporting 
economic growth and development. The overall effects of these have not generally 
improved the competitiveness nor enhanced the economic growth of the Nigerian economy 
relative to its resource abundance although it is becoming more diversified and has started 
to attract more foreign investment and trade in recent times.14  
 
Nigeria is not only desirous of achieving sustainable development domestically but it 
wants its domestic firms to be able to compete effectively on the global scene. In addition, 
the ever increasing international economic integration involving desegregations of 
production processes (out-sourcing and off-shoring of  components) facilitated by modern 
information and communication technologies have continued to exert pressure on 
developing countries to adopt new approaches to develop their economies into more 
competitive ones to fit into and benefit from global structures. These approaches thus call 
for an embrace of competition culture, particularly clear competition law and policy.  This 
thesis argues that this will not only promote the establishment of a competitive process but 
it will go a long way to assure both local and foreign investors that its government is 
interested in establishing a conducive business environment and thereby facilitate trade and 
economic development. 
 
 
13 P. Marsden, ‘Building an effective competition law regime in Nigeria: establishing a local content and 
building international standards’, National Conference on Competition Law, International Law Institute and 
Lagos Business School, Nigeria, March 9th-10th 2006. 
14 I.S. Ukpata and G.A. Olukotun,’ The effect of organisational development in the Nigerian economy’ 
(2008) 2(5) African Journal of Business Management, 092. 
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As a result of the foregoing reasons, Nigeria actively began the process of enacting a 
competition law and policy around 2001 although the economic reforms that were initiated 
in the late 1980s also had the economic development in Nigeria as their main focus. The 
Federal Government of Nigeria in 2001 issued some directives for its banking sector to be 
restructured. Implicit in the directive is the idea that if the banks were recapitalized they 
will stimulate development of the other sectors of the economy.15 This is based on the 
view that the recapitalisation exercise will involve merger of banks and the new entities 
will then become more efficient to compete effectively within and outwith the country. 
This is the only sector that has witnessed some level of significant merger and acquisition 
activities in Nigeria: thus it will be used as a source of reference in the discussion of 
merger in this chapter. 
 
However, the directives concentrated on the benefits accruable from the restructuring 
exercise but failed to fully consider the likely negative effects that mergers could have on 
an economy. In the instant case there were 89 banks in Nigeria before the restructuring 
exercise and 10 out of the banks were the dominant banks with huge capital bases while 
the remaining 79 banks were medium scale banks.16  In addition the welfare effect in 
relation to the lending policy of the banks was not properly analysed before the exercise. 
The majority of businesses in Nigeria are small-scale enterprises and cottage industries 
which play very important roles in economic development. Apart from the Federal 
Government, they create the largest percentage of employment opportunities and resource 
utilization in Nigeria. Following the directive to recapitalize, the number of commercial 
banks was reduced to 21 as a result of mergers and acquisitions that took place, and this 
 
15 See Central Bank of Nigeria, ‘Guidelines and incentives on consolidation in the Nigeria banking Industry’ 
2004. Published at  http://www.cenbank.org.  Last visited on 4th April 2009. 
16 F.K Emeni and C. Okafor, ‘Effects of banks mergers and acquisition on small business lending in Nigeria’ 
(2008) (2) 9 African Journal of Business Management, 146. 
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affected their lending policy. They have now reduced their lending facilities to small and 
cottage industries. This was partly as a result of the decision to reduce their operational 
costs by reducing the number of branches they operate and centralization of their 
operations with modern information and telecommunication technologies.  
 
This development is not unusual. In fact a study conducted by Berger et al., found that 
when banks merge to become large banking institutions it results in two effects; dynamic 
and static effects.17 The dynamic effect is the resultant change in focus to reduce size, 
transaction costs and financial position while the static effect tends to be a reduction in the 
supply of small business lending per their asset base. In an economy like Nigeria with 
limited sources of finance for small businesses the overall effect might be a serious 
negative impact on the growth and development of the whole economy. Further, the sector 
is more attractive to the inflow of international investors who will both like to take 
advantage of the liberalisation of the sector (which offers a great degree of investment 
potential) and also require clear regulatory rules to safeguard their investment against any 
fear of changes in governmental policies.   
 
However, the result of the exercise could have been different had there been a substantive 
competition or merger control law in place. At that time the likely effect of the 
merger/acquisition was never in issue rather the concern was to strengthen the positions of 
the banks without any consideration to the effects this would have on the structure of the 
market, especially that it brought a reduction in the number of competitors, making it 
easier to form a collusive agreement among the few remaining banks. 
 
17 A.N. Berger et al., ‘The effects of bank mergers and acquisitions on small business lending’ (1988) Journal 
of Finance Economics, 188. 
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4.3 Introduction to the Nigerian Federal Competition Bill  
Following the liberalization and privatisation programme involving many of its publicly 
owned corporations, the Nigerian economy has continued to experience different forms of 
market distortions which have led to sharp increases in the price of goods and services. 
This will invariably lead to more concentration in some sectors of the economy, such as the 
financial and the energy sectors and possibly create more tension and conflicts in the 
country as a result of the other particular economic problems in the country. The 
emergence of the present draft FCB began in 2001 when the government formed a 
Competition and Antitrust Reform Committee to work with the Bureau of Public 
Enterprise (BPE) to design a competition policy for Nigeria. 18  This committee later 
commissioned an American firm to draft a competition law. This draft and other proposed 
competition law legislation were harmonised in 2005 by the Federal Ministry of Justice in 
conjunction with the Federal Executive Council (FEC); resulting in the present Federal 
Competition Bill before the National Assembly. 
 
The main focus of the draft Bill is enshrined in its Preamble and Section 2. The Preamble 
provides as follows: 
An act to establish the federal competition commission, promote the balanced 
development of the national economy, welfare and interest of consumers, 
maintain and encourage competition by prohibiting restrictive business 
practices that substantially lessen competition, prevent the abuse of dominant 
positions of market power in Nigeria and for matters connected therewith. 
 
18The Bureau of Public Enterprises, Nigeria is the agency established by law and charged with the 
responsibility of implementing the Federal Government of Nigeria’s policies on privatisation and 
liberalisation.  See http://www.bpeng.org/NR/rdonlyres/D78D9627-8960-43FF-A411-
855A9488542A/0/CompetitionBill.doc. Last visited on 4th April 2009. 
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Additionally, the objectives of the Bill are set out in Section 2 as follows:  
(a) the balanced development of the Nigeria economy; 
(b) the welfare and interests of consumers, and provide them with competitive 
price and product choices; 
(c) maintain, and encourage competition and enhance economic 
efficiency in production, trade and commerce; 
(d) expansion of opportunities for domestic enterprises to participate 
in world markets; 
(e) and (sic) enhance the ability of small and medium enterprises to 
compete effectively; and 
(f) prohibit restrictive business practices which prevents, (sic) restricts (sic) or 
distorts (sic) competition or constitutes the abuse of a dominant position 
of market power in Nigeria. 19 
 
Arguably, the preamble is made very broad to accommodate competition goals, micro- 
economic goals, as well as other goals that might be connected with the Nigerian economy. 
These goals are further listed in Section 2 to underscore their importance. The provisions 
 
19 The original Bill as prepared by a consultant has undergone some changes and the current draft FCB is 
attached in the Appendix but the old draft available on   the website of the Bureau of Public Enterprises, 
Nigeria, (an agency established by law and charged with the responsibility of implementing the Federal 
Government of Nigeria’s policies on privatisation and liberalisation) has not been changed. See 
http://www.bpeng.org/NR/rdonlyres/D78D9627-8960-43FF-A411-855A9488542A/0/CompetitionBill.doc. 
Last visited on 4th April 2009. 
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of sub-sections 2 (a), (b), (c), and (f) align with the main goal of competition policy, that is, 
consumer welfare and economic efficiency but the provisions of other competing values in 
sub-sections 2 (d) and (e) are micro-economic goals which at first sight  might appear 
capable of  leading to inconsistencies in the application of competition policy. In the EU 
and the US the protection of consumer welfare and efficient allocation of resources form 
the basis of their competition laws. Thus the assertion by D.P. Wood that the: 
 Protection of small and medium-sized businesses, codes of fair competitive 
 conduct, macro-economic policies such as employment and anti-inflation   
 measures, have no place in the US antitrust laws. 20 
 
However, it could be argued that the Nigerian situation is quite different from the US and 
the EU circumstances, other competing values not catered for in other jurisdiction could be 
allowed. In fact there is nothing unusual with the focus of its proposed competition Bill. 
Section 2 of the South African Competition Act 1998 similarly provides for economic 
efficiency as its main goal alongside other goals. These other goals include promotion of 
employment, promotion of small enterprises and promotion of ownership and wealth 
distribution among historically disadvantaged people. 
 
In practice these other competing values are made subject to the main goals associated with 
competition laws. The South African Competition Act includes a novel feature of public 
policy that allows competition to address socio-economic problems that are not directly 
competition concerns but which could impact negatively on the competition process. For 
instance the section addresses the high level of concentration in the South African 
 
20 D.P. Wood, ‘International standard for competition law: an idea whose time has not come’ (1996) 
Programme for the Study of International Organisation (PSIO) Occasional Paper Geneva: Switzerland, 18.   
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economy (in terms of ownership and share) an opportunity for the disadvantaged members 
of the society to become empowered through different schemes, particularly employment 
programmes.21 In some cases, especially merger activities,  the fear that these might result 
in job losses for some section of the society, the provision of this section has had to be 
balanced with the overall objective of competition policy.22 
 
4.4 An Overview of Nigerian draft Federal Competition Bill (FCB) 
The draft FCB under consideration by the Nigerian National Assembly is to be primarily 
enforced by an administrative body known as federal competition commission (FCC) by 
way of public enforcement.23 It contains seventy-six sections, although there are some 
provisions therein not directly related to competition but related to trade, commerce and 
industrial policy meant to promote social cohesion. 24  The focus of the Bill is both 
exploitative and exclusionary abuses. It is an amalgam of the American antitrust laws and 
the EU approach to competition. Thus it combines some of the substance of the American 
antitrust provisions and EU competition25 policy respectively. This is shown, for example, 
in the wording of the provision of section 29 of the draft FCB which makes it unlawful to 
enter into any contracts, understanding, combinations and arrangements that restrict or 
likely to restrict competition in Nigeria. Similarly section 31 prohibits all agreements 
between enterprises which have or are likely to restrict or distort the competition process in 
a market in Nigeria. In addition while Part VIII, particularly sections 36 to 47, deal with 
 
21 D. Lewis, ‘The objectives of competition law and policy and the optimal design of a competition agency’ 
OECD Global Forum on Competition, (10-11 February 2003, Paris), 4 
22 Unilever PLC/Competition Commission v CEPPWAWU [2001-2002] CPLR 336 (CT). This case 
demonstrates how the public interest concerning protection of employment is considered under the South 
African Competition Act. Every merger notice lodged with the Competition Commission must be served on 
trade union or employees’ representative involved in the sector concerned and their input could significantly 
affect any merger decision likely to be reached. 
23 A detailed examination of the function and role of the FCC will be examined in the section that deals with 
design of a competition authority. 
24 See Section 8(a)-(e), Nigerian Federal Competition Bill. 
25 Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 1890, and Articles 81 and 82 EC.   
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conduct which can be abuse Part XI deals with mergers, acquisitions and takeovers, and 
monopoly respectively.  
 
It has earlier been discussed that the draft Bill is quite expansive.  It is arguable that the 
reason for this is to make it comprehensive enough to catch as many anti-competitive 
practices as possible. It contains sixteen parts. Part I sets out the preliminary provisions; 
these include its objectives, the ambit of its application, which comprise all economic 
conduct within and outside Nigeria by persons resident or carrying on business in Nigeria 
to the extent that such conduct substantially affects a market in Nigeria. Some of the 
provisions of this part are both appropriate and instructive. For instance, Section 1 gives a 
list of activities and persons exempted from the application of the draft law. These include 
association of employees for their own reasonable protection, collective bargaining 
agreements by employers and certain services by a group of professional were exempted 
from the ambit of the draft FCB. In addition this exemption is not closed but will be 
subject to a periodic review by its designated competition commission. This approach is 
similar to the past practice that was adopted in the definition of undertaking under Article 
81 EC. Given the close similarity in substance and form when the draft Bill is enacted it is 
probable that its implementation will follow closely the past practice in the EU. The EU 
adopts a functional approach in the definition of the category of persons and economic 
activities covered by the application of Article 81 which prohibits agreements, decisions by 
association of undertakings and concerted practices that distort competition.26  
 
 
26 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Case, and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 129. 
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The central purpose of the Bill contained in section 2, is very broad and it reveals other 
aims not totally premised on competition law. It has multiple goals which might hinder the 
design of a clear framework for its application. It aims to promote the ‘balanced 
development’ of the Nigerian economy by promoting and protecting the competition 
process and interests of consumers. The phrase ‘balanced development’ has different 
meaning in economics and planning. One meaning relates to economic activity and 
distribution of wealth that allows even access across different sectors of a society in 
opposition to uneven development.27  Another meaning is to relate economic development 
with provision of basic infrastructure rather than redistribution of wealth in a society.  It is 
not yet clear from an initial examination of the Bill how this objective would be actualised. 
The question that comes to mind is whether these will be carried out with implementation 
of other fiscal policies and how this would be measured in relative terms remains an 
interesting conjecture. 
 
However, on the surface, the FCB is intended to foster economic development in Nigeria, 
but there is nowhere in the Bill where this aim was clarified. A  careful look at Section 1(5) 
of the draft indicates that in certain cases the determination of what is ‘reasonable or 
desirable’ for the economic development of Nigeria will be subject to the dictates of the 
President on the advice of the National Economic Council (NEC) and in consultation with 
the FCC. This might lead to a great confusion and waste of time that could not be afforded 
in competition matters, especially since the draft did not provide any time frame within 
which the President might act. This is analogous to the concept of ‘public or national 
interest’ in competition.28  This is controversial because both concepts are ambiguous and 
 
27See generally D. Massey, Spatial Divisions of Labour, (London: Macmillan, 1984).  
28 Public interest is provided for in Article of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Act, 2007- Article 1 states: ‘This 
Law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and curbing monopolistic conduct, protecting fair market 
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could allow political and other interests to influence competition decisions under the guise 
of reasonableness or desirability. It could be argued that the provision will allow the 
government some level of leverage considering the fact that the economy has particular 
problems and it is undergoing a liberalization process. Its consumers see the government as 
the best guarantor of their interests, thus the section should be retained for a limited period 
pending the time that a stable competition culture would have been established in the 
country. 
 
Furthermore, another major aim of the draft FCB is the promotion of the welfare and 
interests of consumers through competitive prices and product choices. Achieving this 
objective would likely prove to be a difficult task for the FCC for two reasons. Firstly, the 
concept ‘interests of consumers’ is wide and is more of consumer protection law. This area 
of law regulates relationships between consumers and business as it relates to product 
liability, privacy rights, fraud, misrepresentation or misleading advertisement and other 
unfair business practices targeted at consumers in most cases. Both competition law and 
consumer law have common roots in economics but there are fundamental differences in 
focus and how the two laws are implemented.29 Thus to make this part of the aim of the 
proposed competition law will not only lead to confusion but uncertainty, especially with 
regards to consumers’ expectations, which are best catered for by laws dealing with 
consumer protection. Secondly, competition does not create markets rather it seeks to 
enhance the efficient functioning of markets in order to enhance consumer welfare. This 
role pre-supposes the availability of an appropriate market structure that is yet to be fully 
developed in Nigeria.  
 
competition, enhancing economic efficiency, maintaining the consumer interests and the public interests, and 
promoting the healthy development of socialist market economy’.  
29 T.B. Leary, ‘Competition law and consumer protection law: two wings of the same house’ 2004 Published 
at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/0410221earsyarticle.pdf. Last visited on 4th April 2009. 
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This goal along with the other broad goals is not unusual; it is similar to the initial broad 
objectives of competition policy in the European Community and the recent approach of 
the Chinese Antimonopoly Law of 2007.30 It only shows again that competition statutes 
often contain goals that are not based entirely on the economic undertone of competition. 
Market integration was at the heart of the EC competition policy but since the attainment 
of an internal market the approach has shifted more towards the implementation of 
economic efficiency, so it should not come as a surprise if the focus of the draft Bill shifts 
as a result of changes in the economic situation in Nigeria. This is premised on the view 
that as economic circumstances change the aim of law as an instrument of state policy to 
achieve economic development shifts to a vision of law as a framework for market 
operation and constitutive part of development.31 
 
However, the draft Bill takes cognizance of the presence of other sectoral regulations for 
the utility sector. It aims to ensure a balance and possibly a unity of purpose between the 
application of competition rules and whatever regulation that is in place to regulate the 
public utilities that have become liberalized. In section 2, it provides that before the FCC 
takes any action relating to the public utilities, it should first consult with the sectoral 
regulator involved. This approach will put off any potential conflict or friction between the 
FCB and any other utility regulator. For example the Nigerian Communication Act 2007 
makes provisions for a regulator to ensure fair competition, misuse of market power and 
 
30 See also M. Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 178. 
31 D.M. Trebek and A. Santos, ‘Introduction to the third moment in law and development theory and the 
emergence of a new critical practice’ in D. Trebek and A. Santos, (eds.), The New Law and Economic 
Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2006), 1. 
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other anticompetitive practices in the communication sector.32  Although ‘utilities’ are not 
defined in the draft Bill, it is not clear whether the draftsman confused utilities with the 
regulated industries in general. The body responsible for the public utilities mentioned in 
Section 2 is deemed to be the regulatory agency as defined in Section 114(13).  This in any 
case may not eliminate totally the probability of confusion in future because a careful 
reading of Sections 84 to 85 along with Section 2 shows that the definition of regulated 
industry is couched very wide and the FCC is rather given too much flexibility in its 
powers to designate or determine which industry could be regarded as a regulated industry.  
Rather it may lead to agencies working at cross purposes and act as disincentive to trade 
and commerce. 
 
In addition, section 7 gives the jurisdictional scope of the draft Bill. It provides as follows:  
This Act shall apply to all conducts within and outside the territory of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria by any person resident or carrying on business in 
Nigeria to the extent that such conduct substantially affects a market in 
Nigeria. 
This is very consistent with application of other competition regimes like the EU 
competition law and the American antitrust provisions, particularly the Sherman Act,33 
where the effects doctrine among others as a basis of extraterritorial application of 
competition law is well founded. For example the main provisions of the EU competition 
law, Articles 81 EC and 82 EC did not expressly provide for extraterritorial application, 
 
32 Section 1 Nigerian Communications Act (2003 No. 19) now known as Competition Practices Regulations, 
2007. 
33 R.Y. Jennings, ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction and the United States antitrust laws (1957) 33 British Yearbook 
of International Law 146.  See also, J.P. Griffin, ‘Foreign governments’ reactions to the US assertions of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction’ (1998) 19 ECLR 64. 
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but it has continued to found its extraterritorial application on three doctrines, namely the 
economic entity doctrine, implementation doctrine and the effects doctrine.34 Whether or 
not the FCC will be able to enforce its extraterritorial reach will offer interesting analysis 
when the draft Bill is adopted and comes into operation. 
 
Furthermore agreements and other economic conduct will only be relevant for the purposes 
of Part 1 of the draft Bill if they are capable of having a substantial effect on a market in 
Nigeria. Economic transactions concluded outside the shores of Nigeria, but which lack or 
have no substantial effect on the Nigerian economy will not be regulated by the draft FCB. 
In most cases, the existence of an agreement is not usually the problem; rather it is whether 
or not such an agreement restricts or has the potential to restrict competition that lies at the 
heart of competition authorities’ intervention.35 Although there are some agreements that 
might impinge negatively on competition, nevertheless, they might not be prohibited or 
attract any serious concern from competition agencies. This happens in cases where the 
effects of such agreements are of minor importance. An example of this is the de minimis 
doctrine in the EU that was first formulated by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Volk 
v Vervaecke where it declared that ‘an agreement falls outside the prohibition in Article 
81(1) where it has only an insignificant effect on the market, taking into account the weak 
position which the persons concerned have on the market of the product in question’.36 
There are different thresholds to determine the effect of agreements on competition. The 
 
34 See D. Geradin et al., Extraterritoriality, comity and cooperation in EC competition law’ (July 2008) 
Published at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?  Last visited on 4th April 2009. 
35 At least in the EU the term ‘agreement’ is often treated broadly and objectively. It is not restricted to 
written formal agreement alone but it includes oral agreement; however, this is prohibited only where there is 
an element of collusion to hinder competition, as is the case in most cartel agreements. In the lead judgement 
of the case of ACF Chemifarma v Commission (Quinine), the court found that an unsigned agreement comes 
under the ambit of agreements prohibited in Article 81 of the EC Treaty. – Cases 41, 44 and 45 [1970] ECR 
661.  
36 Case 5/69 [1969] ECR 295. 
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EU’s approach is ‘appreciability’, while the approach of some other jurisdictions is simply 
whether the agreement restricts or does not restrict competition, so in the former an 
agreement that obviously restricts competition might be declared valid if it has only a 
minimal effect on competition and/or trade. 
 
 The express requirement for the effect to be substantial lessening of competition in the 
draft FCB is good drafting. This was absent in the provision of Article 81 EC. It was the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) that gave initial direction on the doctrine before the 
Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance was published in 2001. 37   
However the draft Bill does not have any provisions for some agreements which may not 
substantially affect a market but which can still hinder or distort competition. Small and 
medium enterprises are likely to be the ones to be affected by such conduct. This may 
proved to be a disadvantage and a negation of the intention of the draftsman to enhance the 
ability of small and medium enterprises to compete effectively.  
 
A prima facie examination of the provision of sections 8 and 9 the draft FCB shows it is 
more than a mere legal instrument but a broad legal policy framework for a number of 
reasons. Chiefly among which is the question that section 9 raises, that is whether the draft 
Bill should serve as an instrument for the purpose of facilitating and developing a 
competitive market economy or should it be   employed based on the understanding that a 
free market already exist in Nigeria. This is because a teleological interpretation of section 
1 is to the effect that competition in Nigeria is aimed at creating and maintaining 
competition rather than to promote competition. Yet it is impossible to reasonably 
appreciate the provisions of section 1 without considering the provisions of sections 8 and 
 
37 See the Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance OJ [2001] C 368/13. 
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9. Thus it could be concluded that a joint reading of these sections shows that the goals and 
objectives contained therein are purposely made wide as well as flexible and meant to be a 
complete competition policy for the whole economy. 
 
How the Federal Competition Commission will carry out these objectives remains an 
interesting issue especially that it is not a major government department and its resources 
and expected budget allocation will be quite limited. For instance, the country needs 
adequate infrastructure for efficient functioning of its markets in all of its major sectors 
like electricity and communication sectors. It is not within the powers of the FCC to build 
or create these infrastructures rather it lies within the expected obligation of governments 
to provide an enabling environment and build markets to aid their economies. Information 
asymmetry is often as a result of well-defined markets and competition authorities will not 
be effective where information and data are difficult to access. A detailed examination of 
the powers and function of the FCC in view of the role of competition authorities will be 
done in the next chapter. 
 
Part VII is directed at monopoly and market power, particularly sections 36 to 41 which 
deals with abuse of dominant position and market power but surprisingly, Part XI, 
particularly sections 66 to 76, is further designed to deal specifically with monopoly. The 
joint provision of the two approaches tends toward over-regulation and this could lead to a 
great confusion for not just the businesses involved who desire clear rules to function 
effectively but the FCC also is likely to find it difficult to build a solid legacy based on 
multiple tools without either established staff or successful history of competition 
administration. Besides this, while sections 36 to 41 make ample provisions for the 
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treatment of abuses of dominant position in a similar fashion to that of Article 82 EC, they 
leave many gaps unfilled. For example, the FCB fails to provide any necessary connection 
between dominance and Nigeria unlike the provision of Article 82 that requires that the 
dominant position must be held in the ‘common market or a substantial part of it’. There is 
therefore an absence of the geographical link necessary for the establishment of dominance 
and one is left to ask whether it is dominance at large that is required or where the 
dominance is held is irrelevant. This type of lacuna is also evident in Articles 17 to 19 of 
the Chinese Antimonopoly Law.38   
 
4.4.1 Agreements, Contracts, Arrangements and Restrictive Practices 
Within the context of a resource-dependent developing country like Nigeria, certain 
structural factors (such as high concentration, information asymmetry and lack of entry), 
price transparency and pricing contracts are continuing economic realities that impact on 
its economic development. As a result, the need to mitigate or reduce the impact of these 
factors must have informed the provision of section 114 of the FCB concerning 
‘agreements’. It defines ‘agreement’ as contracts, arrangements, or understanding (written 
or oral) and concerted practices while restrictive practices are defined in the same section 
to mean practices in restraint of trade or which otherwise hinder competition. Generally the 
substance of the provisions of part V1 is the prevention of collusion between firms or 
parties which substantially lessen competition or are detrimental to consumer welfare.39 
One precise feature in the draft FCB is that agreements could either be in writing or oral 
based on some form of consensus likely to undercut the competition process 
 
 
38 The Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China 2007. 
39 See sections 29 to 31 (1) of the draft FCB in the Appendix.  
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The meaning of an ‘agreement’ read along the provisions of sections 29, 30 and 31 is that 
‘agreement’ is not limited to a formal contract but will include other transactions which are 
unenforceable at law due to lack of consideration, infringement of public policy, lack of 
capacity and other factors. What is important is the intention of the parties to conduct 
themselves in certain ways on the market that will lessen competition. The provisions of 
this part raise some other issues. First of all, the use of the word ‘parties’ in section 29 is 
synonymous with the word  ‘enterprises’ as used in other parts of the draft FCB to denote 
anyone involved in business. Thus the Bill will also be applicable to the various Nigerian 
government parastatals or departments involved in the market. Prior to the privatisation 
and liberalisation programmes the government’s economic involvement in the economy 
was through these entities and it still retains substantial levels of interests in most of the 
sectors particularly in the energy, telecommunication and natural resources sectors. This 
will provide an open playing field and reduce any incidence of creating entry barriers 
through governmental influence. Secondly, while the provision of the section seems to be 
an amalgam of the language of the Sherman Act, EC competition law and the UK’s 
Competition Act 1998, the overall intention and effect is to prohibit anticompetitive 
agreements and other forms of conduct between enterprises which are not expressly 
prohibited for in the draft FCB. The decision to make the definition of an ‘agreement’ very 
flexible might be in the best interest of the Nigerian economy which is still growing in all 
ramifications. It does not seem to be a better option to adopt a rigid approach.   
 
4.4.1.1 Elements of Section 29 to 31 
Before a breach of the provisions herein could be found will require the following; 
• the existence of parties or undertakings, 
 136
                                                
• collusion between the parties or undertakings via contracts, arrangements, 
understanding, agreements, concerted practices or combination thereof 
• the collusion has substantial lessening effects on competition 
• the collusion has or is likely to have effects within a market in Nigeria.  
 
4.4.1.2 Parties or Undertakings 
The first element of the provision, that is, the concept of ‘parties or undertaking’ is wide 
but the definition of an undertaking is not expressly provided for in the Bill. Rather from 
the interpretation section it is referred to as an enterprise, which is also defined as any one 
involved in business   and the Bill defines a business as follows:  
‘Business’ means any undertaking that is carried on for gain or reward; or in 
the course of which goods or services are acquired or supplied; or any interest 
in land is acquired or disposed of, otherwise than free of charge.40 
A clearer definition will be preferable to avoid any confusion, although it is probable that 
its interpretation might follow the approach in the EU where many cases have dealt with 
the concept and arrived at a distinct characteristic for the concept. However, a party or an 
undertaking in this context is an economic entity engaged in economic activity irrespective 
of its legal status or how it is being financed.41  Thus it could be argued that in view of the 
additional provisions in section 1(6) the Federal Government of Nigeria, states and local 
governments or any other parastatals and every natural person and body involved in trade 
or commercial activity will be regarded as enterprises for the purposes of this draft Bill.   
 
40 The Draft Bill, Section 114. 
41 For a more detailed explanation see, Case C-41/90 Hofner & Elser v Macrotron [1991] ECR 1-1979. 57-
98.  
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4.4.1.3 Forms of Collusion 
The draft FCB gives a very wide allowance for the forms of collusion which may be 
regulated by the FCC. These are basically contacts, arrangements, agreements, 
understandings, concerted practices or combinations. The wide ambit of the provision 
suggests that it is meant to both protect the process of competition and the position of the 
competitors as well considering the facts that most of the competitors in the Nigerian 
economy are small and susceptible to the likely impact of market power of the dominant 
firms or merger activities within and outwith Nigeria. Thus it is expected to catch as many 
restrictive agreements as possible but it is not possible to set a clear list of the agreements 
that it prohibits. The FCC will need to be firm and objective in assessing the actual or 
potential impact of an agreement rather than an assumption that agreements that come up 
under the list should attract sanction. For example some agreements by a large firm with 
considerable market power might affect the competitive process more than a similar 
agreement by a smaller firm. This position finds much support from the provision and 
interpretation of Article 81(1) EC. For example in Bayer AG v Commission,42 the meaning 
of an agreement was extensively examined, this rests on a subjective element that defines 
the nature of the concept of agreement. Thus an agreement can be bilateral or multi-lateral 
and could be a form of consensus or meeting of minds between two or more undertakings 
on the implementation of a policy or plan on a market.  
 
42 Case T-41/96, Bayer AG v Commission [2000] ECR II-3383, affirmed on appeal Cases C-2&3/01 P, 
Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure EV and Commission v  Bayer AG[2004] ECR 1-23.     
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4.4.1.4 Effect 
The draft Bill adopts a pro-active approach to deal with collusion. Although anti-
competitive agreements restrict competition, in the draft Bill there is no need to show that 
an agreement has already produced such an effect or that the agreement is already in 
practice. This may appear to be favourable for easy administration but the introduction of 
criminal sanction to the enforcement of the prohibition in sections 29 and 31 could create 
legal technicalities which could lead to delay in justice and further distortion of 
competition process. Ideally time is of essence in competition matters and if the draft Bill 
will focus on using only commercial principles and use of civil remedies to deal with anti-
competitive agreements then the enforcement and other activities involved will not be 
slowed down by consideration of criminal principles such as the need to consider the 
mental state of the parties which could be used as a successful defence in criminal matters.  
 
However, for an agreement or any business practice to be caught by the provision of 
sections 29 and 30 it must have as its effect ‘prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition’. The FCB provides a list of examples of agreements targeted; these include 
price-fixing, market sharing agreements, production control, collusive tendering and a few 
others. The examples given in the draft Bill are not exhaustive and more conduct could still 
be caught in line with the criteria in the draft Bill. It is necessary to note that the draft Bill 
did not mention object of the agreement to be prohibited rather it referred to the effect of 
an agreement but a careful reading of section 29(1) b will show that parties involved a trust 
or any conspiracy in restraint of trade normally have an objective of undercutting the 
competition process. It might be necessary for this to be considered in the amendment 
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before the Bill is passed into law.  
 
In addition, in cases where the ECJ could not find that that an agreement was intended to 
restrict or hinder competition, it would go further to examine the effect of that agreement, 
but examining the effect of an agreement is quite more difficult than determining its 
object. 43  The former requires robust economic analysis along with the necessary 
consideration of the legal circumstances of the agreement involved. This points further to 
the need to have qualified personnel to undertake this form of analysis; this requirement 
will be treated in depth in the section concerning design of a competition authority in 
Nigeria.  
 
Although, unlike the provision of Article 81 EC, which states clearly that the effect or 
object of the provision is restriction of trade within the EC, the draft FCB did not define 
the jurisdictional boundary of the provision which for all intents and purposes is assumed 
to be within the Nigerian economy. It is expected that this omission might be corrected 
before the final passage of the Bill. It could also be argued that since the jurisdictional 
elements of the draft Bill are dealt with in the requirement that the antic-competitive effect 
must be impacted in Nigeria, then one can do without the requirement that trade or 
competition in Nigeria must be affected by the anti-competitive agreement.  
 
43 This approach is demonstrated in Case - 306/96- Javico v Yves St Laurent [1998] ECR I-1983. 
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4.4.2 Abuse of Dominant Position or Market Power 
Part VII of the draft FCB deals with abuse of dominant position or market power. The 
concept of abuse as is recognised globally deals with competition problems that may arise 
from the unilateral behaviour of businesses possessing economic power. These provisions 
are modelled after Article 82 EC, but the FCB contains more provisions than the 
provisions found in the EC Treaty.  According to section 37 (1) of the FCB, any conduct 
on the part of one or more enterprises which amounts to the abuse of a dominant position 
in market is prohibited.  
 
Section 4 of the FCB deals with the determination of the existence of market dominance 
and a proper interpretation of this could only be done by having recourse to the provisions 
of section 36 dealing with the concept of dominant position or market power. This is 
described as significant market power by one or more enterprises which give them the 
ability to control prices, exclude competition or affect the competition process in a relevant 
market independently of their competitors or customers. This provision recognises both 
individual and collective dominance similarly to the reference ‘to one or more 
undertakings’ in Article 82 EC.  
 
Measuring dominance is not very easy in practice, although it is all about market power but 
market power must be in relation to a relevant market. A likely problem for a competition 
agency in resource-dependent developing country is the issue of information. It is the 
economic actors that posses privileged information about their activities, especially in 
terms of efficiency gains, market power and the extent of their relationship with each other. 
This information is very important to effective implementation of competition policies and 
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lack of it will pose a great constraint to making well informed decisions. It is arguable that 
section 36 allows a flexible approach in the wide margin it provides for the measurement 
of a dominant position in a relevant market given the difficulties that lack of appropriate 
information might give. It provides that such a position will exist if one or more companies 
individually or collectively has or have a share of more or than forty percent of the relevant 
market. It goes further to provide that they can also be in this position if they have the 
ability to control prices or exclude competition or distort the competition process to an 
appreciable extent independently of other competitors or customers.  
 
Consequently, the flexible margin given to the measurement of market power and 
dominance in section 36 is commendable because the draftsman seems to have taken into 
consideration the peculiar economic circumstances of Nigeria which could make it difficult 
to determine efficiently a dominant position and its abuse. These economic conditions 
include fragmented and small nature of economic activities in form of small businesses 
which makes it difficult to measure their market power and absence of accurate data 
concerning these small enterprises. As a result, the additional express prohibitions in Part 
IX, particularly sections 42 to 47, which deal with resale price maintenance, individual 
resale price maintenance and patented products, appear very strategic to deal with all other 
forms of restrictive business practices that might not be caught by reference to abuse of an 
ordinary or collective dominance. In any case, when the Bill is enacted there will still be 
the need for additional guidance to avoid over-regulation due to the expansive nature of the 
provisions, and also to enhance the manageable balance of the objects of the Bill along 
with other issues that may pose as challenges to a new competition authority in a resource-
dependent country that used to be characterised with publicly owned companies  
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gain maximally from the liberalisation of their economies.45 These activities conform to 
                                                
 
It is commendable that the draftsman of the Bill recognised the role that fines can play in 
dissuading economic agents from engaging in anti-competitive agreements.44 To serve as 
an effective tool, fines must really be higher than the profits economic agents are likely 
derive from the prohibited acts else they will opt to carry out their activities against the risk 
of paying lesser fines if they were discovered. In the draft Bill, apart from the stipulation of 
specific amount of penalties likely to be paid, the FCC is also empowered to elect to apply 
a sanction that is six times the amount of profit made or likely to be made by the offending 
economic agents. This provides a leeway for the FCC to apply the maximum penalty to a 
larger company which in the absence of the probability of the risk of a bigger penalty will 
rather elect to breach the law because it will still been possible to make profit after the 
fines have been paid. Thus this flexibility given in the sanction process can be quite 
effective in discouraging anticompetitive behaviours. Further, provision of a leniency 
scheme in the draft FCB could also prove to be very effective and less expensive in 
enforcement activities.  
 
4.4.3 Merger Provisions in the Draft FCB 
Nigeria, like other developing countries, has witnessed an increase in economic 
restructuring and merger/acquisition related activities within the last decade. This is fuelled 
by the increasing globalisation of the world economy which has prompted the need for 
developing countries to adopt measures towards attracting more foreign investments and 
 
44 For example, the Draft Bill, Section 10(10) (b).  
45 W. Carlin and P. Seabright, ‘The importance of competition in developing countries for productivity and 
velopment Report. innovation’ (2001) Background paper for World De
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Developing countries are clearly affected directly by the monopoly power 
effects of international mergers when a foreign multinational acquires a 
what has been described as the ‘competition culture’ essential for economic 
development.46   
 
An important consequence of these merger/ restructuring activities is always the intention 
to retain some form of ownership control and depending on the structure of the market 
before and after the merger this could impact negatively on competition and  on economic 
development.  The recent attempts at economic policy reform in Nigeria reinforce this 
point. This was mainly in its energy, communication and financial sectors.47 It is arguable, 
(although not based on any empirical data but from the general feeling in Nigeria) that the 
presence of a competition law or merger control regime during the recent restructuring and 
merger activities of the financial sector in Nigeria could have yielded a different result. 
Thus considerable attention will be given to examination of merger provisions in the draft 
Bill. 
 
In addition, with privatisation and the liberalisation of its economy Nigeria is likely to 
witness more influx of foreign investors through international acquisitions/mergers which 
could lead to increased market power of large multinationals and the potential for abuse of 
market power. In support of this view is Ajit Singh’s argument that: 
                                                 
46According to Nicholson, ‘the term has been coined to describe the social political climate for antitrust 
policy, which could include political will, regulatory expertise, efficient enforcement, control of corruption, 
sufficient resources dedicated to the task. See, M. W. Nicholson, ‘Quantifying antitrust regimes’ Federal 
Trade Commission, 2004 Published at  
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp267.pdf Last visited on 4th April 2009, 5.   
47 ‘Banking consolidation: The making of history’ Financial Standard, 16th  January 2006, 2. 
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Given the lack of experience of Nigeria with competition law or policy, the draftsman of 
the draft Bill must have taken this into consideration in the provisions relating to merger 
 
The first striking feature in the merger provisions in the draft FCB is the wide and broad 
definition and description of a ‘merger’ that may be subject to the provisions of the Bill.  
                                                
domestic firm. However, they are also affected indirectly even when mergers 
take place outside their jurisdictions, e.g. within advanced countries 
themselves.48 
and acquisition under the Bill. The draft Bill does not expressly give definition of a merger 
rather it provides a description of when enterprises cease to be distinct and therefore 
become a merged entity. This occurs when they are brought under a common ownership or 
control.49  Section 49 of the draft Bill further gives a broad list of instances when changes 
in either ownership or control could qualify as a merger.50 
This will likely bring into focus many transactions that are not usually regarded as 
mergers. This definition is similar to the definition employed for merger review under the 
 
48 A. Singh, ‘Competition competition policy in emerging markets: international developmental dimensions’ 
(2002) ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 246, 12. 
49 The Draft Bill, Section 48(1) 
50 Section 49 (1) For the purposes of this Act, any two enterprises shall be regarded as ceasing to be distinct 
enterprises, if either (a) they are brought under common ownership or common control (whether or not the 
business to which either of them formerly belonged continues to be carried on under the same or different 
ownership or control); or (b) the enterprise ceases to be carried on at all and does so in consequence of any 
arrangement or transaction entered into to prevent competition between the enterprises. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, enterprises shall (without prejudice to the generality of 
the words “common control” in that subsection) be regarded as being under common control if they are(a) 
enterprises of interconnected bodies corporate; or (b) enterprises carried on by two or more bodies corporate 
of which one and the same person or group of persons have control over it; or (c) enterprises carried on by a 
body corporate and an enterprise carried on by a person or group of persons having control of that body 
corporate.  
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The second striking feature is the provision for two stages of merger control. The first 
 
First, the position of the ‘Minister’ in merger review here will bring in a lot of political and 
                                                
Fair Trade Act UK 1973 (FTA) which was subject to much criticism51 but following recent 
reforms provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA) now govern merger review in the UK. 
It is assumed that lessons from the UK’s experience and recent reform should have guided 
the drafters of the FCB rather they seem to have taken the UK’s former precedent verbatim 
without any justification or qualification. Before the Bill is passed into law it is imperative 
that this anomaly might be corrected during legislative debates to avoid any disputes likely 
arise when this Bill is being implemented. 
stage gives the Minister the power to initiate and make decisions on merger applications.52 
The second empowers the FCC to oversee pre-merger approvals and all other matters 
related to a merger application.53 This is also very similar to the approach adopted under 
the UK’s Fair Trade Act (FTA) which has now been replaced by the provisions contained 
in the Enterprise Act. It is could be argued that the same defects inherent in the merger 
review provisions of the FTA will occur in the present FCB in many ways.  
public policy consideration into matters that most likely require economic consideration, 
particularly that the decision to refer any qualifying mergers to FCC for investigation rests 
with the Minister who might not follow any clear and objective standard in his decision 
making but may be swayed by political influences to make decisions inimical to the 
 
51 For more details, See T. Ellis, ‘A survey of the government control of mergers in the United Kingdom’ 
(1971) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 22, 251-299 and 459-497. 
52 The Draft Bill, Section 48. 
53 The Draft Bill, Sections 59 and 60. 
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competition process.54 The Minister is not mandated in the Bill to give reasoned decisions 
but he or she is not unlikely to do so in practice due to the commercial nature of the subject 
in issue. Even in cases where the Minister decides to refer a merger for investigation, he or 
she is not under any obligation to follow the recommendation of the FCC. A 
recommendation from the FCC is only advisory and the Minister is not under any 
obligation to follow them. Second, it is not clear the particular ‘Minister’ referred to in the 
draft FCB; is it the Minister for finance, or Minister of justice or Minister for commerce 
and industry that is in view. There is a need to clarify which Minister is intended especially 
that the holder of the office is not permanent, the intended Minister is also expected to 
have a reasonable appreciation of the substance of the issues involved.  
 
However it could be argued that the provision giving power to the minister to refer a 
merger and the clear omission to specify the ‘Minister’ intended by the draftsman were 
political ploys that the government will like to make use of in order to have a control over 
economic changes likely to effect a permanent change of its economic structure. This 
might be a valid point for a developing economy lacking a robust market framework but 
the long term cost in terms of consistency and ability to assure investors, particularly 
foreign investors, might be more than the political benefits to be gained. This is because 
where the Minister has decided to allow a merger application it is not likely that the FCB 
could turn around to block it. In addition, any merger authorization or clearance blocked by 
the FCB could also still be allowed by the Minister. This could lead to a lot of confusion 
but it will be interesting to, see how this scenario will evolve in practice. 
 
 
54 It is a common assertion though not proven that experience and individual capability are not the major 
factors often considered for ministerial appointments in Nigeria but political patronage plays a major part. 
These appointments are not permanent and are often seen as opportunities to share in the national wealth. 
Therefore this leave room for corruption, rent-seeking and regulatory capture.   
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The second stage approach requires a mandatory application for a clearance or 
authorisation to the FCC as provided in sections 59 and 60. While the issue of clearance or 
authorisation appears novel, it offers the best approach for merger control which is usually 
best left done by an independent body on objective grounds.  Section 59(5) provides that a 
‘Clearance’ relates to a determination in respect of a merger or an acquisition whereby the 
Commission only considers whether or not the merger, acquisition or takeover in question 
will result in the prohibited effect.  Section 60(6) provides that an ‘Authorisation’ relates to 
a determination in respect of a merger, takeover or an acquisition whereby the Commission 
is requested by the applicant to consider that there exists a factor of public benefit and that 
such factor justifies the authorisation of a merger, takeover or acquisition, which results in 
the prohibited effect. It is suggested that having only one stage, preferably the second stage 
approach which is more objective will be cost effective and will save unnecessary delay 
especially that in practice the presence of the two levels of merger control could lead to 
friction at the cost of the consumers welfare. 
 
The second major feature of the draft FCB concerns asset and turnover criteria. Section 
48(1) (b) of the draft Bill gives the types of mergers that require ministerial reference and 
this is based on the book value of the acquired asset in excess of I billion Naira (£4million) 
of the firm concerned.55 Clearly, this feature is open to some criticisms. First, it is not clear 
from the Bill why it favours asset criterion against market criterion, the turnover criteria 
will comprise vertical, horizontal and conglomerate mergers and this might not reflect the 
real impact of the merger on the market concerned.  Second, the amount of 1billion Naira 
 
55 The Draft Bill,  Section 48(1) A merger reference may be made to the Commission by the 
Minister where it appears to him that two or more enterprises, one of which carries on business in Nigeria or 
by or under the control of a body corporate which is incorporated in Nigeria, have ceased to be distinct 
enterprises and (a) as a result of that, the condition specified in subsection (2) or (3) 
of this section prevails, or does so to a greater extent, with respect to the supply of goods or services of any 
description; or (b) the value of the assets taken over exceeds _1Billion. 
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is not objective considering the fact that there are hundreds of firms with smaller assets but 
with considerable market power who will therefore not be caught by this provision. For 
example as the draft Bill stands a firm with an asset worth 10 Billion Naira acquiring 
another firm worth 800 Million Naira will not be caught by the provision while if another 
firm worth 100 Million Naira desires to acquire a firm worth 1 Billion it will be caught by 
the provision. This looks absurd and might not be the intention of the drafters.  The use of 
market turnover seems to be the most popular and realistic method in most merger 
regimes. Asset acquisitions do not often have immediate effect on firms’ turnovers. 
 
Another remarkable feature of the Bill is the role of public interest consideration in the text 
for merger control in Nigeria. Section 48 of the draft Bill mandates the Minister (where it 
appears to him) to refer qualifying mergers to the FCC for investigation against the test of 
whether the merger, operates or may be expected to operate, against the ‘public interest’.  
The test of public interest is ambiguous. Would it be interpreted as consumer interest or a 
national interest? It is not yet discernible from the Bill whether the interpretation of public 
interest would be geared towards achieving the cardinal or primary objective of the Bill or 
competition law. The cardinal objective being the overall objectives of the Bill as provided 
for in the preamble and section 2 while the primary objective is just the economic 
efficiency objective. It could be argued that the public interest test is actually a 
complement to the substantial lessening of competition test contained in the general 
philosophy of the Bill and should not be read in isolation. Thus if the cardinal objectives 
are achieved through this provision then the Bill will have been successful in addressing 
both the primary competition problems and other secondary economic related problems.   
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Furthermore, public interest consideration is not unusual. While some countries like the 
United Kingdom have abolished it from there competition law, it has started featuring 
strongly under new competition regimes like China and South Africa.56  This undoubtedly 
is linked to differences in economic circumstances. Under the  South African Competition 
Act, before a merger is finally allowed, its Competition Commission not only had to 
determine whether the merger would substantially prevent or lessen competition but also 
would consider other public interest issues, as specified in Section 12A(3) of the South 
African Consolidated Competition Act. The subsection provides as follows: 
When determining whether a merger can or cannot be justified on public 
interest grounds, the Competition Commission or the Competition Tribunal 
must consider the effect that the merger will have on a particular industrial 
sector or region; employment; the ability of small businesses, or firms 
controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to become 
competitive; and the ability of national industries to compete in international 
markets.57 
 
Moreover, there is nothing in the Bill to suggest that the public interest consideration 
should not be extended to other issues such as property rights. This is one of the issues that 
the Nigerian government is grappling with in regards to the minority ethnic group in the 
Niger Delta. This region produces the bulk of the oil and gas revenue for the country but it 
suffers from lack of basic infrastructure, unemployment and serious environmental 
problems due to exploration and development of oil in the area. This has led to very 
 
56 For Article 31 of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law stipulates that in case of national security, the 
acquisition of domestic enterprises by foreign operators shall further be subjected to the relevant provisions 
of the State for national security review in addition to the anti-monopoly review. 
57 South African Consolidated Competition Act, No 39 of 2000. 
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serious agitations in the area for a change in the determination of the property rights to the 
resources in their domain. As a result the people are demanding more control over the 
resources in the region. While this demand has various political and legal implications, this 
thesis argues that the economic rights of these people could be somewhat enhanced in the 
competition Bill with provisions analogous to that in section 2 of the South African 
Competition Act. The section amongst other things stipulates that the Act is to promote a 
greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes of historically 
disadvantaged persons. 
 
While the issue of public interest is very important in merger control for many countries, 
two things remain very clear in all merger regimes. The first is that the majority of all 
merger cases are decided on grounds of competition. The second thing is that what 
constitutes public interest is not static and will continue to be influenced mostly by 
economic factors rather than politics. Consequently, for effective control, merger rules 
would need to be complemented by practice guidance in all cases. This is because both the 
firms and investors in a market need to know within a reasonable range of probability what 
the effect or outcome of their merger proposal will be in an economy.58  This degree of 
certainty would also act as a check on the powers and discretion of the antitrust authorities, 
and allow them to operate within the ambit of defined objective standards. According to 
Whish, it is important ‘to give an objective meaning to expressions such as a ‘substantial 
lessening of competition or a significant impediment to competition’.59 
 
 
58 This finds support in the argument of Jrisy Motis et al., that an essential component of EC merger reform 
should be how to develop a better understanding of synergies method to evaluate them; see also, J. Motis et 
al., ‘Efficiencies in merger control’ in F. Ilzkovitz (ed.), European Merger Control: Do We Need an 
Efficiency Defence? (Gloucester: Edward Publishing Ltd., 2006), 316.  
59 R. Whish, Competition Law, 5th ed., (London: Butterworths, 2003), 789. 
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4.5 The Conflicting Goals of the Draft FCB 
The cardinal objectives of the Bill include the promotion of the balanced development of 
the Nigerian economy, welfare and interests of consumers, creation of opportunities for 
domestic enterprise to compete in world markets and to enhance the ability of small and 
medium enterprises to compete effectively. These objectives appear to be geared towards 
maximizing the full economic potential of Nigeria. Section 2(c) of the Bill seems to be the 
most important goal of the Bill, which is to maintain, encourage and enhance economic 
efficiency in production, trade and commerce. Theoretically, promotion of economic 
efficiency is expected to lead to efficient allocation of resources and productive efficiency 
which should translate into competitive price and product choices envisaged in section 
2(b). However, it could be argued that the goal to promote economic efficiency will 
conflict with the other economic/industrial goals meant to protect domestic enterprises. For 
instance, the balanced development envisaged in the draft Bill is expected at least to 
address some of the peculiar problems in a resource-dependent country which is a fusion of 
politics and economics; and this could be quite controversial. For instance it might be 
patriotic to encourage local enterprises involved in some of the liberalised sectors of the 
Nigerian economy, such as the energy and telecommunication sectors, but this might 
discourage entry of foreign firms who might be more efficient to compete and render better 
services and foreign investors will arguably see the promotion of such industrial objectives 
as a relapse into protectionism.  
 
Nevertheless, this type of conflict is not unique; it is common in other competition regimes 
such as in the EU where Articles 82 and 83 EC are used not only to promote consumer 
welfare but it was used to promote the achievement of the European internal market 
objective. In fact EU competition policy is never read or implemented in isolation, but 
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rather in conjunction with other Articles of the EC Treaty, such as Articles 2, 3(g), 4, 5, 10 
and 12.  In particular, Article 2 EC sets out the objectives of the EU which include the 
establishment of a common market and monetary union, and implementation of common 
policies to promote employment and balanced and sustainable development among 
Member States. Thus, what is required of the competition agency in Nigeria will be to find 
the right balance between the core competition objectives and other objectives, particularly 
industrial policy, contained in the draft Bill. Its ability to do this efficiently will be 
dependent on the level of available resources enforcement powers of the agency. This will 
be further examined in the next chapter. 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
The draft FCB at the moment is a very broad competition law and policy comprising the 
major competition law standards and other industrial and socio-political objectives. This 
will need to be adjusted and tailored to target the basic competition concerns likely to 
affect a resource-based economy like Nigeria. While the draft Bill will help to improve 
such issues as access to market, quality and affordability in some cases, it does not seem to 
have any guarantee to wipe out some of the particular problems of resource-dependent 
countries, such as corruption, rent seeking, the Dutch disease and property rights raised in 
the research questions. For instance the draft Bill mandates the FCC to promote the 
balanced development of the national economy and welfare of the consumers amongst 
other competitive concerns but there is no further regulatory or fiscal provision 
empowering the FCC to carry out such a challenging task. In particular, rent seeking and 
corruption are serious issues that could impact on any economy but the FCC as provided 
for in the draft lacks any policing or investigative powers that could effectively deter such 
activities.  
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Closely linked to the issue of corruption is public procurement, which is a big source of 
loss of revenue by the government through rent seeking officials and private persons in 
developing countries.60The draft Bill does not have any provision to guide against the 
continuance of this phenomenon. It is estimated that the government loses an average of 
N40 Billion Naira (£160million) each year from corrupt practices as a result of lack of 
transparent monitoring process in the award of public contracts. The provisions in the 
proposed competition Bill will not totally remove this but they will reduce its incidence 
and money saved thereby will contribute to the balanced development of the Nigerian 
economy as envisaged in the preamble of the draft FCB. 
 
However, the draft Bill offers some promise in the realisation of its objective to turn 
Nigeria into a ‘balanced economy’. This is expected to occur from the cumulative potential 
welfare effects that will result from a proper implementation of the draft Bill as it concerns 
anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominant position and merger control. If the FCC 
utilizes its powers effectively, it might be able to contribute to employment. For instance, it 
could use the public policy mandate to either contribute to job creation or save jobs that 
could be lost as a result of a merger plan. Thus along with other economic considerations 
as provided for in the draft Bill it may extract commitments from parties to a merger plan 
before it is approved that there would not be job losses This is particularly important in 
 
60 R. Falvey, et al., ‘Competition policy and public procurement in developing countries’ (2007) No 08/07 
CREDIT Research Paper, Published at 
 http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/credit/research/papers/CP0807.pdf. Last visited on 9th 
March 2009. 
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view of the recent wave of restructuring and consolidation that recently took place within 
the banking industry in Nigeria, many workers lost their jobs during this process. 
 
In addition, there is an increase in the number of companies entering the energy and other 
sectors of the economy like the telecommunication and pharmaceutical sectors which have 
led to a number of acquisitions and restructuring in recent times. These restructuring or 
mergers are bound to increase, and it is in its overall interest to have a full competition law 
and policy in place to guide the process, though it is not necessary in most cases for a 
competition law to include a merger control.  These provisions can contribute to the 
balanced economic development of the Nigerian economy through the potential welfare 
effect of international mergers. Further, this demands many necessities in order to ensure 
they deliver maximum benefits to the economy.  One such necessity is the need first to 
develop a proper competition framework or sectoral competition frameworks for different 
sectors akin to what exists in the communication sector in the US and a merger control 
properly targeted at the behavioural practices and effects of mergers originating either from 
within or from abroad. Another necessity is the need for support by a framework of 
international cooperation, particularly among the countries involved, especially since the 
Nigerian government wants its economy to be a tangible player in the global market. 
Consequently, this section of the thesis advances the argument that similar considerations 
and conclusions might be drawn for other developing countries such as Nigeria in the 
throes of liberalization and market reforms. Nigeria and other developing countries need to 
attach more importance to the protection of competition through merger control, which has 
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been described to ‘be the most visible as well the most economically and politically 
significant part of competition law’.61 
 
However, the question remains whether or not the draft Bill is sufficient to achieve its 
goals.  While it is difficult to hazard any definite answer on the overall likely performance 
of the draft FCB as a regulatory instrument, it is still reasonable to assume that a large 
portion of some the provisions of the draft FCB when enacted in Nigeria will benefit its 
economy especially in its ongoing liberalisation process. A defining issue for the Bill will 
be how to balance the micro-economic goals in the Bill with the major competition goals, 
and how effective its implementation would be without any political compromise. This is 
because implementation of competition law will probably raise different problems ranging 
from resistance from firms hitherto not compelled to observe open market rules to the issue 
of lack of appropriate enforcement staff. These issues will be further examined in the next 
chapter where the problems faced by new competition authorities will be examined in 
relation to Nigeria.  
 
Finally the highlighted provisions of the draft FCB is expected to meaningfully contribute 
to the economic development of Nigeria but its effectiveness as a legal framework for 
these developmental objectives will be partly determined by the composition and 
capability of its competition authority, especially its implementation and enforcement 
abilities.  
 
 
61 D. Gerber, ‘The transformation of the European Community Competition Law’, (1994) 34 Harvard 
International Law Journal, 137. 
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Chapter Five 
5.0 Establishing a Competition Agency 
5.1Introduction 
Three years after the submission of the draft Federal Competition Bill (FCB) to the 
Nigerian Federal Parliament, it is yet to be enacted into law. However there has been more 
interest in competition policies, in the expectation that this will improve existing 
regulations and also help to promote competition in the wake of the different liberalisation 
policies going on in the country.1 The principal goal of the draft FCB is to promote and 
protect the process of competition and consumer rights and interests through prevention 
and prohibition of anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance and other competition 
abuses that could substantially lessen competition and as well impact negatively on the 
economic development of Nigeria.  
 
 
Given the focus of the draft Bill and the obligation to implement the competition standards 
and micro-economic objectives therein the draft Bill provides for a Federal Competition 
Commission (FCC), which will have the responsibility for organising, monitoring and 
enforcing the provisions of the draft Bill.2  This chapter argues that implementation of 
competition law and policy in resource-dependent countries presents other problems apart 
from the basic competition concerns that can distort the competition process as well as add 
to transaction costs of regulation. These other problems involve mainly the structural 
requirements for the implementation and enforcement of a competition law and policy. 
Therefore this chapter explores the conditions necessary for an effective competition law 
and policy in resource-dependent countries. These shall be analyzed in the light of the 
 
1 P. Marsden, ‘A deregulated economy without competition law: free market or free jungle’ A paper 
presented at the Third Business Law Conference of the Nigerian Bar Association , Abuja, Nigeria,  March 
27, 2008. 
2 The Draft Bill, Section 3. 
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provisions relating to the composition and powers of the FCC. Thereafter, it argues that 
competition advocacy, if given adequate attention along with enforcement, should equally 
help in realizing the objectives of the draft Bill. It also seeks to answer whether or not the 
FCB is suitably empowered to carry out the objectives of the Bill.  
 
It is no longer a subject of debate that appropriate basic institutions are needed to be 
established to support and ensure the efficiency of markets, whether in developing or 
developed countries. This argument was strongly emphasized in the World Bank 
Development Report, which says that:  
Institutions support markets by helping to manage risks from market exchange, 
increasing efficiency and raising returns hence reducing the transaction costs 
arising from inadequate information, incomplete definition and enforcement of 
property rights.3 
 
The establishment of appropriate institutions to implement competition law and policy in 
any developing or transition economy defines how effective the policy would be. 4  
Institutions are analogous to reinforced foundations that support multi-storey buildings. It 
has also been further argued that if developing countries continue to adopt a piecemeal 
approach to economic reform then they can never succeed in achieving truly competitive 
and prosperous economies.5 This argument might have influenced the logic behind the 
comprehensive nature of the draft Bill. However, it remains to be demonstrated whether 
 
3 World Bank, ‘Building institutions for markets’ in World Bank Development Report, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press Published for World Bank, 2001), 5. 
4 M. Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 64. 
5 See World Bank, note 3. 
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the FCC would be able to implement effectively the broad objectives contained in the draft 
Bill. This might have informed the changes to and cautious delay in the adoption of the 
FCB which was first introduced to the Federal Parliament in 2003. 
 
5.2 Structural Requirements for a Competition Agency in Nigeria 
Competition agencies in developing countries face a host of different problems not 
common in developed countries with an established competition culture; these are both 
fundamental and political. Examples of these include vestiges of state planning systems 
such as government imposed restrictions to entry to imports and foreign direct investment, 
inconsistent domestic business registration processes that hinder the promotion of new 
enterprises, arbitrary taxation regimes, conflicting laws and overlapping jurisdictions of 
regulators.6   
 
Enactment of competition law and policies often involve structural changes that call for 
political support to institutionalize these changes. If these changes do not receive the 
support or backing of the stakeholders then its effective implementation could be hindered 
or frustrated. These are not unusual difficulties, and they are surmountable.  Some of these 
difficulties will include: 
• The realisation that some firms’ conduct which may lead to efficiency in one 
section of the market might distort competition in another. For instance, a merger 
situation that is justified from the circumstances of the firms involved could lead to 
higher prices in the short term, but can also carry the benefit of improving 
efficiency and thereby lead to lower prices in the long term.  
 
6 W. Kovacic, ‘Institutional foundations for economic legal reform in transition economies: the case of 
competition theory and anti-trust enforcement’ (2001) 77 Chicago-Kent Law Review, 301-310. 
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• Business practices do not have universal effects; rather, a particular practice might 
have different efficiency effects depending on which sector of the industry is 
affected.  
• Competition policy could be used to address multiple goals apart from the common 
efficiency goal. For instance, comparing the efficiency goal in the US Sherman Act 
with the promotion of the common market in EU competition policy, one is wont to 
query the avowed wisdom of some economists which says that the only legitimate 
goal of antitrust should be the promotion of efficiency.  
• Competition policy may conflict with other government policies like privatisation 
and liberalization, and if these are not well managed it could lead to those polices 
working at cross-purposes to the detriment of the society.  
• Market power is essential in competition analysis and determining the degree and 
acceptable level of market power is not easy, coupled with the problem of lack of 
reliable data and information asymmetry in developing countries. 
 
However, following from the preceding paragraph, this thesis argues that the main pillars 
that should support a competition agency in a developing economy are a suitable 
competition law model, competition advocacy and a robust institutional or structural 
framework. This support is expected to contribute to the efficiency of the agency and 
therefore maximize resource allocation in the whole economy. It has been argued that the 
development of competition policy in any jurisdiction is a work in progress; this is 
especially true of Nigeria and most developing economies, where economic reforms 
coupled with other developmental policies have been in a continual flux. As a result, 
certain structural forms, like an independent judiciary, a pool of seasoned staff, 
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opportunities for continued education of members of staff among other things, are essential 
in any competition regulatory design. These conditions could be compared with the 
requirement for development in the natural world.  According to Gal, ‘just as ecological 
conditions determine the ability of a flower to bloom, so do some preconditions affect the 
ability to apply a competition law effectively’.7 
 
Competition law is not a stand-alone regulatory tool, but one that must be situated within a 
wider set of public policies in pursuit of social welfare.8 This in most cases will involve 
specific cultural, legal, social and political dimensions within which competition law and 
policy is to be implemented. In unity they constitute the necessary keys to determine 
whether or not pro-competition policies will be successful.9 These public policies in the 
real wider sense are the ecology of competition law and policy, or what can also be 
referred to as the socio-economic ideology that conditions competition regulation.  The 
premium placed on public policies in respect of economic policies such as competition 
policy should be expected to be higher in developing countries than in developed countries. 
The lower level of market discipline and the lack of an established competition culture in 
the latter inform this difference.  
 
It is no wonder that Kovacic also observed that a universal insight about competition rests 
on the fact that institutional designs strengthen results, which should be a striving for better 
practice rather than the common understanding that advocates for the adoption of best 
 
7 M. Gal, ‘Prerequisites for development-oriented competition policy implementation’ in ‘Competition, 
competitiveness development: Lessons from developing countries’, UNCTAD, 2004, 29. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See I. De Leon, ‘The role of competition policy in the promotion of competitiveness in Latin America’ 
(2000) 23 (4) Journal of World Competition Law, 115. 
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practice.10 Since the adoption of a competition law is only one of the  pre-conditions for 
the enforcement of the law, this thesis shall discuss both the structural conditions necessary 
for the establishment of competition law and the those conditions necessary for its 
enforcement. There are several overlaps among these conditions for the two aspects, as the 
examination below will show. 
 
5.2.1 Political Will and Readiness 
Every economy interested in competition, which also wants to experience sustainable 
growth as well as reap the benefit of a free market system, needs to be rooted in the right 
soil or social economy ideology; which is tantamount to a competition culture.11  
 
As indicated previously, competition as a regulatory tool aims at limiting the role and 
actions of economic actors that would probably work against the best interest of the 
society, and these regulations will affect the interest of certain stake holders (these include 
the incumbents’ monopolies, consumers used to subsidized services and products and a 
few others) in the society who are not likely to take the interference without challenging it 
but will likely devise means of safeguarding their entrenched interests.  
 
 
10 An argument originally made by T. Murris, Chairman of the US Federal Trade Commission, cited in W.E. 
Kovacic, ‘Achieving better practices in the design of competition institutions’ Remarks before the Seoul 
Competition Forum, April 2004, Seoul, South Korea. Published at 
http://www2.ftc.gov/speeches/other/040420comppolicyinst.pdf.  Last visited on 30th April 2009. 
 
11 Competition culture as used here indicates that it is not only anti-competitive agreements that hinder 
competition but such issues as lack of appropriate implementation system, conflicting regulations and 
political interference.   
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As a result, competition agencies in developing countries have to fully understand this fact 
and devise a means of balancing the competing interests involved. Political leaders have 
decisive influence on a government’s role in economic reform. This requires executives 
with a defined focus, commitment and pragmatic approach to policy and economic 
management. A valuable tool of effective economic management is the willingness of 
political leaders to delegate policy authorities to competent technocrats, and to empower 
and protect the economic institutions within this line of delegation. Such institutions 
include central banks, ministries of finance and other regulatory authorities.12  Competition 
law is not a stand-alone tool: rather it is supposed to be an integral part of a larger dragnet 
of socio-economic policy and competition culture. For instance, in Nigeria, there is a need 
to balance competition law with its socio-economic ideology in order to avoid a clash and 
failure, as was the case with some developing countries that have adopted competition law. 
For example, prior to the 1980s, the Israeli government and its Antitrust Tribunal gave 
more regard to other goals that run contrary to the basic competition objectives. These 
other goals include the promotion of exports, realization of economies of scale, desire to 
improve the country’s balance of payments and others. These goals were promoted without 
any serious effort to improve competition conditions. 13  Rather, the Tribunal allowed 
agreements that promoted producers’ interests and which also led to increased dominance 
in the Israeli market and consequent reduction in consumer welfare as a result of increase 
in local prices. 
 
 
12 H. Stephen, Pathways from the Periphery, (Ithaca: Cornell University Review, 1990), 46.  
13Gal, note 7. 
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Obviously the Israelis’ approach was in line with the prevailing socio-economic ideology 
fashioned to boost the lot of a newly formed economy. Arguably this action can be 
defended on many grounds, but this thesis will endeavour to reason that the most logical 
defence in this instance is that this approach was taken with a view to strike a balance 
between sovereignty and market. However, governments should limit the application of 
competition principles only in those situations where such limitations are necessary to 
promote other societal goals, and especially when it has been assessed or envisaged that 
the potential benefits accruable from the limitation outweigh the cost of the limitation and 
potential loss from competition. 
 
A pro-competitive socio-economic ideology, irrespective of its affinity to other social 
goals, seems to be the right soil to cultivate the seed for the fruition of competition policy. 
The development in Israel tends to support this view.  Since the mid 1980s, developments 
in Israel have shown a remarkable tilt towards a free market and embrace of competition 
law discipline, which has resulted in its lowering of governmental barriers to trade, 
privatisation programme and a pro competition approach in the jurisprudence of its 
Tribunal and Antitrust Authority.14 In fact its Supreme Court has reasoned that protection 
of free competition constitutes the foundation for protecting other rights, and that ‘free 
competition is a basic pillar of any democratic regime, being a prominent characteristic of 
the individual's freedom to implement his autonomy.’15 
 
 
14 See Civil Appeal 2247/95 Director of Competition Authority v Tnuva Inc., 52 Supreme Court Decisions, 
213 Published at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unitalconduct/questionnaire/IsraelQ
uestionnaireResponse.pdf. Last visited on 30th April 2009. 
15 The General Director, Israel Antitrust Authority, Israel questionnaire response’ 20th November 2006 
Published at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unitalconduct/questionnaire/IsraelQuestionnai
reResponse.pdf. Last visited on  30th April 2009. 
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Sections 8 to 18 of the draft Bill contain generally the objectives, functions and powers of 
the FCC. The draft FCB seems to be a demonstration on the part of the Nigerian 
government that it possesses the political will to enact a competition law and policy, thus 
the inclusion of the role of a Minister in the scheme of the draft Bill. This might appear as 
political interference but the inclusion of a role for the undefined Minister shows the 
government want to get involved with competition policy as much possible and is unlikely 
to leave the scene to the dictates of market forces and the FCC. Sections 9(1) (h) and (i) 
provide as follows: 
The Commission shall  
(h) carry out such investigation or inquiries  as the Minister may request or as it 
may consider necessary or desirable  in connection with any matters falling 
within the provisions of the Act; 
(i) advise the Minister on such matters relating to the operation of this Act 
including recommendations to the Minister for the review of relevant policies, 
legislation and subsidiary legislation as it thinks fit or as it may be requested by 
the Minister.  
 
An examination of section 9(1) shows that the identity of the ‘Minister’ intended by the 
draftsmen is not disclosed anywhere in the draft Bill. There is also no specific Ministry 
mentioned to which can be inferred as the designated Minister’s Ministry. Most Acts in 
Nigeria often indicate expressly or indirectly, at least in the interpretation section, the 
supervising Minister or Ministry under which the act would be implemented. 16  The 
 
16 For example, the Electric Power Sector Reform Act, No 6, 2005, Nigeria, referred to a ‘Minister’ in 
different sections of the act without any clear indication to the specific Minister intended. However, the 
interpretation and citation of the act, section 100, sheds light on the identity of the Minister intended by the 
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omission in this instance could lead to confusion because there are different ministries 
often involved with economic matters in Nigeria. These are Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, Ministry of National Planning and Productivity, Ministry of Finance and Ministry 
of Commerce. Similarly, the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) 2008,  provides for an 
anti-monopoly enforcement agency (AMEA) under the State Council, which will be 
responsible for the enforcement of AML but the Ministry or state department responsible 
for the AML enforcement is not yet certain from the law.17 However, from its legislative 
history and practice three different enforcement agencies have parallel authority to enforce 
the AML. 18  This type of uncertainty is both inefficient and will also create a lot of 
confusion. It is better and more cost effective to have a unified enforcement unit although 
unlike its Chinese equivalent the FCC shall be solely responsible for the enforcement of 
the draft Bill save for the role of the Minister as defined in the Bill. 
 
In addition it is also not clear from the provisions of the draft FCB whether the Minister’s 
authority or direction is supposed to be superior to that of the FCC or whether he or she 
will be bound by any advice given by the FCC. For instance, while section 21 of the draft 
Bill empowers the FCC to make regulations, define terms and conditions of service for its 
employees, yet according to its sub-section 2 these shall not have effect until approved by 
the Minister. Although in Nigeria, the general practice is that ministerial approvals are 
often necessary because Ministers are deemed to have general supervising authority over 
their ministries and activities pertaining to them. It is however, submitted that it will be 
better for these issues to be addressed in the Bill in order to avoid any confusion or 
 
draftsmen. It provides, ‘Minister’ means the Honourable Minister of Power and Steel or any other Minister as 
the President may from time to time assign administrative functions in respect of this Act. 
17 Sections 9- 10 Anti-Monopoly Law of the People Republic of China, 2008. 
18 These are the National Commission for Development and Reform (NCDR), the State Administration of 
Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). See X. Wang, ‘Highlights of 
China’ new Anti-Monopoly Law’ (2008) 1(75) Antitrust Law Journal, 144.  
 166
                                                
hindrances to the implementation of the Bill when it is enacted. Competition matters often 
require timely consideration and should not be subjected to the bureaucratic slow process 
of the civil service in Nigeria. As a guide the practice in the United Kingdom could be 
adopted, under the provisions of The Competition Act 1998, the Chairman of its 
Competition Commission and other panel members are appointed by the Secretary of 
State.19  
 
5.2.2 Due Process, Transparency and Fair Enforcement Mechanism 
In developing countries, in order to have a successful and effective competition policy, 
there is need for reliable, strong and predictable legal institutions along with other 
infrastructures such as flexible capital markets and a stable banking sector. South Africa 
and Nigeria seem to be some of the developing countries doing relatively well in this 
regard in Africa although, unlike South Africa, Nigeria is yet to adopt a substantive 
competition law; however, it has commenced different economic reforms to promote the 
competitiveness of its economy, as stated earlier in this thesis. Every competition agency 
must have a clear set of rules which it has to apply, and not only must these be seen to be 
applied fairly, it must also be seen that due processes are being followed in its application. 
The absence of a fair and transparent enforcement system is a disincentive to foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and most developing economies’ reform programmes in recent times are 
partly directed to attract FDI.  Thus, competition agencies at the initial stage will need to 
be selective and strategic; the choice of cases to be pursued must be carefully decided in 
order to establish its reputation on a firm basis, and also show to businesses that it can act 
decisively without fear or favour as this will not only improve its image but also it will 
allow the law to have a good deterrent effect. A high level of success achieved with the 
 
19 Section 45 and Schedule 7, The Competition Act 1998 United Kingdom. 
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cases it prosecutes will also go a long way to reduce the propensity to engage in any abuses 
by other businesses undertakings.  
 
In addition, the competition agency should be - and also should be seen as being - 
transparent in the performance of its duties, especially in its interpretation and enforcement 
of the provisions of competition law and other substantive laws. There should be a single 
and similar standard across the board among the industries. This will allow the competition 
agency to be consistent in its decision-making, and also make its decisions predictable. In 
fact, this issue of predictability is very important to businesses because it goes a long way 
to assure and help them to plan, execute and defend their management strategies and 
decisions.  
 
Sections 10 to 18 containing the general powers and functions of the FCC give detailed 
guideline on how these powers should be carried out and the limitations of the powers. An 
examination of some of the provisions reveals that some of the powers do not only require 
strict compliance but they must be exercised transparently and objectively because any 
deviations when challenged in court could lead to decisions based therein either to be 
revoked or set-aside. This could then lead to more damage to competition, a situation the 
FCC will like to avoid. 
5.2.2.1 Powers of Investigation and Enforcement of the FCC 
The Bill generally in section 10 empowers the FCC to conduct investigations and to 
enforce prohibitions contained in the draft FCB. As a result, the FCC may require the 
production of specific documents, information and administer oaths. During the 
investigation process the FCC through its authorised officer(s) may only enter any 
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premises with a valid warrant during which they may take or extracts documents from the 
premises as provided in section 11 of the draft Bill.20 A valid warrant in the instant case 
could only be issued by a Chief Magistrate or a judge of a Federal High Court. The 
application for, and grant of a warrant by, the court and its execution call for care and 
impartiality required in judicial matters.  
 
It is necessary to strictly comply with the rules and display that justice is being done 
properly in every case in order to win the confidence of stakeholders and society in 
general.  A warrant shall not authorise the detention of any documents beyond 7 days and 
on entering premises an authorised officer must produce his identity and the authority of 
the warrant. The Bill provides all the necessary steps and precaution to take in order to 
make sure that due process is followed. This provision is very important and should be 
strictly adhered to because it is not unlikely that some unscrupulous person could abuse it 
to either harass other competitors or just to extort money from businesses.21 
 
However, while the Bill makes it an offence to obstruct any authorised officer of the FCC 
in the performance of the investigative role, it says nothing concerning access to privileged 
communications between a lawyer and his clients or documents which are made in 
 
20 The Draft Bill, Section 11(1) The Commission may for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person has 
engaged in, is engaging or is likely to engage in conduct constituting or likely to constitute a contravention of 
this Act, require an authorised officer to (a) enter and search any premises; (b) inspect and remove for the 
purpose of making copies, any documents or extracts there from in the possession or under the control of the 
person. 
(2) Except as otherwise directed by the Commission, an authorised officer shall only exercise the powers 
conferred by subsection (1) of this section with a warrant issued under subsection (3) of this section. 
(3)Where a Chief Magistrate or a Judge of a High Court is satisfied on information on oath that there is 
reasonable ground for believing that any person has engaged or is engaging or likely to engage in conduct 
constituting or likely to constitution contravention of this Act, he, may issue a warrant permitting an 
authorised officer to exercise the powers conferred by subsection (1) of this section in relation to any 
premises specified in the warrant. 
 
21 In the last decade there were some cases of illegal execution of purported court orders. 
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connection with legal proceedings. This is an aspect of the enforcement procedure that will 
draw the ire of businesses and is bound to be controversial. Thus this issue needs to be 
addressed before the Bill is passed into law to avoid unnecessary delay from any dispute or 
controversy likely to occur. 
 
5.2.2.2 Enforcement Procedure in the Bill 
Part XV (sections 99 to 104) of the draft Bill provides generally for the enforcement 
procedure of the prohibitions contained in the Bill. This shall be by an administrative 
hearing.22 The provisions of section 99 of the draft Bill direct that every complaint shall be 
made in designated form containing such particulars and this is to be accompanied by 
payment of specific filing fees to be determined by FCC.23 These provisions raise some 
concerns, such as uncertainty about cost, double jeopardy and damage multipliers. It is not 
clear from this provision whether parties before the FCC, especially those under 
investigation, will be made to bear the cost of the investigation and the administrative 
hearing. In cases where the hearing officer reaches an opinion that the provisions of the 
Bill have been breached, they shall make a determination to that effect and make 
appropriate recommendations to stop the violation and also to accord the injured party a 
reasonable remedy.  In the first instance, it will be better that the claimants or injured 
parties are aware of the possible costs of filing a complaint, going through its  hearing and 
the likely amount of compensation they will receive. If the amount of compensation will 
 
22 The Draft Bill, section 100. 
23 Section 99 (1) Any person who alleges that he has suffered, or is likely to suffer, an injury as a result of a 
violation or likely violation of any provision of this Act may file a complaint with the Commission. 
(2) Every complaint pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall be made in such form, contain such 
particulars, and be accompanied by payment of such fee as the Commission may prescribe. 
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not cover their cost and the amount of injury suffered, this will deter them from pursuing 
the complaint and the cost of the injury will continue to be borne by the society. 
 
Nevertheless, the composition of the administrative hearing shall be determined by the 
Executive Chairman of the FCC subject to criteria set by the FCB. Parties are entitled to 
appear in person or with a legal practitioner or any other person to assist them. The Bill, 
specifically section 100(3), provides that the conduct of the hearing should avoid any strict 
formality and technicality. Thus the hearing officer is empowered to determine the rules 
suitable for the hearing, making sure that all parties are given reasonable opportunity to 
explain their position. In addition, the determination of the hearing is fixed to be completed 
within forty five days. It is commendable that both the flexibility and time limit will 
prevent any unnecessary delay tactics which could hinder the competition process. 
 
In aid of sections 99 to 104 of the Bill, is section 97 which makes it an offence for any 
person required by the FCC who fails to provide or appear before it without any reasonable 
excuse. Such a person is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding three years or a fine not exceeding 200, 000 Naira. (£1,000) or both. This 
provision might aid the enforcement process and could be compared with the provision of 
criminal sanctions against individuals and companies who fail to cooperate with the 
investigative process with regards to access to privileged information between solicitor and 
clients. 
 
5.2.3 Independent Judiciary  
An independent judiciary is an essential requirement in every democratic society, 
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and this is particularly important where the exercise of private economic rights could clash 
with the sovereign interests of a state and the legitimate expectation(s) of the populace. 
There appears to be a positive correlation between good governance and an independent 
judiciary, and the same seems to be the case for most regulatory enforcement agencies and 
the judiciary. 24  Good governance is partly hinged on the institution of efficient and 
unbiased judicial system, hence the common assertion that an enduring and prosperous 
democratic Nigeria is only possible when its judiciary is truly independent and separated 
from all other governmental arms and pressure from the society.25 In a society where the 
rule of law is upheld and the role and duties of the judicial arm of government are rendered 
without fear or any interference from other arms of the government, rather they give 
support to uphold the sanctity of the law, then it is very likely the majority of the society, 
especially the business community, will not be easily inclined to try to influence or 
disregard the powers of the judiciary.  
 
In essence, an effective judiciary is not only a necessary back-up for most regulatory 
agencies in the discharge of their duties, it is an effective and strong deterrent for those 
who might want to breach or derogate from the provisions of the law. Apart from its 
administrative functions, the FCC will also perform quasi- judicial functions towards the 
determination of anti-competitive agreements that lessen competition in accordance with 
 
24 S.D. Sharma, ‘Democracy, good governance, and economic development’ (2008) 3(1) Taiwan Journal of 
Democracy, 31. 
25 In early 2004, the Nigerian government improved upon the welfare conditions available to the judiciary, 
which move is expected to give them job satisfaction as well as enhance their image in comparison to 
workers in other sectors of its economy, particularly in the private sector. See K.  Zannah, ‘The fight against 
corruption in the judiciary in Nigeria: the journey so far’ A paper presented by the Chief Judge, Borno State,  
during the all Nigeria Judges’ conference, Sheraton Hotel & Towers, Abuja, 5- 9november, 2007. Published 
at  
http://www.nji.gov.ng/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=86&Itemid=180. Last visited 
30th April 2009. 
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the provision of the draft Bill. Further, there might be the need to create special courts or 
divisions to handle competition matters bearing in mind the sensitive commercial nature of 
the issues normally involved and that timely and effective resolution will be required for 
disputes that may arise.  
Consequently, it is argued that the function and capacity of the FCC should be in a way 
that provides for a separation of judicial and administrative duties. The administrative staff 
should not be involved with the exercise of the judicial functions of the body. Rather both 
categories should work together within defined scope of duties and objective. For instance 
the economists or actuaries employed by the FCC should be strictly concerned with 
economic analysis of facts involved in cases under investigation while the legal team 
should be able to interpret and harness the work of the economists. This will give the FCC 
a good opportunity to have well reasoned decision and also make its work appear objective 
and predictable 
 
5.2.3.1 Judicial Review 
The decisions of the FCC are administrative acts and under the 1999 Constitution of 
Nigeria, decisions, actions and proceedings affecting the validity of executive and 
administrative public bodies are subject to appeal before Federal High Court to the 
exclusion of any other courts. 26  As a result, in the instant case where any party is 
dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative hearing under the Bill such a party has 
an opportunity to apply for judicial review by virtue of sections 100(9) to (10). Section 
100(9) provides as follows: 
 
26 Section 251(10) (r), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation) Decree 1999.  
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Where the Commission declines to entertain a complaint duly filed, or finds 
that no violation of this Act has occurred or that there has been a violation, as 
the case may be, any party not satisfied with the determination of the 
Commission may file an application for review with the Court. 
As the  competent ‘court’ in view here is the Federal High Court as defined in the 
interpretation section of the Bill and s.251(1)(r) of the 1999 Constitution of  Nigeria,  any 
application  to any other court will be invalid. This provision removes any confusion that 
may arise with parties who might want to apply to States’ High Courts for review. While 
both courts are of equal standing and share some common powers, they still have different 
jurisdiction in relation to substance of the matter and category of people that can apply to 
them in both civil and criminal matters.  
 
In addition, no person is able to bring any application for a judicial review before the 
Federal High Court unless the requirements of section 101 are satisfied. This section 
specifies the category of persons who have the right to apply for judicial review in relation 
to the provisions of the draft Bill. The decisions of the FCC are subject to well defined 
rights of review. These could be on grounds of illegality, irrationality or procedural 
impropriety. This provision is comprehensive and is commendable because it makes it 
clear from the outset the categories of people who has jurisdiction before the Court.27 This 
 
27 The Draft Bill, Section 101. The following persons may exercise the right of application for review 
pursuant to the provisions of this Act: 
 (a) in the case of an application against a determination of the Commission in relation to an application for 
an authorisation under section 78 of this Act, the applicant and any person who participated in any 
conference held by the Commission under section 81 of this Act in relation to the authorisation; 
(b) in the case of an application against a determination of the Commission revoking or amending an 
authorisation pursuant to section (1) of this Act or revoking an authorisation and substituting a further 
authorisation pursuant to that subsection, the person to whom the authorisation was granted; 
(c) in the case of an application against a determination of the Commission under section 59 or section 60 of 
this Act in relation to a notice seeking a clearance or an authorisation, as the case may be: 
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will help in saving time that could be lost due to any dispute about the issue of jurisdiction 
or rights of parties who may approach the Court in respect of any decision of the FCC. 
 
Further, section 102 empowers the Federal High Court in its decision on any application 
for review, to do any one or more of the following things: (a) confirm, modify, or reverse 
the determination or any part of it. It furthers empowers the Court to exercise any of the 
powers that could have been exercised by the Commission in relation to the matter to 
which the application relates. This provision is rather too wide, especially as it allows the 
Court to act in the same administrative capacity of the FCC that conducted the hearing. In 
essence it allows the Court to revisit the application and probably allow a consideration of 
new facts and evidence. This may lead to considerable delay and confusion. It is suggested 
that the provision of section 102(1)(b) that empowers the court to exercise all the 
administrative power to hear an application should be expunged and section102(2) which 
allows it to send  back application to the FCC for a fresh administrative hearing should 
suffice to address any irregularity or procedural impropriety. 28  Although, judges are 
qualified for monitoring substantive accountability, their autonomy and rules of judicial 
 
(i) the person who sought the clearance or the authorisation; and (ii) any person whose assets or the shares in 
a company are proposed to be acquired pursuant to the clearance or authorisation; and 
(iii) any person who participated in any conference held by the Commission under section 81 of this Act in 
relation to the clearance or authorisation. 
(d) in the case of an application against a determination of the Commission under section 81 of this Act made 
on the application of any person who is a supplier of regulated goods or services, the applicant and any 
person who in the opinion of the Court is a substantial consumer or purchaser of the regulated goods or 
services to which the determination relates or who represents a substantial group of consumers or purchasers 
of those goods or services; 
(e) in the case of an application against a determination of the Commission under section 81 of this Act made 
by the Commission on its own motion, any person who is a supplier of regulated goods or  services to which 
the determination relates and any person who in the opinion of the Court is a substantial consumer or 
purchaser of the regulated goods or services to which the determination relates or who represents a 
substantial group of consumers or purchasers of those goods or services 
28 The Draft Bill, Section 102(2) Notwithstanding anything in this section, the Court may, in any case, 
instead of determining any application under that section, direct the Commission to reconsider, either 
generally or in respect of any specified matters, the whole or any specified part of the matter to which the 
application relates. 
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process allow them to be shielded from political pressure or influence better than other 
regulatory bodies. This then call for extra caution in the way they exercise their powers of 
review of activates of public bodies. In relation to competition law and policy, because 
most of the judges in Nigeria are not expert in this field thus they will need to be extra 
vigilant so that the adversarial judicial process is not exploited by persons seeking  judicial 
reviews  to frustrate  the work of the regulatory authorities who are expected to be well 
informed of the issues involved. 
 
However, this thesis opines that to save time and also to allow a rapid development in the 
determination of cases involving competition matters it is more reasonable to create a 
special court to handle the review because the Federal High Court is already involved in 
other commercial matters, such as disputes in the maritime, aviation, communication and 
energy industries. Apart from the volume of these other matters, it is very important to 
separate the two because their substance differs and adjudicating between them calls for 
different principles and approaches that must not be confused with each other. The special 
court could still be under the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. Further, while the 
administrative hearing officer is not obliged by the Bill to give reasoned decisions, though 
one will expect it to do so, the Federal High Court as a superior court of record shall, in 
giving any direction to either the FCC and or the parties, give reasoned decisions.  
 
5.2.4 Adequate Funding 
The issue of funding and how best to allocate available resources are germane in every 
organisation, and either the adequacy or shortage of funds can determine the efficiency of 
an organisation, especially a regulatory agency whose works include policing, monitoring 
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and enforcement of rules among corporate organisations. Almost all competition agencies 
in both developed and developing countries face some form of challenges and difficulties 
related to adequacy of funding in their effort to promote, implement and enforce 
competition policies or laws, although developing countries and emerging economies pose 
‘unique issues for competitiveness and competition law enforcement’.29 As indicated in the 
earlier part of this thesis, some of their features include low level of economic 
development, lack of adequate institutional design to support competitive markets, 
government bureaucracy and corruption accompanied with rent seeking from both the 
politicians and big businesses, all of which create serious challenges for resource allocation 
in these economies.30  
 
In most of these developing countries, apart from local businesses the presence of large 
multinational companies is a common feature and their activities do give or could at times 
give competition concerns. These corporate organisations could be so large and efficient to 
the extent that their budgets are more than that of a nation state. An example is 
ExxonMobil whose annual income is more than that of many developing countries in 
Africa; this puts it in a position to influence many decisions if it so desires, and also it 
commands an intimidating outlook compared with an average regulatory agency. In any 
case, the level of funding might be dependent on the competition culture and be relative to 
the economic strength of the country. 
 
 
29 ‘Challenges obstacles faced by competition authorities achieving greater economic development through 
the promotion of competition’. Contribution from the Fair Trading Commission, Jamaica’s Competition 
Agency, SESSION II – OECD Global Forum on Competition, 2003 Published at 
http://www.jftc.com/newsandpublications/Speeches/Reports/OECD%20SESSION%20II-8-12-03.pdf. Last 
visited on  30th April  2009. 
30 Ibid. 
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Section 24 of the draft FCB provides for a fund to be maintained by the FCC. It shall be 
given a take-off grant by the Federal Government and subsequently receive annual 
budgetary subvention from the Federal Government. In addition the FCB is allowed by the 
draft Bill to receive moneys from other arms of government and aid from other 
organizations in furtherance of its activities. While the Federal Government will have a 
noticeable influence on how the FCC is commissioned and thereby affect its operation, it is 
noteworthy that the draftsmen envisage the importance of giving the agency some form of 
financial autonomy. Thus it provides in section 24(3) that the FCC shall be in position to 
manage its fund in accordance with its own internal rules but, of course, in accordance 
with every other procedure in place to ensure proper record keeping and accountability. 
 
Consequently, the FCC shall need not only to be very prudent but will have to  prioritise its 
activities, especially concerning the need to plan and implement programmes, taking 
cognisance of the amount and types of resources available to it. It will have to be 
objectively selective in the types and number of cases to investigate and prosecute, so that 
if at an early stage it achieves a high degree of success rate, this could possibly increase its 
credibility and act as a successful deterrent to firms or individuals found wanting and 
eventually reduce the number of cases it has to handle. Else if it spends its budgetary 
allocations on cases that were later decided against it, then its competence and consumers’ 
confidence in it will be negatively affected. 
 
Actually, the process of revenue allocation differs from one country to another; in the 
developing countries in particular, most of the competition agencies receive their allocation 
from government ministries or establishments which then give a lesser degree of 
independence. For instance, the Argentine Competition Commission is funded from the 
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budget of the Ministry of Economy and Production allocated on an annual basis. This does 
not give it budgetary autonomy.31  Compared with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
in the US which has financial autonomy, it would be less efficient and susceptible to 
governmental pressure and interferences. The provision in the Nigerian draft FCB is 
commendable. Its competition agency will not be at the mercy of any governmental 
department rather its budgetary allocation will only be subject to a limited control of the 
Federal Government which is also subject to the Federal Parliament which have power 
over the total annual federal budget allocations. 
 
In any case, if a government is really committed to the establishment of a good competition 
structure then it will be disposed to finance adequately the competition agency, but further 
assistance and grants could be obtained from international organisations that are also 
championing the establishment of competition laws by developing and emerging 
economies. Such organisations include the World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and World Trade Organisation (WTO). Section 26 of 
the draft FCB expressly empowers the FCC to receive gifts of land, property, money and 
any other property subject to the condition that the gifts are not inconsistent with its 
functions as defined under the Bill. For example, while the competition authority of 
Panama receives a major percentage of its budget from the central government budget, but 
it is also receives additional financial support through donations and loans from 
international organisations.32 
 
 
31 OECD and the Inter-American Development Bank, ‘Institutional challenges in promoting competition’ 
(2004) Published at  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/41/32033728.pdf. Last visited on 30th April 2009. 
32 Ibid. 
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5.2.5 Qualified Personnel 
Having a pool of experienced and qualified staff working in a competition agency is 
comparable to a nation equipped with an efficient army ready to tackle any threat or 
invasion within or from outside its jurisdiction. The development of an efficient 
competition policy in developing countries will involve substantial investment in human 
resources, particularly the core professionals, who should be able to conduct extensive 
research as circumstances might demand. As a result, competition agencies need to employ 
lawyers, economists and other professionals familiar with competition law and trade 
regulation. It is very important at the initial stage to get the right blend of workers, 
especially lawyers versed in both civil and administrative procedures. Adequate knowledge 
of these is very necessary in the successful prosecution of competition matters before 
courts that are also new to the idea of competition law enforcement. Coupled with this is 
the fact that the businesses are very likely to afford the best lawyers and professionals in 
order to defend them.  
 
With regards to Nigeria, these personnel are the regular core staff of the FCC and not the 
‘executive’ members to be appointed by the government as provided in sections 4 and 20 
of the FCB.  These are the FCC members as provided by the draft Bill. It is submitted they 
are called executive members not because they will be appointed by the executive 
president of Nigeria, rather it is because they represent the highest  management of the 
agency thus the draft refers to their chairman as an ‘executive chairman’. Among the 
member of staff is the Secretary who shall be appointed by the FCC. Sections 21 and 22 
specify the conditions and terms to be employed by the FCC in the appointment of other 
core employees for the proper and efficient performance of the functions of the draft Bill. 
It is commendable that the FCC is given a free hand in the determination of the terms and 
conditions of service for its employees. This will protect the agency from any unnecessary 
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delay that could be encountered in the recruitment process in the civil service in Nigeria. 
 
However, experience in development of competition law in Jamaica has shown that it has 
to be in measured stages, because the most suitable remedy for the mismatch between 
ambitious substantive commands and weak institutional structures is to embrace a 
gradualist policy that will roll out a competition policy system in phases.33 The agency 
could start with a small, but well educated and motivated, number of staff to pursue the 
goals of competition policy. There might be a need to have a blend of professionals with 
good practical experience and others with an academic bias.  This is important to prevent 
their operation being subject to technical frustration, which the multi–background of the 
agency’s staff should be able to envisage and deal with, especially at the initial stages. 
 
A likely problem for Nigeria in this regard is that its proposed competition agency will 
have to compete seriously with the private sector, especially the financial sector, in 
attracting the quality of professionals that it may require. The remuneration in the private 
sector is much more than what is normally offered in the public sectors and therefore 
economic considerations will play a large role in determining the calibre of professionals 
that will be attracted to and recruited by the agency. 
 
Consequently, this thesis emphasises the need for an optimal use of both human and capital 
resources. The latter is necessary to attract the best professionals so that round pegs would 
 
33 Inter-American Development Bank , ‘Jamaica: Institutional challenges in promoting competition’ Latin 
American Competition Forum, (June 14-15, 2004) Published at   
http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubS-202.pdf. Last visited on 30th April 2009. 
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be fitted into round holes and not square pegs into round holes.  The former also is 
necessary for maintaining the resources and continued relevance of the agency; otherwise 
they might become easily susceptible to ‘regulatory capture’.34 
 
5.2.6 Continuing Education  
There is the need to invest in the education of the staff involved in competition matters 
both at the competition agency and in the judiciary. With the latter, ordinary legal training 
is not sufficient towards the appreciation of the technical points of competition law and 
policy, and in order for judges involved to render fair and objective judgements; they need 
to be taken through the rudiments and the nature of economics, competitive issues and how 
these can affect the economy. However, the basic Nigerian legal education curriculum does 
not provide for any core economic courses unless students on their own initiative decide to 
do the subjects among their elective subjects. This education has to be as detailed as 
possible, bearing in mind local circumstances and how to balance them with global 
economic realities, such as sovereign wealth, impacts of cross-border mergers etc. The 
designers of the legal academic curriculum in this regard should not adopt precedents from 
either the US or EU without first subjecting the precedents to critical consideration.  
 
The probability of doing this is high because of the robust materials available on 
competition jurisprudence and also the chequered history of competition matters in these 
places.  In the same vein, other staff of the competition authority should be exposed to 
 
34 For a detailed discussion on regulatory capture see, I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, ‘Tripartism: regulatory 
capture empowerment’ Published at 
 http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1747-4469.1991.tb00291.x. Last visited on 30th April 
2009. 
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continual education in order to avail themselves of any current regulatory issues and the 
tools for handling them. Thus it is will be rational for the proposed competition agency in 
Nigeria to dedicate a specific percentage of its annual budgetary allocation for training 
purposes. This should not be for the benefit of its staff alone rather others like the judiciary 
and consumer related pressure groups should be given chances to participate in these 
training programmes. 
 
5.2.7 Independent Agency 
It cannot be overemphasized that, in order to assure its efficiency and reliability, an 
independent regulatory agency stands in a better position compared with one that is not 
independent of any direct or indirect governmental control and influence. This will 
arguably sell it to stakeholders as an objective and fair agency. Further, this is dependent 
on the attitude of the government to entrenching a better competition culture; also, much 
depends on the quality and character of the agency’s staff and their degree of motivation. 
This is also dependent, to some extent, on the financial autonomy of the agency. If the 
budget or financial capability of the agency is tied to the goodwill of the appointing 
government, then the agency could be endangered by different political groups’ 
ascendancy to power. This is particularly serious in developing economies such as Nigeria, 
where market discipline is not well established and rent seeking is rife among 
governmental agencies, as earlier indicated. On the other hand, if competition policy is 
viewed as a state policy, then the agency might be torn between different pressure groups 
that might not be convinced of the competition objectives of the state and how the 
competition authority carries it out.  
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Consequently, an independent competition authority allows the presumption that to a very 
large extent the application and enforcement of competition law will not be influenced by 
political and other reasons not related to the promotion of efficient resource allocation. It is 
a critical factor that ought to be given serious consideration before a competition authority 
is created in any country. This could probably reduce the chances of the agency being 
captured or compromised as a result of any external influence or interest group. 35  
Moreover, in developing countries such as Nigeria, this is a feat that could be done only 
with the understanding and support of the government, that knows full well the long-term 
benefit of such an approach rather than the immediate benefit of the incumbent 
government, which might want to use the agency to advance its political ends, especially 
by favouring its associates in the selection and appointment process into the agency. Thus 
the appointment and terms of office of the members of the FCC is provided for in the draft 
Bill. The Bill is clear on the criteria for the appointment of the full time members but that 
of the part-time members is not made clear. They are expected to be qualified lawyers, 
economists or from any field of management and must have at least ten years cognate 
experience. However, all the members will enjoy a fixed tenure and can only be removed 
subject to the occurrence of certain events as stipulated in section 5 of the draft Bill. 
 
5.2.8 Non-Political Appointment of the Executive Chairman 
It is not just the selection criteria of competition authority key officers that matter; rather 
the mode of appointment or selection of the designee or head of the agency is very 
important. Professional suitability and credibility should not be sacrificed for political 
 
35 Regulatory capture is an ever-probable occurrence in most regulatory and governmental environment. This 
is especially true due to the fact  that regulation provides costs and benefit, however in order to achieve a 
balance , market –based instruments  and independent regulatory bodies are required.. The argument amongst 
others in support of regulation is presented in more detail in D. Helm, ‘Regulatory reform, capture and the 
regulatory burden’ (2006) 22(2) Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 174.  
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expediency, as is widely believed to be the case in many of the developing and emerging 
economies. However, it is not possible to separate politics from competition policy, as the 
aim of competition in most cases affects the market power of economic actors who often 
tend to influence politics and economic decisions in a nation state. The competition 
authority is thus put in the full glare of the media, and both its good actions and mistakes 
will continually be under public scrutiny.  
 
The head of the authority should be someone who is widely respected and seen as 
competent in the face of the consumers and other stakeholders, otherwise it might be rather 
difficult to sell the authority’s vision and enforcement activities to them. The Bill only 
gives a prescription of professions from which the full time members should be drawn 
from and does not specify whether the executive chairman should be from a particular 
field. This is good if the appointees will be spread among these professions but it might be 
better to limit the profession of the executive chairman to law and economics.  Further it 
will be better to avoid all the members from being chosen from a particular profession. 
This is necessary to avoid the FCC from being overly influenced by a particular 
perspective rather having a wide or balanced outlook.  
 
Section 4 of the draft Bill provides for mode of composition of the FCC. It shall be 
composed of nine members; four full time members and five part-time members. The 
appointment shall be made by the President of Nigeria. The draft Bill stipulates that the full 
time members shall consist of an economist, a lawyer and other professionals in the field of 
management, all of whom must have had at least ten years cognate experience in their 
respective fields. The Bill is silent on the criteria for the appointment of the part-time 
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members. This suggests that their appointment could largely be influenced by political 
consideration. It would have been better to expressly lay down the yardstick for their 
appointment because competition is complex and requires professionalism. Leaving the 
yardstick opened to the dictates of the President could give room to avoidable compromise 
and influence from both the industry and political arena.  
 
Eventually, if the appointed part-time members are members of the ruling political party or 
with strong industrial connections they might not be able to objectively carry out their 
duties along with the other full time members. In addition the appointment of the 
designated executive chairman, that is the head of the FCB, is at the discretion of the 
President. This gives the President or the government an opportunity to influence the 
function of the agency, and the probability that they will do so is high. In Nigeria like most 
other countries ministers hold their office subject to the dictates of the president and 
amount of political goodwill they command. As a result, it is arguable that this 
arrangement gives the government a great opportunity to influence ministries and 
regulatory bodies under the control of different Ministers. The FCC is unlikely not to be 
subject to this form of influence. 
 
While the independence of the FCC is crucial to the successful implementation of the draft 
Bill, it is also important to note that if the members of the FCB are of good integrity it will 
be difficult to influence them. Thus a competition authority needs to get it right from the 
beginning and this calls for prioritizing its activities from the outset; this takes cognizance 
of the other problems a new competition authority might face. One suggested issue that 
could be placed on the top of the priority list of newly formed competition authorities in 
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developing and emerging economies is competition advocacy. In fact, the ICN argues that 
competition advocacy should be promoted far above enforcement of competition rules.     
 
5.2.9 Empowerment of Consumer Groups and Relationship with Other Agencies 
It might also be appropriate to encourage the formation of consumer watch groups in 
different sectors, because their existence could serve as an additional check and watchdog 
over the activities of business. They would also monitor the work of the competition 
authorities, thereby reducing the incidence of any regulatory capture. For a very long time 
such groups were absent in Nigeria; the most visible one now is involved with the 
telecommunications sector. The existence of a consumer pressure group could also help 
reduce the problem of information asymmetry, because, with their direct link to the 
consumers (in cases where they are very active), they might be able to supply information 
to the competition authority. It is also beneficial for the competition authorities to develop 
a working relationship with other regulatory agencies in the economies as they are also 
sources of information and are all meant to work towards enhancing the development of 
the economy concerned. Section 9(2) (c) of the draft Bill is consistent with this argument. 
It provides that the FCC should cooperate with and possibly assist any association or body 
of persons in developing and promoting the observance of standards of competition in 
accordance with the goals of the draft FCB.  
 
However, the Bill fails to define either the form or level of assistance the FCC will render 
to any of these associations or body of persons. It might also be necessary to specify the 
limit of the influence that these bodies will have on the operation of the FCC. This is 
necessary to avoid time wasting and every unnecessary intermeddling by any pressure 
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group in the implementation of the Bill when it is eventually enacted into law.  
 
As earlier indicated, the agency must be seen as credible, transparent and committed to 
observing due process in its activities. One important adjunct to this in relation to sharing 
of information with other agencies and possibly the consumer groups in developing 
countries is the need for the antitrust authority to maintain a credible data protection and 
ethical standards, because more often businesses that engage in restrictive practices are big 
and well connected, and complainants or informants will need the assurance that they will 
not be unreasonably exposed to them and thereby suffer any repercussion or victimization. 
 
5.3 Jurisdictional and Enforcement Problems   
Just as will probably be the case in most circumstances where changes are being effected, 
established status quo and traditional positions will be affected.  The introduction and 
implementation of competition law and policy in developing and emerging economies has 
created institutional challenges. Even in jurisdictions where competition law has a 
chequered history, discretion and legal tact are still coveted in the general administration 
and management of competition issues. There are many reasons for this scenario. One 
reason for this could be the multifaceted composition of the subject, which led to the 
observation of the US Supreme Court that courts of law are not well equipped to deal with 
the day-to-day enforcement of the remedies they could impose on the basis of competition 
rules, success of which demands a ‘continuing supervision of a highly detailed decree’.36  
 
 
36 See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, LLP, 2004, 540 U.S.14.N. 
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According to the International Competition Network (ICN), another reason, particularly in 
developing and emerging economies, is the ‘incoherent policies between competition 
authorities, regulatory regimes and other government agencies’.37  There is a need for 
cooperation and a proper coordination between the newly created competition agencies and 
the government ministries or parastatals which prior to the introduction of competition 
laws, had earlier (in most cases) the control and regulation of the sectors concerned. Thus 
there is bound to be tension and conflict among these offices, especially where there are 
lacunas in the laws relating to conflict or roles and exercise of concurrent jurisdictions over 
sectors to which the competition laws and sectoral regulations are applicable.  
 
Those types of situations are not unique: they have been dealt with in many countries. For 
instance, the interface between competition rules and sector specific regulation was 
recently dealt with in both the US and in the EU, although the two jurisdictions treated it 
differently. The US Supreme Court’s decision was radically different from that of the 
EC. 38  The Supreme Court ruled that competition authority should refrain from acting 
where there are sector specific provisions that could be applied taking cognisance of the 
industries involved and the circumstances. According to the Court:  
 (c) Traditional antitrust principles do not justify adding the present case to the 
few existing exceptions from the proposition that there is no duty to aid 
competitors. Antitrust analysis must always be attuned to the particular 
structure and circumstances of the industry at issue. When there is in existence 
a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm, the 
 
37 ICN Competition Policy Implementation Working Group, ‘Lessons to be learnt from the experiences of 
young competition agencies’ May 3-5, 2006 Capetown, South Africa. Published at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_5th_capetown_2006/ICNSG2Proj
ectReportFinal.pdf. Last visited on 30th April 2009. 
38See Petit, ‘Circumscribing the Scope of EC Competition Law in Network Industries? A comparative 
approach to the US Supreme Court ruling in the Trinko Case’ (2004), 13 Utilities Law Review, 6.  
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additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to 
be small, and it will be less plausible that the antitrust laws contemplate such 
additional scrutiny. Here Verizon was subject to oversight by the FCC and the 
PSC, both of which agencies responded to the OSS failure raised in the 
respondent’s complaint by imposing fines and other burdens on Verizon. 
Against the slight benefits of antitrust intervention here must be weighed a 
realistic assessment of its costs.39 
 
It is instructive to note that the court did not say whether in all cases where there is a 
sectoral regulatory structure that the competition agency should be hands off, rather it 
could be inferred from the court’s language, that ‘antitrust analysis must always be attuned 
to the particular structure and circumstances’ means that it would not always be the case 
that competition law should give in to sector specific regulation rather the industry 
structure; circumstances and cost benefit of competition intervention must be carefully 
balanced so that the end result will still be a contribution to consumer welfare. This 
particular judgment, according to Petit, heralds the beginning of ‘a pre-emption’ or 
‘exhaustion principle’ in the field of antitrust’.40 That is, a private claim in competition 
matters should be, to some extent, reasonably exhausted where a sector-specific resolution 
provision is provided. 
 
 
39 Note 47. 
40 Petit, note 46, 10. 
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The EU’s treatment of this issue, on the other hand, could be seen in the Commission’s 
Deutsche Telecom Decision,41 where it concluded that the competition laws of the EC may 
apply even where sector specific legislation exists, but in most cases the Commission will 
refer the cases to the regulators for the resolution of the problems through sector-specific 
remedies.42 It is important for the enabling act of parliament or the specific competition 
rules to be as clear and explicit as possible with regards to its ambit and situations that may 
occur where there are conflicting concurrent jurisdiction, otherwise these will encourage 
forum shopping, including forum-shopping by industry players, duplication of resources, 
and inter-institutional conflict, all of which could lead to confusion and distortion of 
competition. This thesis recommends the US approach to Nigeria because of its simplicity. 
 
Consequently, it appears daunting the wide powers given to the FCC in section 19 of the 
draft FCB which empowers it to administer and implement other legislation not directly 
related to competition policy but consumer protection. These include the Dumped and 
Subsidised Goods Act, Consumer Protection (Special Provisions) Act 1992 and Weight 
and Measures Act 1990.43 It is submitted that the management of the provisions of these 
other acts will make the work of the FCC too complex and difficult to manage. Though the 
inclusion could be justified on the principle of pre-emption but this is not advisable for a 
newly formed competition agency. It is not practicable for the FCC to effectively manage 
its core objectives along with these other acts whose focus are not exactly the same with 
that of the draft Bill. It might be a better judgement to leave this legislation under the 
 
41 Deutsche Telekom AG, 2003 O.J. (L 263) 9. Commission Decision of 21 May 2003 relating to a 
proceeding under Article 82 EC. 
42 See P. Alexiadis, ‘Informative and interesting: the CFI rules in Deutsche Telekom v. European 
Commission’ (2008) Published at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Alexiadis-GCP-
May-08.pdf. Last visited on 30th April 2009. 
43 1958 CAP 87 Vol V Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, CAP 66 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
1992 and CAP 467 Vol XX1V Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 respectively. 
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authority of government departments previously entrusted with their administration and the 
FCC could still extend its authority by the provision of section 2 when there is a need to 
intervene in the sectors where those legislation are applicable. 
 
Nevertheless while the mandate given to the FCC apart from being too wide, seems 
unlikely to be realisable by an ordinary agency involved with competition, although the 
mandate could be justified on political grounds. This is because an absolute embrace of 
competition policy in anticipation of economic development or wealth creation could lead 
to abuse of economic powers and undermine the social legitimacy of government in a free 
market economy.44 This could then call for some measure of government interference to 
balance competition with regulation whether as a prescriptive regulator or a light-touch 
umpire.45 This approach might be opposed by the proponents of the economic efficiency 
goal as the only legitimate goal of antitrust, but studies have shown that there is a strong 
correlation between principles of a political system (such as property rights, human rights 
and political rights) and effective regulatory systems for economic development.46 
 
In addition it might also serve good purpose for the proposed FCC and the Federal High 
Court to have powers to charge fines that are commensurable to the amount of damage or 
potential damage that a restrictive business practice might have on the market or on 
competitors, because businesses might be easily deterred by the awareness that they could 
suffer more pecuniary damages than the likely amount of profit they could make if they are 
 
44 M. Neuman, Competition Policy: History, Theory and Practice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001), 27. 
45 M. Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 413. 
46 See H. Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Elsewhere (New 
York: Basic Books, 2000) and M.H. Halperin et al., The Democracy Advantage; How Democracy Promotes 
Prosperity and Peace (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
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found engaged in any anti competitive practices. In support of this view, the International 
Competition Network (ICN) lends its support when it argues that: 
A measure that will work for all agencies, and may ultimately be the most 
effective means of developing an awareness of a competition culture, is that 
advocated by the Netherlands Competition Authority. The NMA indicated that 
it seeks to achieve greater awareness for the importance of competition by the 
announcement of its imposition of high fines on undertakings which have 
infringed the Competition Act. It suggests that companies have become more 
aware of competition by observing the consequences faced by others that 
infringe the Competition Act. This is certainly a measure that all agencies can 
benefit from, and is guaranteed to leave a lasting impression on all similar 
businesses.47  
 
5.4 Competition Advocacy 
It has become a common understanding that the success of competition policy rests on 
application of different tools. These often include enforcement, litigation aimed at 
practices that restrict competition and merger review and control. However, another major 
tool that is a key ingredient, although it is less recognised, is competition advocacy.48 
Although  that there is no universally accepted definition of competition advocacy; it has 
been defined both in terms of its ends and means, but the substance of whatever definition 
that is adopted is always aimed at the same thing, which is the promotion of a competition 
 
47 ICN Competition Policy Implementation Working Group, ‘Lessons to be learnt from the experiences of 
young competition agencies’ (May 3-5, 2006) Cape Town, South Africa. Published at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_5th_capetown_2006/ICNSG2Proj
ectReportFinal.pdf. Last visited on 30th April 2009. 
48 T. Zywicki and James C. Cooper, ‘The U.S. Federal Trade Commission   and competition advocacy: 
lessons for Latin American competition policy’ George Mason University Law Economics Research Paper 
Series, (2007) Published at http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/papers/docs/07-07.pdf.  Last visited on 30th 
April 2009. 
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culture and an enabling environment for its growth.49 Competition advocacy according to 
the World Bank can be defined in the following terms: 
Competition advocacy refers to the ability of the competition office to provide 
advice, influence and participation in government economic and regulatory 
policies in order to promote more competitive industry structures, firm 
behaviour and market performance. Creating a popular base of support for 
competition policy is also part of competition advocacy.50 
Another popular definition is that of the Advocacy Working Group of the ICN, which 
defined competition advocacy as follows: 
Those activities conducted by the competition authority related to the 
promotion of a competitive environment for economic activities, by means of 
non-enforcement mechanisms mainly through its relationships with other 
governmental entities and by increasing public awareness of the benefits of 
competition.51 
 
The second definition above emphasizes two things: what competition advocacy is not, 
that is, it is not concerned with enforcement, and the two branches of competition 
advocacy. The difference between enforcement activities and the advocacy duties of a 
competition agency is not usually strictly differentiated, because in most cases the two 
duties are complementary to each other and handled by the same agency. The main theme 
 
49 See J. Tavares de Aranujo and L. Tineo, ’The harmonization of competition policies among Mercosur 
countries’ (1997) Published at http://www.dttc.oas.org/trade/STUDIES/COMPET/m_comp3e.asp. Last 
visited on 30th April 2009. 
50 S.J. Evenett and J.L. Clarke, ‘Designing and implementing economic reforms in developing countries: 
what role for competition advocacy?’ (2005) 
51 See the website of International Competition Network, Published at 
http:/ww.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org. Last visited on 30th April 2009. 
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of competition advocacy is to educate and influence both the government and the public 
towards a robust competition policy, which in essence lends credence to the fluid nature of 
most definitions that could be given of competition advocacy, as shown in OECD Peer 
Review of Chile’s competition law. It argues, for instance, that: 
There is no single, all-purpose definition of competition advocacy because 
competition authorities around the world need to use advocacy to deal with a 
variety of challenges. In general, it means the promotion of competition market 
principles in policy discussion and regulatory processes. In practice, the scope 
of advocacy presentations can vary widely. A set of bullet points about basic 
issues, such as how monopoly harms the public but enriches the monopolist, is 
advocacy. So is an extended legal and economic argument in a sectoral 
regulatory process.52 
 
What constitutes advocacy is wide enough to cover conference papers, policy papers 
issued to legislature and the public, court sector, ministries, courts, sectoral regulators, or 
local governments and other consumer pressure groups. It can also include both peer 
review articles, report of proceedings organized in benefit of competition policy and other 
public awareness campaigns such as holding of press conferences and consultative forums 
aimed at educating the public about the importance and implications of competition law 
and policy. In a developing country like Nigeria lacking an established, free market 
framework without well-established competition regimes, promoting competition 
principles to its citizenry will be a continual process at least for the first five years. It takes 
 
52 OECD, ‘Competition policy in Chile’ Published at http:/www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/60/34823239.pdf. Last 
visited on 30th April 2009 
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an average of ten years for competition policy to become fully effective in developing and 
emerging economies.53 
 
This tool is very important in developing competition culture in developing countries 
where various studies have confirmed that the promotion of the principles of competition 
policy must be a continual process and cannot be put in second place. Public patronage 
amongst other considerations plays an important role in the success of this.  That is also the 
position of the ICN, which argues that competition advocacy should be preferred to 
competition enforcement in developing countries. This could be explained by different 
reasons.  
 
One major reason is that competition law and policy faces enormous threats from both 
private and public restraints.54 The latter might sound contradictory because it is easy to 
take for granted that governments are interested in fostering competition and its resultant 
advantages, but experience has shown that governments or their functionaries do seek rent 
just like businesses and thus may engage in practices that may distort or hinder 
competition.  Another reason is that as a result of the privatisation process in most of these 
developing countries, such as Nigeria, the state assets privatised have given rise to 
 
53 J. Preston ‘Investment climate reform competition policy and economic development: some country 
experiences’ (2003) Case study commissioned by the Department for International Development, UK. A 
Contribution to WDR 2005 on Investment Climate, Growth and Poverty. Published at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resources/477407-1096581040435/dfid_preston_10.pdf. 
Last visited  on 30th April 2009. 
54 T. Zywicki, ‘How should competition policy transform itself? Designing the new competition policy’ 
(November 20, 2003) Competition Policy Research Center, Fair Trade Commission of Japan Inaugural 
Symposium. Published at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/031120zywickijapanspeech.pdf. Last visited on 
30th April 2009.  
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intensive rule-making processes and different legislation to guide the privatisation process 
the success of which could be furthered by competition.55  
 
Closely related to this is the fact that the level of lobbying and rent seeking activities will 
naturally increase in any economy that has just been reformed to accept market discipline, 
especially where old structures supporting monopolies and government dependent 
parastatals have been changed; therefore competition advocacy will in this instance be used 
to educate and counter-influence the government against the former beneficiaries of the old 
regime desiring to claw back some of the lost advantages. Another important reason is the 
fact that competition advocacy tends to be less expensive and non-adversarial compared 
with competition enforcement that requires more financial and human resources like 
skilled competition lawyers, specialised judges and an efficient judicial system; most 
developing countries cannot boast of a combination of these at any particular time, at least 
for now.  
 
However, unlike enforcement of competition law that could be seen as malevolent by some 
businesses, competition advocacy is often given a warmer reception. There is a common 
understanding and acceptance of its main theme among the antitrust/ competition 
community. 56  It has been argued that competition advocacy and economic reform are 
complementary tools and that the former is a necessary means for the continuation of the 
economic liberalization process.57  This is especially true for developing and transition 
 
55 See the website of the Bureau for Public Enterprises in Nigeria  for a brief note on the privatisation 
programme in Nigeria the amount of new legislation in place- http://www.bpeng.org.  
56 S.J. Evenett, ‘Competition advocacy: time for a rethink? (2006) Published at 
http://www.evenett.com/articles/CompAdvJan06.pdf. Last visited on 30th April 2009. 
57 G. Oliveira and G. Vargas, Antitrust policy in Brazil: recent trends challenges ahead’ (1999) Published at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0299/ijee/brazil.htm. Last visited on 30th April 2009. 
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countries, where the possibility of competition being distorted by public policies and 
institutional structures is high; former public monopolies will also want to transform into 
private monopolies, or at least take advantage of their dominant status.  In these economies 
the governments are not likely to give absolute control to the market; rather, they still 
intervene in the markets through regulation, although there could be laudable justifications 
for this in some instances.  
 
As a result, competition advocacy aims to minimize these distortions and also help in 
regulatory reform so that the objectives of competition can be realized. The competition 
agency can carry out its advocacy programme through different forums, but the most 
strategic ones are the following: seminars, workshops, and road shows, publication of 
research, documentary and building a competition culture. However, there are basically 
two popular types of competition advocacy that are often pursued, as indicated earlier in 
this thesis. One is by influencing government decisions with regard to economic reform 
and regulation, and the second type is by educating the stakeholders on the merits of 
competition in the market.58 More importantly, just like competition enforcement, there are 
some perquisites for a successful competition advocacy by a competition authority; these 
perquisites include independence from both private and governmental influences, 
availability of resources and credibility. These go to reinforce the fact that competition 
enforcement and advocacy are co-drivers necessary for executing competition law and 
policy and show the advantages accruable in the economy in the long run.59 
 
58 S.J. Evennet and J.L. Clarke, ‘Designing and implementing economic reforms in developing countries: 
what role for competition advocacy?’ (2005) Published at 
http://www.evennet.com/working/Deliverable5.pdf. Last visited on 30th April 2009. 
59 T. Zywicki and J. Cooper, ‘The U.S. Federal Trade Commission   competition advocacy: lessons for Latin 
American competition policy’ George Mason University Law Economics Research Paper Series, (2007) 
Published at http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/papers/docs/07-07.pdf. Last visited on 30th April 2009. 
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In relation to the goals of the draft FCB and the functions of the FCC, competition 
advocacy is only given scant attention in the Bill. While sections  8 and 9 dwell 
extensively on the objective and functions of the FCC, in section 10 that deals with the 
powers of the FCC,  only  sub-section10(1) briefly provides a blank provision which might 
be interpreted as a flexible provision for competition advocacy. The provision is as 
follows: 
Section 10(1) For the purpose of carrying out its functions under this Act, it 
shall be lawful for the commission to: (h) do such other things as it considers 
necessary for the effective performance of its functions under this Act.  
It is obvious the draftsmen did not take into consideration the importance of competition 
advocacy and the need to incorporate it into the draft Bill in order to create an easier way 
for its integration into the Nigerian economy. This thesis argues that it is better to make 
express provision in the Bill rather than leave it open or subject it to the interpretation of 
section 10(1) (h) of the draft FCB. Dabbah supports this position; he argues that the 
success of a competition system is dependent on both the extent to which competition 
advocacy is embedded in the competition system and the degree of receptiveness of a 
domestic system to international developments in other jurisdictions of similar economic 
circumstances. 60  Thus he advocates that competition law should support competition 
advocacy directly.  
 
60 M.M Dabbah, ‘Measuring the success of a system of competition law: a preliminary view’ (2000) 21(8) 
ECLR 369-76. According to him ‘Competition advocacy can become a safety valve in a system of 
competition law that would ensure against not only anti-competitive practices, but also lobbying and 
economic rent-seeking behaviour by various interest groups, which seem to be common in competition law 
matters. The desirability of these ends cannot be denied, since they are bound to help achieve greater 
accountability and transparency in economic decision-making mechanisms and promote sound economic 
management and business principles in both public and private spheres’. 
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All the same, while the importance of competition advocacy cannot be over emphasized, 
yet there seems to be little empirical record to support its efficacy in developing countries; 
thus it might be wise for Nigeria and other developing countries to adopt a balanced 
approach that involves competition enforcement and advocacy as much as the resources of 
the competition agencies will allow. This is not a rebuttal of the position of the ICN that 
developing and emerging economies should devote more of their time and resources to 
competition advocacy instead of competition enforcement; rather, this thesis favours a dual 
approach towards achieving their priorities without necessarily incurring additional costs.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The success and effective enforcement of competition law arguably as indicated in this 
chapter does not rest on the provisions of competition laws and competition authorities 
alone; rather, the whole competition process must be viewed as a system that requires an 
adequate and balanced nutrient to be nurtured into a robust body that will be able to 
withstand all the wills and caprices of a market economy. These nutrients include an 
independent competition agency, non political nomination of the agency’s director or 
substantive head, judicial review and accountability amongst others nutrients. The 
provisions of the draft FCB in respect of the implementation of the Bill by the FCC when 
enacted into law is quite wide, but it might not be able to adequately carry out the 
objectives of the Bill without some adjustment and possibly a reduction in the focus of the 
Bill. 
 
Moreover, one principal change that should be made concerns some of the wide mandate 
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given to the FCC concerning the objectives of the Bill. It contains both micro-economic 
and competition objectives. It is submitted that it should not be part of the mandate of the 
FCC to promote employment and social welfare of the Nigerian citizens. This mandate 
should rest with the Ministries of Labour and Employment, and Ministry of Trade, 
Commerce and Industry.    
 
Closely related to the issue raised in the preceding paragraph is the serious need to 
ascertain the particular Minister that will be involved with competition law and policy as 
provided for in the draft Bill.  The specific ‘Minister’ and the limits of its role in relation to 
the composition of the FCC and the implementation of the draft Bill will need to be 
clarified before its enactment. The amendment to the Bill must also show that while the 
body is an independent entity it is a corporate body that enjoys no privilege or immunity. 
This could act as a check on the exercise of its powers and thereby make it more objective 
and professionally minded. 
 
In addition, the quasi-judicial function of the of the FCC could be made more expansive by 
creating a special court, as a special department of the Federal High Court to deal with 
appeal against the decisions of the board rather than the general provisions in section 101of 
the FCB  to go before the Federal High Court judicial review. The Federal High Court has 
a very busy work load that might not allow for quick determination of applications of 
competition related applications.  Thus the creation of this specialized section will not only 
allow for a quick determination of cases but it will also allow  a rapid  development of the 
understanding and judicial expertise of the judges who will be dealing primarily with 
competition and economic related issues. This should not prevent allocation of other cases 
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to the specialized section. Some of these cases could be matters involving international 
trade and financial transactions and regulations.  
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Chapter Six  
6.0 Conclusion and Implications 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have examined and illustrated the concept of competition law and 
policy, theories underlying it, advantages it involves and the arguments against it, as well 
as its growing popularity and adoption in the global community exposed to globalization 
and other factors. The factors in question involve pressures from development agencies 
and the desire to use competition law and policy as a basis for development and stable 
economies, particularly in the emerging economies of developing countries.  
 
With the importance of these in mind, the thesis has explored some particular 
characteristics of the economies of resource-dependent developing countries, using Nigeria 
as a proxy to situate the types of developing economies and how their specific features 
could affect Nigeria’s economic development, especially with particular regard to its 
projected gains from a competitive market economy. This point was treated in the light of 
resource allocation issue in a resource-rich country which Nigeria is considered to be. This 
thesis submits that it is essential/critical for Nigeria and other resource dependent-
developing and emerging economies to define and map out the aim, purpose, and vision for 
their economic development parallel to whatever economic reform they intend to pursue, 
giving particular interest to building a sustainable competition culture in the sense that 
research has shown there is no single sustainable competition culture that ‘fits all’ 
economic or political models, that is, as ready-made for adoption. Both circumstances and 
the peoples involved in them differ.  
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The required competition law and policy, for most resource-dependent developing 
countries, especially Nigeria, will consist of an amalgam of some of provisions borrowed 
from the US antitrust laws and EC competition policy alongside other features. The reason 
underlying such an approach is that most of the economies are at different levels of 
economic development with varying institutional and governance capacities.1  The system 
in Japan model, combining both competition and cooperation to promote rapid 
industrialization, may be considered as a model suitable for Nigeria.2 
 
6.2 Key Findings and Conclusions in this Study 
Starting from Chapter One the thesis sets out the research problems and sub-set research 
question concerning the extent to which competition law and policy can be employed to 
promote the efficient allocation of resources and thereby development in resource-
dependent developing economies.  
 
Chapter Two concludes that resource-dependent developing countries, while sharing the 
same or most of the problems typical of developing countries, also have to confront a range 
of additional issues and problems that require tailor-made economic policies and reforms. 
The most critical among these problems include price volatility, the Dutch disease, rent 
seeking, access to energy and corruption. These problems further provide fertile soil for 
other core competitive concerns such as anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance 
and merger related problems. 
 
1 A. Singh and R. Dhumale, ‘Competition policy and development in developing countries’ Published at 
www.southcentre.org/publications/index.htm. Last visited on 30th April 2009. 
2 See H. Odagiri, Growth Through Competition: Strategic Management and the Economy in Japan, (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). This book offers an excellent insight into the argument that 
because of different economic background and governance capacities different economies need different 
competition policies. 
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Chapter Three concludes that along with other objectives, economic objectives are part of 
the basic foundations of competition law thereby advocate different approaches for the 
particular economic problems of resource-dependent economies.3 It also pointed out that 
there is a necessary positive correlation between competition policy and development.  
These conclusions in turn introduce other concerns, prompting, not least the question: as to 
what economic standard(s) should be adopted in the substance of competition law and 
policy for them. 
 
Chapter Four examined the draft FCB and reached the conclusion that in its present state it 
is a very broad competition policy comprising the major competition law standards and 
other industrial and socio-political objectives. This will therefore need to be adjusted and 
tailored to target the basic competition concerns likely to affect a resource-based economy 
like Nigeria. While the draft Bill will help to improve such issues as access to market, 
quality and affordability in some cases, it does not seem to have any guarantee to wipe out 
some of the particular problems of resource-dependent countries, such as corruption, rent 
seeking, the Dutch disease and property rights raised in the research questions. For 
instance the draft Bill mandates the FCC to promote the balanced development of the 
national economy and welfare of the consumers amongst other competitive concerns but 
there is no further regulatory or fiscal provision empowering the FCC to carry out such 
challenging task.  
 
 
3 R.D. Cooter, ‘The theory of market modernization of law: economic development through decentralized 
law’ in J.S. Bhandari and A.O. Sykes (ed.), Economic Dimension in International Law: Comparative and 
Empirical Perspective (London: Sage, 1998), 225.  
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Chapter Five considered the design of the regulatory agency for implementation of 
competition policy in Nigeria. Its main conclusion is that the success and effective 
enforcement of competition law arguably as indicated in the chapter does not rest on the 
provisions of competition laws and competition authorities alone; rather, the whole 
competition process must be viewed as a system that requires an adequate and balanced 
nutrient to be nurtured into a robust body that will be able to withstand all the wills and 
caprices of a market economy. These nutrients include an independent competition agency, 
non political nomination of the agency’s director or substantive head, judicial review and 
accountability amongst others nutrients.  
 
That competition policy has continued to enjoy a remarkable growth across the world in 
recent times needs no lengthy discussion: in many countries awareness and continuing 
acceptance prevail as to the value of competition policy as an important component for 
building the complex sets of market institutions to support economic growth, development 
and policy management capability.4 While there is evidence to show that foreign direct 
investment, especially through mergers, is necessary for promoting economic progress in 
developing countries, there is at the same time not much evidence to indicate that mergers 
will particularly enhance economic efficiency in developing countries. It is generally 
agreed that international mergers, especially those involving multinational companies 
incorporated in industrialized countries, are very likely to have negative impacts on 
competition and the ability of undertakings to compete in developing countries, and 
thereby stifle economic development.  Thus emerging economies and developing countries 
require a competition policy with due regard to the possible positive or negative impact of 
 
4 T. Stewar et al., Competition Law in action: Experiences from Developing Countries, (Ottawa: International 
Development Research Center, 2007) 15. 
 
 
 206
transnational mergers; and the economic reforms, as well as to the positive or negative 
impact of   privatization, deregulation and liberalization experienced as positive and 
beneficial in the jurisdictions of developed economies. A further point to consider is that, 
whatever may be the domestic competition law and policy of a developing country, there is 
no guarantee as to absolute restraints on anticompetitive behaviour by multinational firms.  
 
Consequently, it appears that Nigeria is not ready to be left out from the category of 
developing countries embracing rapid economic reforms, as reflected in the light of recent 
events in the country. In fact, beside much excitement, there are also high expectations 
from the public about economic reform and the drive towards a truly competitive economy. 
This is supported by the zeal and amount of interest generated by the populace in the 
companies earmarked for privatisation. Most of the shares of the public companies floated 
in recent times were bought in record time, and many people have continued to complain 
that they were unable to buy into these companies. This tends to suggest an 
acknowledgement of the consumers’ trust in the market or the desire to give the market a 
fair chance, rather than to continue under the old state frontier where there was in most 
cases no control, influence or possibility to practically protect consumer’s interests. 
 
This thesis further observes that in some countries, particularly in the US and EU, 
competition policies have been utilized in conjunction with other economic reform 
programmes in order to jump start their economies on the path to stable economic 
development.   This consideration rides on the back of the argument and experience that all 
economies are prone to different levels of anti-competitive practices.  This therefore 
reflects on the question whether competition policy could be used to solve the economic 
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problems ‘peculiar’ to resource rich countries. The present thesis undertook to identify the 
most primary competition problem to be tackled, such as those concerning restrictive trade 
practices and abuse of dominant position, are common in most jurisdictions and 
consequently common standards in competition can be used to address them. However, 
other secondary problems, such as rent seeking, resource curse and corruption cannot be 
considered to be directly competition problems; but they could be mitigated only by 
resorting to a competition process to solve through transparent regulatory structures, such 
as decisions of the judiciary, an effective law enforcement system, proper management and 
institution of transparent political accountability.5  
 
Additionally, the thesis recognises that a total application of competition and a relevant law 
are not suitable in some sectors. This is due to features inherent to the sector in question, 
for example, serious concern that a serious conflict could emerge between sovereign 
concerns, on the one hand, market and the sectors that supply special goods and services to 
the citizenry. As a result, the use of regulation as a complement/balance to competition in a 
liberalised sector is advocated as a possible way of addressing the issue. This can ensure 
that competition and competition processes are jointly protected to enhance total welfare. 
 
In addition, with the ongoing economic reforms, an expansion or non-expansion of the 
scope of applicability of competition law and policy is likely to lead an increase in 
regulatory concerns. The awareness that the rules of the game have changed (market 
discipline) can breed the expectation of the consumers as to better and more efficient 
availability of products and services.  The emergence of such a situation can generate the 
 
5 A detailed examination of how this could be done is not within the ambit of this thesis.  
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need to ensure better compliance with relevant regulations and laws.  If the latter have not 
been adopted in time and/or earlier, capacity of the involved   agencies will be stretched, 
their levels of inadequacy may be exposed; they may possibly be pitched against 
businesses that want to maintain the status quo. 
 
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that recent economic reforms and the introduction of 
competition law and policy in Nigeria should contribute to the promotion of employment. 
The percentage of the contribution might be very small but in the long run it can have a 
major positive effect, because most of the additionally employed manpower would have to 
be suitably qualified or trained to achieve a particular proficiency level. An implication of 
this is that they would have to be remunerated commensurably. As a complement, the crop 
of the new staff will boost the quality level of the pool of human resources available to 
businesses and governments, a fact, which may ordinarily contribute to the efficiency level 
and, degree of sophistication in society as a whole.  
 
Further, the thesis recognises that, with the level of information asymmetry in Nigeria and 
an ongoing liberalisation programme, it will be difficult to prevent the new private 
companies from becoming private monopolies. The absence of precise information on how 
the firms are managed, especially in relation to cost and liability, might compound the 
problem. If any pro-active competition agency were to be established, it should be able to 
reduce any likely incidence of abusive market practices but, as earlier pointed out, such an 
ability would depend on a host of factors, amongst which to be underlined are political 
will, a high level of professional integrity of the agency’s staff, an independent judiciary 
and clear enforcement rules. 
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Another major conclusion is that Nigeria and other developing countries need to continue 
to improve the level of their infrastructural provisions, such as the sphere of law, 
enforcement mechanism, empowerment of the consumer etc.  Just as in the developed 
economies, markets in developing economies are in a state of flux and the participants will 
always want to maximize their profits and naturally will take advantage of any 
opportunities to improve their respective positions. This view holds as especially true for 
developing countries, where rent seeking has in recent times   been elevated almost to a 
position of envy occupied mostly by a privileged few politicians, businesses and 
technocrats. 
 
Another consequence that should be expected from the operation of market discipline and 
the impact of competition policy on the Nigerian economy can be defined as the issue of 
regulatory conflicts in respect of duplication of authorities with powers over transactions in 
the key resource industries. At the moment there are various legislated areas regulating the 
oil and gas industries, the electricity and communication industry. By the time a 
competition law is eventually introduced, there will be a need to harmonise the laws in 
question with the provisions of competition law, although the supremacy of the provisions 
of competition law in certain cases might be spelt out ab initio. However, the probability of 
conflicts is not far fetched; it could heat up the economy and thereby have a negative 
impact on FDI. This is not an unusual problem, as countries with more established 
traditions in competition have experienced it. It only calls for the need for better advocacy 
and a better understanding of the tenets of competition policy by all, especially the legal 
teams on either side of the divide, and the judiciary called to adjudicate on whatever 
dispute may arise. However, if the issue of conflicts and potential claims likely to arise 
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from these economic reforms and eventual introduction of competition policy is not 
addressed from the beginning, the judicial system might not be able to deal with the deluge 
of cases that may arise.  There is thus, preferably before the adoption of the envisaged 
laws, the need to commence early with the training of required judicial officers. Possible 
assistance in this regard could be obtained from the OECD, UNCTAD, the WTO, ICN and 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC).6 
 
In addition, the ongoing economic reforms and the eventual introduction of a competition 
policy and their influence on public services, as to how these public services will be 
governed, will lead to more transparency and involvement of the masses, given the fact 
that the market is expected to play a superior role. This possibility is expected to have an 
impact on the earlier mentioned secondary problems that competition policy might not be 
able to solve. However, competition agencies and policy makers have to be ever cautious 
of economic changes, some of which have queried the neoclassical use of the ‘Economic 
Man’ (homo economicus) in economic analysis. The Economic Man is a willing tool for 
economic modelling but its major weakness is that s/he does not exist. 7   To avoid 
neutralising the effects of competition law and policy especially through changes, the 
competition enforcement agencies will need all necessary resources for the effective 
enforcement of the rules. The importance of ensuring the independence of the enforcement 
agencies and giving them political support cannot be overemphasised.  
 
6 The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is a public corporation created by the Parliament 
of Canada in 1970 to help developing countries use science technology to find practical, long-term solutions 
to the social, economic, environmental problems they face. Support is directed toward developing an 
indigenous research capacity to sustain policies technologies that developing countries need to build 
healthier, more equitable, more prosperous societies’. See, http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-1-201-1-
DO_TOPIC.html. Last visited on 30th April 2009. 
7 C. Lambert, ‘The marketplace of perceptions: behavioural economics ‘ March-April 2006) Harvard 
Magazine, 50-51.   Some behavioural economists at Harvard, Stanford, Berkley, Chicago and other schools 
of late have been examining the value deregulation in solving real world problems and whether the 
economics assumption they are based on have generally enhanced consumer welfare or not 
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6.3   Implications for Theory, Policy and Practice  
The experiences of countries with a long and chequered history of competition policy are 
always instructive as everything that happens in competition policy is a prologue; there are 
lessons to be learned from the success and mistakes of the past in order to avoid policy 
failure. 8   As in almost all economic matters, competition policy will continue to be 
responsive to economic changes, so the preferred approach to competition matters in 
Nigeria and possibly for most developing countries this should be a flexible approach, 
although within defined parameters.  
 
One of the major criticisms of policies in developing countries - especially policies that 
were initiated as a result of the influence of international development agencies and 
economic institutions, adopted or being initiated by developing and emerging countries - is 
the argument that most of these policies are not suitable or do not reflect the peculiar 
circumstances of the adoptee nations. As a result, it is very important, apart from 
researching into the importance of competition policy in developing and transition 
economies, also to commit time and money to studies that show how competition is 
working in comparison to how it has worked and is worked in developed economies. The 
result from such research will help to improve the understanding of the stakeholders - 
particularly policy makers, judges and competition agency’s staff - and help to shape and 
steer the agenda of the economy concerned in a manner that will maximize their strengths 
and weaknesses.  
 
8 K.P.  Ewing, Competition Rules for the 21st Century: Principles from the American’s Experience (The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006), 193. 
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In addition, competition agencies in developing countries will have to start in earnest to 
address the issue of competition policy and sustainable development; in essence they need 
to identify how they can achieve a balance between the competition policy and other 
environmental and economic policies. This has to be done in such a way that will not put 
them on a collision course with the developed countries. The thesis argued in chapter five 
that the agencies must properly prioritise the types and number of cases they are involved 
with. This will help to maximize time and money 
 
Moreover, the issue of information asymmetry identified is a common problem in 
developing and emerging economies, it poses a serious regulatory challenge in the research 
problem analysed in the present thesis. It is taken as understood that a competition 
authority and other regulatory authorities will need to be in place to effect competition 
policy and economic reforms. Access to information across the concerned industries is a 
crucial ingredient to their success. For example parallel to merger activities and other 
economic restructuring activities that have continued to grow in developing countries, 
country-specific data have become available, but the author of the present thesis is unaware 
of any concerted efforts to collate and assess cross-country differences in this competition 
process among developing countries. As a result, the regulatory authorities must devise 
means of obtaining reliable and accurate information and establish how they could 
collaborate among themselves; otherwise their assessment and intervention might be 
tainted and could result in faulty decisions and a further distortion in the market 
concerned.9   
 
9 While it has not been possible to adopt an international competition law, cooperation, especially, exchange 
of data, emergence of network forums like the International Competition Network, bilateral agreements and 
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Furthermore, given that the trend is tending towards a convergence in competition matters, 
with increasing knowledge of the competition process, competition policies can now be 
formulated and implemented to achieve a more efficient global economy,10 but to achieve 
such a goal, especially in resource rich developing countries, certain core principles will 
have to be adopted and enforced as firmly as possible. According to Ewing, the principles 
in question will include focused, factual and rigorous examination of the competitive 
process in the light of the particular environment of the process of competition; balancing 
good and bad effects, and long and short-term interests, with the costs of government 
intervention and to continuously re-evaluate competition policies and enforcement 
mechanisms, using empirical data.  
 
Almost all the principles emphasised by Ewing are part of the requirements to deal with 
while examining the design of a competition agency and the issue of competition 
advocacy.  In short, the principles summarize the essence of what an enduring competition 
culture entails. However, the last principle, which Ewing has termed an ‘Eleventh 
Commandment’, is an issue that has continued to receive attention from different 
commentators. One such commentator is Kovacic, who writes:  
When experience in one jurisdiction illuminates superior approaches, such 
methods ought to become focal points for possible emulation by others…  
Rather than promoting ‘best practices,’ it might be more accurate and 
 
multilateral have continued to produce  ‘successful convergence and cooperation and spreading best practice 
between competition authorities from around the world’. See, Jones & Sufrin,  EC Competition Law, 1395 
and F. Jenny, ‘Competition trade and development before and after Cancun’ in B. Hawk (ed.) 2003Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute,  631. 
10 Ewing, note 8, 331. 
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informative to say we are seeking ‘better practices…Envisioning problems of 
substance or process as having well-defined, immutable solutions may neglect 
the imperfect state of our knowledge and obscure how competition authorities 
must work continuously to adapt to a fluid environment that features industrial 
dynamism, new transactional phenomenon, and continuing change in collateral 
institutions vital to the implementation of competition policy.11   
This in essence, is a contribution that the present thesis has given to policy makers in 
Nigeria; it exposed the need for continuity and continual evaluation of policies without 
which the country will lack behind in economic development among comity of nations.   
 
In addition, it is hoped that the present thesis will make a contribution to the knowledge of 
technocrats and enhance the probable introduction and teaching of competition law in 
universities, with particular comparative reference to the needs of developing economies. 
The introduction of competition law in schools’ curriculum could be part of a competition 
advocacy in the context of free market economies in development countries. Although 
many policy documents and journals have been produced to address different issues 
touching economic reforms, there have not been any case studies (at least to the knowledge 
of the author of this thesis) or literature to address the competitive problems likely to be 
faced by resource-dependent developing countries that have adopted a competition law.  
            
 
11 W. Kovacic, ‘Achieving better practices in design of competition policy institutions,’ Remarks before the 
Seoul Competition Forum 2004, Seoul Korea, April 20, 2004, 12. Another commentator is D.P. Majoras, the 
FTC Chairman, in 2005; she says ‘the need to improve our knowledge base and to incorporate that 
knowledge into enforcement work continues with unequal urgency today. We can take nothing for granted 
except the need to improve’. – ‘Celebrating the federal Trade Commission: Introductory remarks for the 90th 
Anniversary Symposium,’ (2005) 72 Antitrust Law Journal 755, 758-59. 
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6.4   Limitations 
A major limitation, though not peculiar to the present research or just to Nigeria as a proxy 
country for very many most developing countries, is the issue of information asymmetry.  
The level of information management in developing countries is still low in comparison 
with the situation in developed countries. As a result, it continues to be difficult to obtain 
adequate information on key economic issues, especially in relation to the privatisation and 
liberalisation programmes. For example, in Nigeria there is no definite information on the 
status of the draft FCB. Thus the lack of wide empirical data to compare the present 
research theme especially with practices in developed countries with rich traditions of 
competition policies. This shortcoming thus calls   for more research. 
 
Closely related to the preceding limitation is the dearth of literature and empirical research 
on the application of competition policy specifically to resource allocation in developing 
countries. While there exists a large body of literature on competition matters concerning, 
monopoly, mergers, abusive behaviours and others in the USA and the EU, there exists 
little material in relation to resource allocation in developing countries, although there are 
some materials available from studies by organisations like WTO and OECD highlighting 
and promoting the essence of competition law in transition and developing economies. 
This deficit is mainly due to differences in the political and economic circumstances of the 
developed countries, on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other.  However, as 
submitted in the present thesis, competition law can assist in curtailing and also preventing 
anti-competitive behaviour as well as assist in creating an environment that could mitigate 
the occurrence of other economic problems not directly related to competition.  
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6.5   Further Research      
Nigeria and most of the other developing countries - especially in Africa - have many 
lessons to learn from other jurisdictions with rich and long established tradition in 
competition law and policy, as pointed out in the present thesis.  However, one lesson that 
stands out is that competition policy is complex; for example, in the US the domain of 
antitrust laws have remained excessively dominated by triple actions, many per se rules 
and many difficult cases settled with reference to the rule of reason. While in the EU, for a 
long time achieving a balance between its integration/ common market and efficiency 
goals caused considerable concern with the enforcement and implementation of its rules. 
Thus, competition policy is a continually growing (and also evolving) issue; its adoption or 
non-adoption will have macroeconomic impacts on any economy as the world economy 
continues to experience the effects of globalisation and other factors inducing economic 
changes.  
 
Lastly, there is generally much scope and need for additional research in the area relative 
to the evolution of resource-dependent economies in developing countries Despite a 
growing popularity of competition laws and encouragement given by international 
organisations, such as OECD and the WTO to developing and emerging economies to 
adopt competition laws, a query that will continue to arise from developing countries and 
emerging economies, particularly in  Africa, is the question how significant the benefit or 
probably the payoff will be when competition laws are adopted  in a manner modelled 
either after that of the EC competition  or  US antitrust laws. Accordingly, further research 
and continuous policy reviews should be expected to the extent that a balance has to be 
maintained between sovereignty and market exigencies so that a reasonable level of 
continual economic development could be guaranteed. 
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Consequently, while recognising that resource-dependent countries have peculiar 
problems, this thesis concludes that with some level of adaptations competition law 
standards can be employed effectively in resource-based developing countries. It further 
concludes that the draft FCB is a credible legislative instrument for the promotion of    
economic development but it will require some amendments incorporating other tools or 
measures to guarantee its successful implementation. These amendments should include a 
provision for competition advocacy, clear definition of the Minister to be involved and the 
limit of his role,  and empowerment of the proposed FCC to be able to independently carry 
out its mandate as provided for in the draft Bill. 
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  APPENDIX  
          Nigeria’s Federal Competition Bill 
 
 
                            A BILL   FOR 
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH THE FEDERAL COMPETITION COMMISSION, 
PROMO`TE THE BALANCED DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, 
WELFARE AND INTEREST OF CONSUMERS, MAINTAIN AND ENCOURAGE 
COMPETITION BY PROHIBITING RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES THAT 
SUBSTANTIALLY LESSEN COMPETITION, PREVENT THE ABUSE OF 
DOMINANT POSITIONS OF MARKET POWER IN NIGERIA AND FOR MATTERS 
CONNECTED THEREWITH. 
         Commencement. 
                BE IT ENACTED by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
as follows- 
             PART I –PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
1. (1) This Act shall not apply to  
        Application of this Act. 
(a) combinations or activities of employees for their own reasonable protection as 
employees; 
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(b) arrangements for collective bargaining on behalf of employers and employees for the 
purpose of fixing terms and conditions of employment; 
(c) subject to section (3), the entering into of an arrangement in so far as it contains a 
provision relating to the use, licence or assignment of rights under or existing by virtue of 
any copyright, patent, or trade mark; 
(d) any act done to give effect to a provision of any such arrangement; 
(e) the entering into or carrying out of such agreement as is authorised by the Commission 
under Part XIII or the engagement in such business practice as is so authorised; 
(f) activities expressly exempted by virtue of any treaty or agreement to which Nigeria is a 
party; 
(g) activities of professional associations designed to develop or enforce professional 
standards of competence; 
(h) such other business or activity declared by the Minister by an Order published in the 
official Gazette. 
(2) This Act applies to public utilities but the Commission shall before it exercises any 
functions in relation to such utilities, consult with the body responsible for the regulation 
of the given utility. 
(3) With respect to professional services provided by professional associations listed in 
Schedule I of this Act, the Commission may establish guidelines for the application of 
certain provisions of this Act to the supply of services or conduct of business by members 
of such professional associations. 
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          Schedule I. 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3) of the section, the Commission shall from time to 
time review the list of professional groups to be included in the list in schedule 1 of this 
Act with the view to determining the groups that are eligible to be accorded privileges and 
exemption with respect to the application of any provision of this Act. 
(5) On the advice of the National Economic Council and upon consultation with the 
Commission, the President may determine if deemed reasonable or desirable for the 
development and growth of the Nigerian economy, special exemptions from the 
application of the provisions of this Act for any sector of the economy and such 
exemptions shall be published in the gazette. 
(6) This Act shall be binding and applicable to 
 (a) the Federal Government, the government of each of the States of the Federation and 
the Local Governments as far as the said governments engage in trade or commercial 
activity; 
(b) every body corporate or other agency of the Federal Government, State Government or 
any Local Government, in so far as such corporation or other agency engages in trade or 
commercial activity; 
(c) every body corporate in which the Federal Government, the government of any state of 
the Federation, any Local Government or a body corporate referred to in paragraph (b) of 
this subsection has a controlling interest in so far as it engages in trade or commercial 
activity. 
(7) This Act shall apply to all conducts within and outside the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria by any person resident or carrying on business in Nigeria to the extent 
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that such conduct substantially affects a market in Nigeria. 
(8) Part XII of this Act shall apply to the acquisition outside Nigeria by a person (whether 
or not the person is resident or carries on business in Nigeria) of the assets or shares of a 
business to the extent that such acquisition substantially affects a market in Nigeria. 
2. The objects of this Act are to promote    Objects of the Act. 
(a) the balanced development of the Nigeria economy; 
(b) the welfare and interests of consumers, and provide them with competitive price and 
product choices; 
(c) maintain, and encourage competition and enhance economic efficiency in production, 
trade and commerce; 
(d) expansion of opportunities for domestic enterprises to participate in world markets; 
(e) and enhance the ability of small and medium enterprises to compete effectively; and 
(f) prohibit restrictive business practices which prevents, restricts or distorts competition or 
constitutes the abuse of a dominant position of market power in Nigeria. 
  
PART II ESTABLISHMENT OF NIGERIA COMPETITION COMMISSION 
3. (1) There is hereby established a body to be known as the Federal 
Competition Commission (in this Act referred to as “the Commission”). 
    Establishment of the Federal Competition Commission. 
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(2) The Commission(a) shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common 
seal; 
(b) may sue and be sued in its corporate name; and 
(c) may acquire, hold and dispose of property whether movable or immoveable. 
(3) The headquarters of the Commission shall be situated in the Federal Capital Territory, 
Abuja and there shall be established one or more additional offices as the Commission may 
from time to time determine. 
            Constitution of the Commission. 
4.(1) The Commission shall consist of nine members, of whom:   
        Constitution of Commission. 
(a) Four shall be fulltime members; and 
(b) Five shall be part time members. 
(2) The fulltime members shall comprise of an economist, a lawyer and other professionals 
in the field of management. 
(3) A person shall not be appointed a full time member of the Commission unless he has at 
least ten years cognate experience as an economist, legal practitioner or professional in the 
management field as the case may be. 
(4) The members of the Commission shall be appointed by the President. 
(5) The President shall appoint the Executive Chairman of the Commission from amongst 
the fulltime members. 
(6) The President shall not appoint a person a member of the Commission unless, in the 
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opinion of the President, such person is qualified for appointment, having regard to the 
functions and powers of the Commission, by virtue of that person's knowledge of or 
experience in industry, commerce, economics, law, accountancy, public administration, or 
consumer affairs. 
(7) The powers of the Commission shall not be affected by any vacancy in its membership, 
or by any deficiency in the appointment of any member. 
(8) The Commission may coopt representatives of sector regulatory agencies to participate 
in its proceedings as it deems fit and such coopted representatives shall participate in the 
Commission’s proceedings on terms to be specified in the instrument Coopting them. 
(9) The Executive Chairman and the other full time members shall be responsible for the 
day to day administration of the Commission subject to oversight by the Commission, and 
in this respect the Executive Chairman and the other full time members shall report to the 
Commission in monthly and other meetings. 
(10) The supplementary provisions set out in Schedule II to this Act shall have effect with 
respect to the proceedings of the Commission and the other matters mentioned therein. 
                                                                                                                                          
         Schedule 2 
5.(1) A person appointed       Tenure of office etc. 
 (a) a fulltime member of the Commission shall hold office for a term of four years in the 
first instance and may be reappointed for a further term of 4 years and no more; 
(b) a part time member of the Commission shall hold office for a term of three years in the 
first instance and may be reappointed for a further term of three years and no more. 
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(2) A member of the Commission may resign his appointed by notice in writing addressed 
to the President and that member shall, on the date of the receipt of the notice by the 
President, cease to be a member. 
(3) The President may, terminate the appointment of a member of the Commission and 
remove him from office for  
(a) inability to discharge the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of mind 
or body or any other cause); or 
(b) his being convicted for a crime involving dishonesty or moral turpitude; or 
(c) his disqualification by an competent authority from the practice of his or her profession 
in any part of Nigeria; or 
(d) misconduct or gross misconduct as defined under the Public Service Rules. 
(4) The President may, pending the termination of a member of the Commission suspend 
such member from office. 
(5) Nothing in subsection (3) shall permit the termination of the membership of any person 
in the Commission solely on the ground that such person voluntarily withdrew from his 
profession. 
(6) The President may, if he is satisfied that it is not in the interest of the Commission or 
the public that a member continues in office remove him from office. 
6. Where a vacancy occurs in the membership of the Commission, it shall be filled by the 
appointment of a successor to hold office for the remainder of the term of office of his 
predecessor, so however that the successor shall represent the same interest as his 
predecessor. 
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Vacancy in membership, Emoluments, etc. of members. 
7. The Chairman and members of the Commission shall be paid such emoluments, 
allowances and benefits as the Federal Government may, from time to time approve. 
PART III OBJECTIVES AND FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE 
COMMISSION 
8. The objectives of the Commission shall be to  Ojectives of the Commission     
(a) promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the Nigerian economy; 
(b) provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; (c) promote 
employment and advance the social and economic welfare of Nigerians; 
(d) ensure that small and medium enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate 
in the Nigerian economy; and (e) protect Nigerian industries from unfair trade practices. 
9.(1) The Commission shall  Functions of the Commission 
(a) formulate measures to increase market transparency including weight and measures 
administration; 
(b) periodically, initiate policy review of commercial activities in Nigeria to ascertain 
anticompetitive and restrictive practices which may adversely affect the economic interest 
of consumers; 
(c) provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
(d) promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of Nigeria; 
(e) ensure that small and medium enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate 
in the Nigeria economy; 
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(f) protect Nigerian industries from unfair trade practices; 
(g) carry out on its own initiative or at the request of any person, such investigation or 
inquires in relation to the conduct of business in Nigeria as will enable it to determine 
whether any person is engaging in business practices in contravention of this Act and 
initiate actions for such violations; 
(h) carry out such other investigations or inquires as the Minister may request or as it may 
consider necessary or desirable in connection with any matters falling within the provisions 
of the Act; 
(i) advise the Minister on such matters relating to the operation of this Act including 
recommendations to the Minister for the review of relevant policies, legislation and 
subsidiary legislation as it thinks fit or as may be requested by the Minister; 
(j) eliminate anticompetitive agreements, misleading, unfair, deceptive or unconscionable 
marketing, trading and business practices; 
(k) resolve disputes or complaints and issue clear directives or apply sanctions were 
necessary; 
(l) make recommendations to the relevant Ministries, ExtraMinisterial Departments and 
Agencies regarding relief for an industry seriously injured by increasing import, if it makes 
an affirmative injury determination; 
(m) give and receive advice from other regulatory authorities or agencies within the 
relevant industry or sector on consumer protection and competition matters; 
(n) create public awareness through seminars, workshops, studies and make information 
with regard to the exercise of its functions and powers available to the public; and 
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(o) perform such other functions or duties as are required to give effect to this Act. 
(2) The Commission shall make available to 
(i) to persons engaged in business, general information with respect to their rights and 
obligations under this Act, 
(ii) for the guidance of consumers, general information on the rights and obligations of 
persons under this Act whose activities affect the interest of consumers. 
(b) undertake studies and publish report and information with regard to matters that affect 
the interest of consumers; 
(c) cooperate with and assist any association or body of persons in developing 
and promoting the observance of standards of conduct for the purpose of ensuring 
compliance with the provisions of this Act. 
(3)Where the Commission is required under this Act to determine whether or not, or the 
extent to which a conduct or activity or practice will result, or likely result in a benefit to 
the public, the Commission shall have regard to any economic efficiency that it considers 
will result or will likely result from that conduct. 
10. 
(1) For the purpose of carrying out its functions under this Act, it shall be lawful for the 
Commission to        General Powers of the Commission. 
(a) prohibit the making or carrying out of an agreement; 
(b) order the termination of an agreement; 
(c) prohibit the withholding of supplies or any threat thereof; 
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(d) declare certain business practices as abuse of dominant positions of market power; 
(e) prohibit the attachment of extraneous conditions to any transactions; 
(f) prohibit 
(i) the recommendation of retail prices, and 
(ii) discrimination or preferences in prices or other related matters; 
(g) require the publication of transparent price list; and 
(h) do such other things as it considers necessary for the effective performance of its 
functions under this Act. 
(2) Where the Commission considers it necessary or desirable for the purpose of carrying 
out its functions and exercising its powers under this Act, the Commission may, by notice 
in writing served on any person, require that person: 
(a) to furnish to the Commission, by writing signed by that person or, in the case of a 
company, by a director or competent servant or agent of the company, within the time and 
in the manner specified in the notice, any information or class of information specified in 
the notice; 
(b) to produce to the Commission, or to a person specified in the notice acting on its behalf 
in accordance with the notice, any document or class of documents specified in the notice; 
or 
(c) to appear before the Commission at a time and place specified in the notice to give 
evidence, either orally or in writing, and produce any document or class of documents 
specified in the notice. 
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(3) The Commission shall obtain such information as it considers necessary to assist it in 
its investigations or inquires and where it considers appropriate, shall examine and obtain 
verification of documents submitted to it. 
(4) The Commission shall have power to 
(a) summon and examine witnesses; 
(b) call for and examine documents; 
(c) administer oaths; 
(d) require that any document submitted to the Commission be verified by affidavit; 
(e) require the furnishing of such returns or information as it may require within such 
period as it may specify by notice; 
(f) adjourn any investigation or inquiry from time to time. 
(5) The Commission may hear orally any person who in its opinion will be affected by an 
investigation or inquiry being carried out by it. 
(6) The Commission may require a person engage in business or such other person as it 
considers appropriate, to state such facts concerning products manufactured, produced or 
supplied by that person as the Commission may think necessary to determine whether the 
conduct of the business in relation to the products constitutes an anticompetitive practice. 
(7) If the information provided for in subsection 
(3) of this section is not furnished to the satisfaction of the Commission, it may make a 
finding on the basis of information available to it. 
(8) A summons to attend and give evidence or to produce documents before the 
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Commission issued under the hand of the Secretary or any member of the Commission 
shall be served on the person concerned. (9) Hearings of the Commission shall take place 
in public, but the Commission may, whenever the circumstances warrant, conduct a 
hearing in camera. 
(10)(a) If a person without sufficient cause, fails or refuses to  
(i) appear before the Commission in obedience to a summons, or 
(ii) produce a document which he is required by such summons to produce or wilfully 
(i) insults any member or officer of the Commission, or 
(ii) obstructs or interrupts the proceedings of the Commission; 
he shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to imprisonment for 3 years or fine 
of _200,000.00 or both. 
11.(1) The Commission may for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person has 
engaged in, is engaging or is likely to engage in conduct constituting or likely to constitute 
a contravention of this Act, require an authorised officer to Power of Entry. 
(a) enter and search any premises; 
(b) inspect and remove for the purpose of making copies, any documents or extracts 
therefrom in the possession or under the control of the person. 
(2) Except as otherwise directed by the Commission, an authorised officer shall only 
exercise the powers conferred by subsection 
(1) of this section with a warrant issued under subsection (3) of this section. 
(3) Where a Chief Magistrate or a Judge of a High Court is satisfied on information on 
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oath that there is reasonable ground for believing that any person has engaged or is 
engaging or likely to engage in conduct constituting or likely to constitution contravention 
of this Act, he, may issue a warrant permitting an authorised officer to exercise the powers 
conferred by subsection (1) of this section in relation to any premises specified in the 
warrant. 
(4) A person who applies for a warrant shall, having made reasonable inquiries, disclose  
(a) details of every previous application for a warrant to search the place that the person 
knows has been made within the preceding twelve months; 
(b) the result of the application; 
(5) A warrant shall not authorise the detention of a document or documents for more than 7 
days. 
(6) An authorised officer shall 
(a) on entry into any premises pursuant to a warrant, produce evidence of his identity and 
the authority to enter; and 
(b) upon the completion of the search authorised by the warrant, leave a receipt containing 
a list of documents or extracts there from that are removed for the purposes of this section. 
(7) The occupier or person, in charge of any premises entered pursuant to this section shall 
provide the authorised officer with all reasonable facilities and assistance for the effective 
exercise of the officer functions under this section. 
(8) A person who obstructs or impedes an authorised officer in the performance of his 
duties under this section shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to 
imprisonment for 2 years or a fine of _200,000.00 or both. 
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12.(1) A warrant issued under section 11 of this Act shall authorise the person named in it 
and any police officer or public official providing assistance to the person named in it, 
which assistance shall be at the written request of the person named in the warrant: 
       Powers conferred by warrant. 
(a) to enter and search the place specified in the warrant on one occasion within thirty days 
of the date of issue of the warrant at a time that is reasonable in the circumstances; 
(b) to use such assistance as is reasonable in the circumstances; 
(c) to use such force for gaining entry and for breaking open any article or thing as is 
reasonable in the circumstances; 
(d) to search for and remove documents or any article or thing that the person executing the 
warrant believes on reasonable grounds may be relevant; 
(e) Where necessary, to take copies of documents, or extracts from documents, that the 
person executing the warrant believes on reasonable grounds may be relevant; 
(f) Where necessary, to require a person to reproduce, or assist any person executing the 
warrant to reproduce, in usable form, information recorded or stored in a document. 
(2) Any police officer or public official assisting the person executing the warrant also has 
the powers referred to in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of subsection (1) of this section. 
(3) The warrant shall be executed in accordance with such conditions as may be specified 
in the warrant when it is issued. 
13. A person executing a warrant issued under section 11 of this Act shall: 
        Warrant to be produced. 
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(a) have the warrant with him; 
(b) produce it on initial entry and, if requested, at any subsequent time; 
(c) identify himself or herself to the owner or occupier or person in charge of the place if 
that person is present; and 
(d) produce evidence of his or her identity. 
14.(1) A person who executes a warrant issued under section 11 of the Act shall, before 
completing the search, leave in a conspicuous place at the place searched:         
Other duties of the person who executes a warrant. 
(a) in the case of a search carried out at a time when the owner or occupier was not present, 
a written notice stating: 
(i) the date and time when the warrant was executed, 
(ii) the name of the person who executed the warrant and the names of the person or 
persons who assisted him; and 
(b) in the case of a search where a document or article or thing was removed from the place 
being searched, a schedule of documents or articles or things that were removed during the 
search. 
(2) If it is not practicable to prepare a schedule before completing the search and if the 
owner or occupier of the place being searched consents in writing the person executing the 
warrant: 
(a) may, instead of leaving a schedule, leave a notice stating that documents, or articles, or 
things have been removed during the search and that, within seven days of the search, a 
schedule will be delivered, left, or sent stating what documents, articles or things have 
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been removed; and 
(b) shall, within seven days of the search: 
(i) deliver a schedule to the owner or occupier, or 
(ii) leave a schedule in a prominent position at the place searched, or 
(iii) send a schedule by registered mail to the owner or occupier of the place searched. 
(3) Every schedule shall state: 
(a) the documents, articles and things that have been removed; 
(b) the location from which they were removed; and 
(c) the location where they are being held. 
(4) The occupier or person in charge of the place that a person authorised pursuant to a 
warrant issued under section 11 of this Act enters for the purpose of searching shall 
provide that person with all reasonable facilities and cooperation in executing the warrant. 
(5) The Commission, or any person authorised by the Commission for the purpose, may 
inspect and take copies of any documents, or extracts from them, obtained pursuant to a 
warrant issued under section 11 of this Act. 
(6) The Commission may exercise any power under the provisions of this Act 
notwithstanding that any proceedings have been instituted in any Court, except where the 
Court makes an order to the contrary. 
15.(1) For the purpose of carrying out its functions and exercising its powers under this 
Act, the Commission may receive in evidence any statement, document, information, or 
matter that may in its opinion assist it in dealing effectively with the matter before it, 
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whether or not the same would be otherwise admissible in a Court of law. 
     Power of the Commission to take evidence. 
(2) The Commission may take evidence on oath and for that purpose a member of the 
Commission or any officer of the Commission duly appointed for the purpose may 
administer an oath. 
(3) The Commission may require the evidence referred to in section 10(c) of this Act to 12 
be given on oath, and for that purpose a member of the Commission or any officer of the 
Commission duly appointed for the purpose may administer an oath. 
(4) The Commission may permit a person appearing as a witness before the Commission to 
give evidence by tendering and, if the Commission deems fit, verifying by oath, a written 
statement. 
(5) Where any person has appeared as a witness before the Commission pursuant to a 
notice in that behalf, or has given evidence before the Commission, whether pursuant to a 
notice or not, the Commission may, if it deems fit, order any sum to be paid to that witness 
on account of his expenses. 
16.(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, the Commission may, in relation to any 
application for, or any notice seeking, any clearance or authorisation under Part XIII of this 
Act, or in the course of carrying out any other investigation or inquiry under this Act, make 
an order prohibiting the publication or communication of any information or document or 
evidence which is furnished, given or tendered to, or obtained by, the Commission in 
connection with the operations of the Commission. 
     Power of the Commission to prohibit disclosure 
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     of information, documents and evidence.  
(2) Any order made by the Commission under subsection (1) of this section may be 
expressed to have effect for such period as is specified in the order, which shall not be less 
than two years, but no such order shall have effect: 
(a) where the order was made in connection with any application, or notice of interest, 
relating to any clearance or authorisation under this Act, after the expiry of thirty days 
from the date on which the Commission makes a final determination in respect of that 
application or notice, or, where that application or notice is withdrawn before any such 
determination is made, after the date on which the application or notice is withdrawn; 
(b) where that order was made in connection with any other investigation or inquiry 
conducted by the Commission, after the conclusion of that investigation or inquiry. 
(3) Every person who, contrary to any order made by the Commission under subsection (1) 
of this section, publishes or communicates any information or document or evidence 
commits an offence and is liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding _1,000,000.00 in 
the case of a person not being a company, and _50,000,000.00 in the case of a company. 
17. A person who destroys any record likely to be required for an investigation that has 
commenced under this Act, with intent to mislead the Commission or to prevent or impede 
the investigation shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to imprisonment for 
a  term of 3 years or a fine of _300,000.00 or both.   
        Destruction of records. 
18.(1) If the Commission at any stage of an investigation under this Act is of the opinion 
that the matter being investigated or subject to inquiry does not justify further investigation 
or inquiry, the Commission may discontinue the investigation or inquiry. 
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Discontinuance of inquiry or investigation. 
(2) Where the Commission discontinue an investigation or inquiry, it shall, within 14 days 
thereafter, submit a report in writing to the Minister and give written notice to the parties 
concerned in the investigation or inquiry, stating the information obtained and the reason/s 
for discontinuing the investigation or inquiry. 
19. The Commission shall have power to administer and implement the provisions of    
Special Powers of the  Commission. 
(a) Dumped and Subsidised Goods Act; 
(b) Safeguards Act; 
(c) Consumer Protection; 
(Special Provisions) Act; and 
(d) Weight and Measures Act, 
PART IV STRUCTURE, MANAGEMENT AND STAFF OF THE COMMISSION 
20.(1) There shall be for the Commission, a Secretary who shall be appointed by the 
Commission. 
       Appointment of the Secretary. 
(2) The Secretary shall 
(a) have such qualifications and experience as are appropriate for a person required to 
perform the functions of that office under this Act; and 
(b) hold office on terms and conditions as may be contained in his letter of appointment. 
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(3) The emoluments and terms of conditions of service of the Secretary, other than 
allowances that are not taken into account in computing pensions, shall not be altered to his 
disadvantage during the period of his tenure in the office of the Secretary. 
21.(1) The Commission may, appoint such other staff or employees as, in the opinion of 
the Commission, may be expedient and necessary for the proper and efficient performance 
of its functions under this Act. 
       Other staff of the Commission. 
(2) The terms and conditions of service (including remuneration, allowances, benefits and 
pensions) of the employees of the Commission shall be as determined by the National 
Salaries and Wages Commission. 
(3) The Commission shall have power to appoint either on transfer or on secondment from 
any public service in the Federation, such employees as may, in the opinion of the 
Commission, be required to assist the Commission in the discharge of any of its functions 
under this Act, and shall have power to pay to persons so employed such remuneration 
(including 14 allowances) as the National Salaries and Wages Commissions may 
determine. 
22.(1) The Commission may, subject to the provisions of this Act, make staff regulations 
relating generally to the conditions of service of the employees of the Commission and 
without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, such regulations may provide for Staff 
regulations. 
(a) the appointment, promotion and disciplinary control (including dismissal) of employees 
of the Commission; and 
(b) appeals by such employees against dismissal or other disciplinary measures, and until 
 239
such regulations are made, any instrument relating to the conditions of service of officers 
in the public service of the Federation shall be applicable. 
(2) Staff regulations made under subsection (1) of this section shall not have effect until 
approved by the Minister and when so approved they need not be published in the Federal 
Gazette but the Commission shall cause them to be brought to the notice of all affected 
persons in such manner as it may, from time to time, determine. 
23.(1) Service in the Commission shall be approved service for the purposes of pensions 
and accordingly, the officers, staff or employees of the Commission shall be entitled to 
pensions and other retirement benefits in accordance with the provisions of the Pension 
Reform Act. 
Pensions. 2004 No.2. 
(2) For the purposes of the application of the provisions of the Pensions Act, any power 
exercisable under the Act by a Minister or other authority of the Government of the 
Federation (not being the power to make regulations under section 97 thereof) is hereby 
vested in and shall be exercised by the Commission and not by any other person or 
authority. 
PART V FINANCIAL PROVISIONS 
24.(1) The Commission shall establish and maintain a fund from which shall be defrayed 
all expenditure incurred by the Commission. 
        Funds of the Commission. 
(2) There shall be paid and credited to the fund established pursuant to subsection (1) of 
this section(a) the initial takeoff grant from the Federal Government; 
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(b) annual budgetary subvention from the Federal Government; 
(c) such moneys as may, from time to time, be granted to the Commission by the Federal, a 
State Government or a local government; and 
(d) all sums of money accruing to the Commission by way of grants in aid, gifts, 
testamentary dispositions and endowments and contributions from any other sources 
whatsoever. 
(3) The fund shall be managed in accordance with the rules made by the Commission and 
without prejudice to the generality of the power to make rules under this subsection, the 
rules shall in particular contain provision (a) specifying the manner in which the assets or 
the fund of the Commission are to be held, and regulating the making of payments into and 
out of the fund; and (b) requiring the keeping of proper accounts and records for the 
purpose of the fund in such form as may be specified in the rules. 
25. The Commission shall apply the proceeds of the fund established pursuant to section 
24 of this Act to     
       Expenditure of the Commission. 
(a) the cost of administration of the Commission; 
(b) the payment of salaries, fees, remuneration, allowances, pensions and gratuities payable 
to the members of the Commission and the employees of the Commission, as the case may 
be; 
(c) the payment for all consultancies, contracts, including mobilisation, fluctuations, 
variations, legal fees and cost on contract administration; 
(d) the payment for all purchases; and 
(e) undertake such other activities as are connected with all or any of the functions of the 
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Commission under this Act. 
26.(1) The Commission may accept gifts of land, money or other property on such terms 
and conditions, if any, as may be specified by the person or organisation making the gift. 
         Power to accept gifts. 
(2) The Commission shall not accept any gift if the conditions attached by the person or 
organisation making the gift are inconsistent with the functions of the Commission under 
this Act. 
27.(1) The Commission shall not later than 30 th September in each year, submit to the 
Minister an estimate of the expenditure and income of the Commission during the next 
succeeding year. 
        Annual estimates and expenditure. 
(2) The Commission shall cause to be kept proper accounts of the Commission in respect 
of each year and proper records in relation thereto and shall cause the accounts to be 
audited not later than 6 months after the end of each year by auditors appointed from the 
list and in accordance with the guidelines supplied by the Auditor General for the 
Federation. 
28. The Commission shall prepare and submit to the Minister not later than 30 th June in 
each year, a report in such form as the Minister may direct on the activities of the 
Commission during the immediately preceding year, and shall include in the report a copy 
of the audited accounts of the Commission for that year and the auditor’s report  
         Annual Reports.  
PART VI CONTRACTS, ARRANGEMENTS AND RESTRICTIVE 
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PRACTICES SUBSTANTIALLY LESSENING COMPETITION 
29.(1) It shall be unlawful to enter into any contract, arrangement, understanding or 
combination thereof  between  Prohibition of contracts, agreements, etc. in restraint of 
trade etc.                
(a) two or more parties in Nigeria; or 
(b) one or more parties in Nigeria on the one part and one or more parties outside Nigeria 
or the other part, where such contract, arrangement, understanding or a combination 
thereof has the characteristics of trust or otherwise consists of conspiracy in restraint of 
trade or commerce. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, restraint of trade in relation to a contract, arrangement, 
understanding or conspiracy means restraint in any market in which a party supplies or 
acquires or is likely to supply or acquire goods or services and shall include acts which 
(a) directly or indirectly fix a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition; 
(b) divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or specific types of goods 
or services; 
(c) involve collusive tendering; 
(d) limit or control production, market, technical development or investment; 
(e) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transaction with other trading parties thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; and (f) make the conclusion of a contract 
subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligation and which, by their 
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts.                             Conditions showing restrictive practice 
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30.(1) An agreement to engage in a restrictive practice is presumed to exist between two or 
more parties where                                                          
.(a) any one of the parties owns a significant interest in the other, or they have at least one 
director or substantial shareholder in common; and 
(b) any combination of the parties are engaged in that restrictive practice. 
(2) Any contract, arrangement, or understanding which is prohibited under section 29 of 
this Act is void. 
31.(1) All agreements between enterprises which have or are likely to have the effect of 
preventing, restricting or distorting competition in a market are prohibited and void. 
Provisions of agreements that restrict, prevent or distort competition. 
(2) The provision of subsection (1) shall not apply to any agreement or category of 17 
agreements the entry into which is authorised by the Commission after being satisfied that 
it  
(a) contributes to the improvement of production or distribution of goods and services or 
the promotion of technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of 
the resulting benefit; 
(b) imposes on the enterprises concerned only such restrictions as are indispensable to the 
attainment of objectives referred to in paragraph (a) or 
(c) does not afford such enterprises the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of 
a substantial part of the goods and services concerned. 
(3) All decisions by associations or enterprises and concerted practices by enterprises 
which prevent, restrict or distort competition are prohibited under this Act and no person 
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shall give effect to them. 
32.(1) Any person who makes or enters into any contract or engages in any arrangement, 
conspiracy or combination declared unlawful under section 29 of this Act shall be guilty of 
an offence and on conviction shall be liable to 2 years imprisonment, or a fine of at least 
six times the amount of profit the person would have made or both. 
Offence and penalty in respect of  agreements etc. in restraint of trade. 
(2) If the offence is committed by a body corporate, the body corporate shall be guilty of 
an offence and on conviction liable to a fine of not less than N1 million and each director, 
manager or officer of the body corporate shall be proceeded against and punished as if 
himself committed the offence. 
33.(1) No person shall  
     Agreements containing exclusionary provisions. 
(a) enter into a contract, arrangement or understanding that contain an exclusionary 
provision; 
(b) give effect to an exclusionary provision in an agreement be it contract, arrangement or 
understanding. 
(2) For the purposes of this Act, a provision of an agreement is an exclusionary provision if 
(a) the agreement is entered into between or among persons, any two or more of whom are 
in competition with each other; 
(b) the effect of the provision is to prevent, restrict or limit the supply of goods or services 
to, or the acquisition of goods or services from, any particular person or class of persons, 
either generally or in particular circumstances or conditions, or, if a party is a company, by 
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and interconnected or affiliated company.18 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) of this section, a person is in competition with 
another person if that person or any affiliated or interconnected company  
(a) is or is likely to be; or 
(b) but for the relevant provision would be or would likely be, in competition with the 
other person, or with an affiliated or interconnected company, in relation to the supply or 
acquisition of all or any of the goods or services to which that relevant provision relates. 
34.(1) Where the Commission determines that any agreement or trade practice referred to 
in section 31 and 33 are anticompetitive, it shall 
serve an order on the parties stating the reasons for determining and requiring them to                       
  Action by Commission against anticompetitive agreements, etc. 
(a) cease a practice referred to in section 31; or 
(b) terminate an agreement referred to in section 33. 
(2) A person who has suffered a loss as a result of any anticompetitive agreement or trade 
practice may apply to the Commission for compensation and the Commission may, if it is 
satisfied that the circumstances of the case so warrant, order the parties whose agreement 
or trade practice is anticompetitive 
to pay to the applicant such compensation as the Commission may determine. 
(3) A person who fails to terminate the anticompetitive agreement or trade practice within 
the period agreed with the Commission shall be guilty of an offence and on conviction 
shall be liable to imprisonment for 2 years or payment of a fine of _200,000.00 or both. 
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PART VII EXEMPTIONS OF CERTAIN AGREEMENTS  
35. Nothing in this Part shall prohibit 
(a) a contract or an arrangement between partners none of whom is a corporate body in so 
far as it contains provisions in relation to the terms of the partnerships or the conduct of the 
partnership business or in relation to competition between the partnership and a party to the 
contract, arrangement or understanding while that party is, or after that party ceases to be a 
partner; 
(b) a contract or an arrangement where the only parties are or will be affiliated firms or 
companies; 
(c) a contract of service or a contract for the provision of services in so far as it contains 
provisions by which a person, not being a body corporate agrees to accept restrictions as to 
the work, whether as an employee or otherwise, in which that person may engage during or 
after the termination of the contract; (d) contract for the sale of a business or shares in the 
capital of a company 19 carrying on business in so far as it contains a provision that is 
solely for the protection of the purchases in respect of the goodwill of the company; 
(e) contract or an arrangement in as much as it contains a provision that relates to the 
remuneration, conditions of employment, hours of work or working conditions of 
employees; 
(f) any act done otherwise than in trade, in concert by users of goods or services against the 
suppliers of those goods or services; 
(g) any act done to give effect to a provision of a contract or an arrangement referred to in 
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paragraphs (a) to (f) of this section; 
(h) any act done to give effect to any intellectual property right, which shall mean a right, 
privilege, or entitlement that is conferred as valid by or under(i) the Copy right Act Cap 68 
LFN 1990 
(ii) Patent and Designs Act, and Cap 344 LFN 1990 
(iii) Trade Marks Act. Cap 436 LFN 1990 
PART VIII ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION OR MARKET POWER 
 
36. For the purposes of this Act, one or more enterprises hold a dominant position in the 
relevant market if, singularly (by itself) (including activities involving an interconnected or 
affiliated company) or collectively, it or they has or have a share of more than forty percent 
of the relevant market, or if it or they otherwise has or have the ability to control prices or 
to exclude competition or to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers or suppliers. 
         Dominant position. 
37.(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection 
(3) of this section, any conduct on the part of one or more enterprises which amounts to the 
abuse of a dominant position in a market is prohibited. 
Abuse of dominant position. 
(2) An enterprise abuses a dominant position if it impedes the maintenance or development 
of effective competition in a market and in particular if it(a) restricts the entry of any other 
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enterprise into that or any other market; 
(b) prevents or deters any enterprise from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any 
other market; 
(c) eliminates or removes any enterprise from that or any other market; 
(d) directly or indirectly imposes unfair purchase or selling prices or other anticompetitive 
practices; 
(e) limits production of products to the prejudice of consumers; 20 
(f) makes the conclusion of agreements subject to acceptance by other parties of 
supplementary obligations which by their nature, or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such agreements; (g) engages in any business conduct 
that results in the exploitation of its customers and suppliers, including, but not limited to 
such conduct as exclusive dealing, market restriction or tied selling. 
(3) An enterprise shall not be treated as abusing a dominant position(a) if it is shown that 
its behaviour was exclusively directed to improving the production or distribution of 
products or to promoting technical or economic progress and consumers were allowed a 
fair share of the resulting benefit; 
(b) if the effect or likely effect of its behaviour in the market is the result of its superior 
competitive performance; 
(c) if the enterprise seeks by its action to enforce or seek to enforce any right under or 
existing by virtue of any copy right, patent registered design or trade mark. 
(4) An enterprise may be treated as abusing its dominant position in enforcing or seeking 
to enforce the rights referred to in subsection (2)(b) of this section, if the Commission is 
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satisfied that the exercise of those rights(a) has the effect of unreasonably lessening 
competition in a market; and 
(b) impedes the transfer and dissemination of technology. 
(5) For the purpose of this Act“ exclusive dealing” means any practice whereby a supplier 
of products (a) as a condition of supplying the products to a customer, requires the 
customer to(i) deal only or primarily in goods supplied by or designed by the supplier or 
his nominee, or 
(ii) refrain from dealing in a specified class or kind of products except as supplied by the 
supplier or his nomince; 
(b) induces a customer to meet a condition referred to in paragraph 
(a) by offering to supply the products to the customer on more favourable terms or 
conditions if the customer agrees to meet that condition; “Market restriction” means any 
practice whereby a supplier of products, as a condition of supplying them to a customer, 
requires that customer to supply any products only in a defined market or exacts a penalty 
of any kind from the customer if the customer 
supplies any products outside a defined market; 21 “Tied selling” means any practice 
whereby a supplier of products( a) as a condition of supplying the products (hereinafter 
referred to as the “tied products”) to a customer, requires the customer to (i) acquire any 
other products from the supplier or nominee, (ii) refrain from using or distributing, in 
conjunction with the tied products, any other products that are not of a brand or 
manufacture designated by the supplier or the nominee; and 
(b) induces a customer to meet a condition set out in paragraph (a) by offering to supply 
the tied products to the customer on more favourable terms or conditions if the customer 
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agrees to meet that condition. 
38.(1) Where the Commission has reason to believe than an enterprise or enterprises 
holding a dominant position in a relevant market in accordance with section 36 has abused, 
or is abusing that position, the Commission may, subject to section 40 of this Act conduct 
an investigation into the matter. 
 Actions by the Commission in relation to  abuse of dominant position. 
(2) If the Commission finds that an enterprise or enterprises has or have abused or is 
abusing dominant position and that the abuse has had, is having or is likely to have the 
effect of lessening competition substantially in a market, the Commission shall prepare a 
report indicating the practices that constitute the abuse and shall (a) notify the enterprise or 
enterprises of its findings accompanied by a copy of the report; and (b) direct the enterprise 
or enterprises to cease the abusing practice forth with or not later than six months after 
receipt of the notice. 
(3) Where the Commission finds that the abusive practice constitute tied selling, the 
Commission shall prohibit the enterprise or enterprises concerned from continuing that 
practice forthwith. 
(4) If the Commission finds that the abusive practice is exclusive dealing or market 
restriction, it may prohibit the major supplier of products in a market which is likely to(a) 
impede entry into or expansion of an enterprise in the market; (b) impede introduction of 
productions into or expansion of sales of products in the market with the effect of lessening 
competition. 
(5) The Commission may prohibit the supplier referred to in subsection (4) from 
continuing to engage in market restriction or exclusive dealing or order that supplier to 
take such other action as in the Commission’s opinion is necessary to restore or stimulate 
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competition in relation to the products. 
(6) This section shall not apply in relation to exclusive dealing or market restriction 22 
between or among affiliated or interconnected companies. 
39. (1) The Commission shall not investigate an enterprise under this section unless it is 
satisfied that it controls more than forty percent of the market. 
     When an enterprise is in dominant position.  
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1) of this section, an enterprise control more than forty 
percent of a market if, in cases where the market relates to the supply or, as the case may 
be, the export from Nigeria, of products of any description, more than forty percent of all 
the products of that description which are supplied or produced in Nigeria are supplied by 
or to that enterprise or are produced by that enterprise or a group of affiliated or 
interconnected companies of which the enterprise is a part. 
(3) Where the market relates to the export of products, a dominant position shall be taken 
to exist both in relation to exports of products of that description from Nigeria generally 
and from Nigeria to each country taken separately. 
40.(1) If within thirty days of the receipt of the directive under section 38(1), the enterprise 
or enterprises concerned submits to the Commission the measure it or they would take to 
cease the abusive practice and the timetable for giving effect to the measures, and the 
Commission is satisfied as to those measures, it shall suspend the operation of the directive 
and give written notice to the enterprise or enterprises of the suspension. 
       Suspension of operation of the Order. 
(2) If an enterprise fails or neglects to give effect to the measures mentioned in subsection 
(1) within a period of six months after the date on which those measures were accepted by 
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the Commission, the directive issued under section 38(2) shall take effect at the end of that 
period.  
      Identification of relevant market. 
41. For the purpose of delineating the relevant market under this Part, the criteria that the 
Commission shall take into account include   (a) the geographical boundaries that identify 
groups of sellers and buyers of goods and services within which competition is likely to be 
restrained; 
(b) all goods and services which are regard as interchangeable or substitutable by the 
consumer, by reason of the characteristics of the goods and services, the prices and the 
intended use; 
(c) all suppliers to which consumers may turn in the short term, if the abuse of dominance 
leads to a significant increase in price or to other detrimental effect upon the consumer. 
PART IX RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 
42.(1) It is unlawful for any two or more enterprises which are suppliers of products, to 
enter into or carry out any agreement whereby they undertake to Collective agreements  by 
suppliers.                                           
(a) withhold supplies of products from dealers (whether parties to the agreement or not) 
who resell or have resold products in breach of any condition as 23 to the price at which 
those goods may be resold; 
(b) refuse to supply products to such dealers except on terms and conditions which are less 
favourable than those applicable to other dealers carrying on business in similar 
circumstances; 
(c) supply products only to persons who undertake or have undertaken to do any of the acts 
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described in paragraph (a) or (b). 
(2) It is unlawful for any two or more enterprises referred to in subsection (1) to enter into 
or carry out any agreement authorizing(a) the recovery of penalties (however described) by 
or on behalf of the parties to the agreement from dealers who resell or have resold goods in 
breach of any condition described in subsection (1)(a); or (b) the conduct of any 
proceedings in connection therewith. 
       Collective agreement by dealers. 
 
43.(1) It is unlawful for any two or more enterprises which are dealers in any products, to 
enter into or carry out any agreement whereby they undertake to (a) withhold orders for 
supplies of goods from suppliers (whether parties to the agreement or not) who(i) supply or 
have supplied products without imposing a condition described in section 43(1)(a); or 
(ii) refrain or have refrained from taking steps to ensure compliance with such conditions 
in respect of products supplied by them; or 
(b) discriminate in their handling of products supplied by those suppliers.  (2) It is unlawful 
for any two or more enterprises referred to in subsection (1) to enter into or carry out an 
agreement authorizing the recovery of penalties (however described) by or on behalf of the 
parties to the agreement from the suppliers referred to in that subsection or the conduct of 
any proceedings in connection therewith. 
44. Sections 42 and 43 shall apply in relation to an association whose members consist of 
or include enterprises which are suppliers or dealers in any products or representatives of 
such enterprises. 
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Publication of section 42 and associations.  
     Individual Minimum Resale Price Maintenance 
45.(1) Any term or condition of an agreement for the sale of any products by a supplier to a 
dealer is void to the extent that it purports to establish or provide for the establishment of 
minimum prices to be charged on the resale of the products in Nigeria. 
Minimum resale maintained by contract. 
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), it is unlawful for a suppler of products or his agent 
to 
(a) include in an agreement for the sale of products, a term or condition which is void by 
virtue of this section; 24 
(b) require as a condition of supplying products to a dealer, the inclusion in the agreement 
of any term or condition or the giving of any undertaking to the like effect; 
(c) notify to dealers or otherwise publish on or in relation to any products, price stated or 
calculated to be understood as the minimum price which may be charged on the resale of 
the products in Nigeria. 
(3) Subsection (2)(a) does not affect the enforceability of an agreement except in respect of 
the term or condition which is void by virtue of this section 
(4) Nothing in subsection (2)(c) shall, be construed as precluding a supplier (or an 
association or a person acting on a suppliers behalf) from notifying to dealers or otherwise 
publishing prices recommended as appropriate for the resale of products supplied or to be 
supplied by that supplier. 
46.(1) Section 45 applies to patented products (including products made by a patented 
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process) as it applies to other products. 
      Patented products under sections 45. 
(2) Notice of any term or condition which is void by virtue of section 44 or which would 
be so void if included in an agreement relating to the sale of such products, is of no effect 
for the purpose of limiting the right of a dealer to dispose of those products without 
infringement of the patent. 
(3) Nothing in section 45 and this section affects the validity, as between the parties to an 
agreement and their successors, of any term or condition of 
(a) a licence granted by the proprietor of a patent or a licensee under any such licence; or 
(b) any assignment of a patent, so far as it regulates the price at which products produced 
or processed by the licensee or assignee may be sold by him. 
47.(1) It is unlawful for a supplier to withhold supplies of any products from a dealer 
seeking to obtain them for resale on the ground that the dealer  
Maintenance of minimum resale prices by other means    
(a) has sold products obtained either directly or indirectly from that supplier, at a price 
below the resale price or has supplied them either directly or indirectly to a third party who 
had so done; or 
(b) is likely, if the products are supplied by that dealer, to sell them at a price below that 
price, or supply them either directly or indirectly to a third party who would be likely to do 
so. 
(2) In this section, “the resale price” in relation to a sale of any description, means the price 
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(a) notified to the dealer or otherwise published by or on behalf of a supplier of the 
products in question (whether lawfully or not) as the price or minimum price which is to be 
charged on or is recommended as appropriate for a sale of 25 that description; or 
(b) prescribed or purporting to be prescribed for that purpose by an agreement between the 
dealer and any such supplier. 
(3) Where, under this section, it would be unlawful for a supplier to withhold supplies of 
products, it is also unlawful for him to cause or procure any other supplier to do so. 
PART X MERGERS, TAKEOVERS AND ACQUISITION 
48.(1) A merger reference may be made to the Commission by the Minister where it 
appears to him that two or more enterprises, one of which carries on business in Nigeria or 
by or under the control of a body corporate which is incorporated in Nigeria, have ceased 
to be distinct enterprises and that  
         Merger reference. 
(a) as a result of that, the condition specified in subsection (2) or (3) of this section 
prevails, or does so to a greater extent, with respect to the supply of goods or services of 
any description; or 
(b) the value of the assets taken over exceeds _1Billion. 
(2) The condition referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, in relation to 
the supply of goods of any description, is that at least onequarter of all the goods of that 
description which are supplied in Nigeria or in a substantial part of Nigeria are either 
(a) supplied by one and the same person or are supplied to one and the same person; or 
(b) supplied by the persons by whom the relevant enterprises (in so far as they continue to 
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be carried on) are carried on, or supplied to those persons. 
(3) The condition referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, in relation to 
the supply of services of any description, is that the supply of services of that description, 
in Nigeria or in a substantial part of Nigeria, is, to the extent of at least onequarter, 
either 
(a) supplied by one and the same person or supplied for one and the same person; or 
(b) supplied by the persons by whom the relevant enterprises (in so far so they continue to 
be carried on) are carried on, or supplied to those persons. 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, enterprises shall be taken to have 
ceased to be distinct enterprises at a time or in circumstances falling within this subsection, 
if either 26 
(a) they did so not earlier than 6 months before the date on which the merger reference 
relating to them is to be made; or 
(b) they did so under or in consequence of arrangements or transactions which were 
entered into without prior notice being given to the Commission of material facts about the 
proposed arrangement or transactions and in circumstances in which those facts had not 
been made public more than six months before the date mentioned in paragraph (a) of this 
subsection. 
49.(1) For the purposes of this Act, any two enterprises shall be 
regarded as ceasing to be distinct enterprises, if either  Conditions for enterprises to cease 
to be distinct enterprises. (a) they are brought under common ownership or common 
control (whether or not the business to which either of them formerly belonged continues 
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to be carried on under the same or different ownership or control); or 
(b) the enterprise ceases to be carried on at all and does so in consequence of any 
arrangement or transaction entered into to prevent competition between the enterprises. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, enterprises shall (without prejudice to 
the generality of the words “common control” in that subsection) be regarded as being 
under common control if they are  
(a) enterprises of interconnected bodies corporate; or 
(b) enterprises carried on by two or more bodies corporate of which one and the same 
person or group of persons have control over it; or 
(c) enterprises carried on by a body corporate and an enterprise carried on by a person or 
group of persons having control of that body corporate. 
(3) A person or group of persons directly or indirectly, able to control or materially 
influence the policy of any person in carrying on an enterprise, but without having a 
controlling interest in that body corporate or in that enterprise, may for the purposes of 
subsections (1) and (2) of this section be treated as having control of such policy. 
(4) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, in so far as it relates 
to bringing two or more enterprises under common control, a person or group of persons 
may be treated as bringing an enterprise under his or their control if 
(a) being already able to control or materially influence the policy of the persons, acquires 
a controlling interest in the enterprises or, in the case of an enterprise carried on by a body 
corporate, acquires a controlling interest in that body corporate; or 
(b) being already able materially to influence the policy of the persons carrying on the 
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enterprises, the person or group of persons become able to control that policy. 27 
50.(1) The provisions of this section shall have effect for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) 
of section 48 of this Act.     Valuation of assets taken over. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of section 48 of this Act, the value of the 
assets taken over shall be determined by 
(a) taking the total value of the assets employed in or appropriated to the enterprises which 
ceased to be distinct enterprises, except any enterprises which remain under the same 
ownership and control or if none of the enterprises remain under the same ownership 
control, then one of the enterprises having the assets with the highest value; and (b) 
reference to the value at which, on the enterprises ceasing to be distinct enterprises or (if 
they have not then done so) on the making of the merger reference to the Commission, the 
assets standing in the books of the relevant business, less any relevant provisions for 
depreciation, renewals or diminution in value. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) of this section, any assets of a body corporate which, 
upon a change in the control of the body corporate or any of its enterprises, are dealt with 
in the same way as assets appropriated to any such enterprise shall be treated as 
appropriated to the enterprise. 
(4) If by acquisition, privatisation or otherwise a person is found by the Commission to 
have more than 51 per cent share of ownership, the Commission shall summon the person 
to prove that he would not be in abuse of dominant position. 
51.(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act on merger reference, the Commission shall 
investigate and report on the question Different Kinds of merger references. 
(a) whether a merger situation qualifying for investigation has been created; and 
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(b) if so, whether the creation of that situation operates or may be expected to operate, 
against the public interest. 
(2) A merger reference may be so framed as to require the Commission, in relation to the 
question whether a merger situation qualifying for investigation has been created, to 
exclude from consideration the provisions of subsection (1)(a) of section 48 of this Act or 
to exclude, from consideration, paragraph (b) of that subsection or to exclude one of those 
paragraphs, if the Commission finds the other satisfied. 
(3) In addition to the question whether any such result as is mentioned in of subsection 
(1)(a) of section 48 of this Act has arisen, a merger reference may be so framed as to 
require the Commission to confine their investigation to the supply of goods or services in 
a specified part of Nigeria. 
(4) A merger reference may require the Commission, where it finds that a merger situation 
qualifying for investigation has been created, to limit the consideration thereafter to such 
elements in, or possible consequences of, the creation of that situation as may be specified 
in the 28 reference and to consider whether, in respect only of those elements or possible 
consequences, the situation operate or may be expected to operate, against the public 
interest. 
52.(1) Every merger reference shall specify a period not more than six months beginning 
with the date of the reference within which a report on the reference is to be made and a 
report of the Commission on a merger reference shall not have effect and no action shall be 
taken in relation to it under this Act, unless the report is made before the end of that period 
or of such further period (if any) as may be allowed by the Minister in accordance with 
subsection (2) of this section. Time limit for report on  merger reference. 
(2) The Minister shall not allow any further period for a report on a merger reference, 
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except on representations made by the Commission and on being satisfied that there are 
special reasons why the report cannot be made within the period specified in the reference. 
(3) The Minister shall allow only one of such further period on any one reference and no 
such further period shall be longer than 3 months. 
53.(1) In making the report on a merger reference, the Commission shall include in it 
definite conclusions on the questions comprised in the reference, together with  Report of 
       Commission on merger reference. 
(a) an account of its reasons for the conclusion; and 
(b) a survey of the general position with respect to the subject matter of the reference and 
of the development which have led to that position, as in the opinion of the Commission 
are expedient for facilitating a proper understanding of those questions and of their 
conclusion. 
(2) Where on a merger reference the Commission finds that a merger situation qualifying 
for investigation has been created and that the creation of that situation operates or may be 
expected to operate against the public interest or that one or more elements in or 
consequences of that situation which were specified in the reference in accordance with 
this subsection so operates or may be expected to so operate, the Commission shall specify 
in its report the particular effects, adverse to public interest, which in its opinion the 
creation of that situation (or, as the case may be, those elements in or consequences of it) 
have or may be expected to have and the Commission  
(a) shall, as part of its investigations, consider what action (if any) shall be taken for the 
purposes of remedying or preventing those adverse effects; and 
(b) may, if it thinks fit, include in its report, recommendations as to such action. 29 
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(3) In paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section, the reference to action to be taken for 
the purpose mentioned in that paragraph is a reference to action to be taken for that 
purpose 
(a) by the Minister; or 
(b) by one or more persons specified in the report as being persons carrying on, owning or 
controlling any of the enterprises which, in accordance with the conclusions of the 
Commission, have ceased to be distinct enterprise. 
54.(1) The provisions of this section shall have effect where a report of the Commission on 
a merger reference has been sent to the Minister and the conclusions of the Commission set 
out in the report  Order of Minister on report of  merger reference. 
(a) include conclusions to the effect that a merger situation qualifying for investigation has 
been created and that its creation or particular elements in or consequences of it specified 
in the report, operate or may be expected to operate against the public interest; and 
(b) specify particular effects, adverse to the public interest, which in the opinion of the 
Commission, the creation of that situation, or (as the case may be) those elements in or 
consequences of it, have or may be expected to have. 
(2) In the circumstances mentioned in subsection (1) of this section, the Minister may, by 
order published in the Federal Gazette, exercise such one or more of the powers specified 
in the Schedule to this Act as he may consider necessary to exercise for the purpose of 
remedying or preventing the adverse effects specified in the report as mentioned in 
subsection (1) of this section and those powers may be so exercised to such extent and in 
such manner as the Minister considers appropriate for the purpose. 
          Schedule. 
(3) In determining whether, or to what extent or in what manner, to exercise any of the 
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powers, the Minister shall take into account any recommendations included in the report of 
the Commission in pursuance to subsection (2) of section 53 of this Act and any advice 
given by the Commission under section 73 of this Act. 
55.(1) Where a merger reference has been made to the Commission and does not impose 
on the Commission a limitation under section 51 of this Act, then, with a view to 
preventing action to which this subsection applies, the Minister subject to subsection (3) of 
this section, may by order Interim Order of merger reference. 
(a) prohibit or restrict the doing of things which in his opinion constitute action to which 
this subsection applies; or 
(b) impose on any person concerned, obligations as to the carrying on of any activities or 
the safeguarding of any assets; or 
(c)provide for the carrying on of any activities or the safeguarding of any assets either by 
the appointment of a person to conduct or supervise the conduct of any activities (on such 
terms and with such powers as may be specified or 30 described in the order) or in any 
other manner; or 
(d) exercise any of the powers which, by virtue of paragraph 12 of the Schedule to this Act, 
are exercisable by an order under section 50 of this Act. 
Schedule. 
(2) In relation to a merger reference, subsection (1) of this section applies to any action 
which may prejudice the reference or impede the taking of any action under this Act, 
which may be warranted by the Commission’s report on the reference. 
(3) No order shall be made under this section in respect of a merger reference after 
whichever or the following events first occur, that (a) the time (including any further 
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period) allowed to the Commission for making a report on the reference expires without 
their having made such a report; and (b) the period of forty days beginning with the day on 
which a report of the Commission was sent to the Minister. 
(4) Any person who contravenes the provisions of this section, commits an offence and 
shall be liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 2 years or to a fine of 
N100,000 or to both such imprisonment and fine. 
56.(1) A merger reference may be made to the Commission by the Minister where he has 
reasonable grounds to believe that arrangements are in progress or in contemplation which, 
if carried into effect, shall result in the creation of a merger situation qualifying for 
investigation. 
      Reference in anticipation of merger. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of this section, on a merger reference, the Commission shall 
proceed in relation to the prospective and (if events so require) the actual results of the 
arrangements proposed or made as it may proceed if the arrangements in question had 
actually been made and the results in question had followed immediately before the date of 
the reference under this section. 
(3) A merger reference under this section may require the Commission, where it finds that 
a merger situation qualifying for investigation has been created or shall be created if the 
arrangements in question are carried into effect, to limit their consideration thereafter to 
such elements in, or possible consequences of, the creation of that 31 situation as may be 
specified in the reference and to consider whether, in respect of only those elements or 
possible consequences, the situation may be expected to operate against the public interest. 
(4) In relation to a merger reference under this section, sections 50, 51, 53, 54 and 55 of 
this Act shall apply subject to the following modifications, that is (a) subsection (1) of 
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section 49 of this Act shall be construed as modified by subsection (2) of this section;(b) in 
subsections (2) and (3) of this section, any reference to the question whether a merger 
situation qualifying for investigation has been created or whether a result mentioned in 
paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section 54 of this Act has arisen, shall be construed as 
including a reference to the question whether such a situation shall be created or such a 
result shall arise out of the arrangements in question are carried into effect and subsection 
(4) of that section shall not apply; (c) in subsection (2) of section 55 of this Act and in 
subsection (1) of section 57 of this Act, the references to subsection (4) of section 49 of 
this Act shall be constructed as references to subsection (3) of this section; and (d) in 
subsection (1) of section 54 of this Act, the reference to the conclusion to the effect that a 
merger situation qualifying for investigation has been created shall be construed as 
including a reference to conclusions to the effect that such a situation shall be created if the 
arrangements in question are carried into effect. (5) If, in the course of their investigations 
on a merge reference under this section, it appears to the Commission that the proposal to 
make arrangements such as are mentioned in the reference has been abandoned, the 
Commission shall (a) if the Minister consent, set aside the reference; and (b) in that case 
furnish the Minister such information as he may require as to the results of the 
investigations. 
57. Any person who is injured in his business or property by failure to comply with this 
part of this Act may bring an action in the Federal High Court and shall recover damages 
and the Court may in addition award simple interest on the actual damage from the date of 
the commencement of the action up to the date of the judgment. 
      Cause of action in relation to merger. 
58. It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such 
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, 
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machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, 
consumption or resale within Nigeria or fix a price charged therefor or discount from or 
rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or 
purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares,  merchandise, machinery, 
supplies 32 or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, 
where the effect of such lease, sale or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or 
understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce. 
         Exclusive dealings. 
59.(1) A person who proposes to acquire assets of business or shares of a company shall 
give the Commission a notice seeking clearance for the acquisition. The Commission shall 
give clearances for  mergers, takeover and acquisitions.  
(2) Subsections (1), (2)(a) and (b), (4) and (5) of section 81 of this Act shall apply in 
respect of every notice given under subsection (1) of this section as if the notice was an 
application under section 83 of this Act. 
(3) Within twenty-one days after the date of registration of the notice, or such longer 
period as the Commission and the person who gave the notice may agree, the Commission 
shall either: 
(a) if it is satisfied that the acquisition will not result in an effect described in section 36 of 
this Act, by notice in writing to the person by whom or on whose behalf the notice was 
given, give a clearance for the acquisition; or (b) if it is not satisfied that the acquisition 
will not result in an effect described in section 36 of this Act, by notice in writing to the 
person by whom or on whose behalf the notice was given, decline to give a clearance for 
the acquisition. 
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(4) The Commission shall within the period specified in subsection (3) of this section give 
a clearance for the acquisition or decline to give a clearance for the acquisition. 
(5) For the purpose of this section, the term “Clearance” relates to a determination in 
respect of a merger or an acquisition whereby the Commission only considers whether or 
not the merger, acquisition or takeover in question will result in the prohibited effect. 
60. 
(1) A person who proposes to acquire assets of a business or shares of a company shall 
give the Commission a notice seeking an authorisation for the acquisition. The 
Commission shall give authorisation for mergers,  takeovers and acquisitions. 
(2) Subsection (1),(2)(a) and (b), (4) and (5) of section 82 of this Act shall apply in respect 
of every notice given under subsection (1) of this section as if the notice was an application 
under section of this Act. 
(3) Within sixty days after the date of registration of the notice, or such longer period as 
the Commission and the person who gave the notice may agree, the Commission shall: 
(a) if it is satisfied that the acquisition will not result in an effect described in section 36 of 
this Act, by notice in writing to the person by or on whose behalf the notice was give, grant 
an authorisation for the acquisition; 
(b) if it is satisfied that the acquisition will result in such a benefit that it should be 
permitted, by notice in writing to the person by or on whose behalf the 33 notice was 
given, grant an authorisation for the acquisition; or 
(c) if it is not satisfied as to the matters referred to in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of this 
subsection, by notice in writing to the person by or on whose behalf the notice was given, 
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decline to grant an authorisation for the acquisition. 
(4) The Commission shall within the period specified in subsection (3) of this section, 
grant an authorisation for the acquisition or decline to grant an authorisation for the 
acquisition. 
(5) The Commission shall state in writing its reasons for a determination under subsection 
(3) of this section. 
(6) For the purpose of this section, the term “Authorisation” relates to a determination in 
respect of a merger, takeover or an acquisition whereby the Commission is requested by 
the applicant to consider that there exists a factor of public benefit and that such factor 
justifies the authorization of a merger, takeover or an acquisition, which results in the 
prohibited effect. 
61.(1) A clearance given or an authorisation granted under subsection (3) of section 59 or 
under subsection (3) of section 60 expires: 
(a) twelve months after the date on which it was given or granted; or Provisions applying 
to applications for clearance and authorisation for mergers, takeovers and  acquisitions. 
(b) in the event of an application or appeal being made against the determination of the 
Commission giving the clearance or granting the authorisation, and the determination of 
the Commission being confirmed by the Court, twelve months after the date on which the 
determination is confirmed. 
(2) Every person who gives a notice under section 59 or section 60 of this Act shall from 
time to time produce or, as the case may be, furnish to the Commission, with such time as 
may specify, such documents and information in relation to the acquisition as may be 
required by the Commission for the purpose of enabling it to exercise its functions under 
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section 59 or section 45 of this Act. 
(3) Notwithstanding section 59 or section 60 of this Act, where the Commission is of the 
opinion that a proposed acquisition is, for reasons other than arising from the application of 
any provision of this Act, unlikely to be proceeded with, the Commission may, in its 
discretion, decline to give a clearance or grant an authorisation under this section . 
(4) The Commission shall state in writing its reasons for declining to give a clearance or 
grant an authorisation under subsection (2) of this section. 
(5) A person who has given notice in respect of an acquisition under section 59 or section 
60 of this Act may at any time, by notice in writing to the Commission, advise the 
Commission that it does not wish the Commission to give a clearance or grant an 
authorisation and the Commission shall accordingly not give a clearance or grant an 34 
authorisation in respect of that acquisition. (6) The Commission may consult with any 
person who, in the opinion of the Commission, is able to assist it in making a 
determination under section 59 or section 60 of this Act, as the case may be. 
62. Nothing in sections 62 or 63 of this Act shall apply to the acquisition of assets of a 
business or shares if the assets or shares are acquired in accordance with a clearance or an 
authorisation and while the clearance or authorisation is in force. 
Effect of Clearance or authorisation. 
63.(1) In giving a clearance or granting an authorisation under section 59 or section 60 of 
this Act, the Commission may accept a written undertaking given by or on behalf of the 
applicant or a person who gave a notice under section 59(1) or section 60(1) of this Act, as 
the case may be, to dispose of assets or shares specified in the undertaking. 
The Commission may accept undertakings. 
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64.(1) Before making a determination under section 59(3) or section 60(3) of this Act in 
relation to a merger, takeover or an acquisition, the Commission may decide to hold a 
conference and shall appoint a date, time, and place for holding the conference and give 
notice of the date, time, and place so appointed and of the matters to be considered at the 
conference to the persons entitled to be present at the conference. 
Conferences in relation to mergers, takeovers and acquisitions. 
(2) The provisions of section 81 of this Act shall apply to every conference held under this 
section as if:(a) every reference in that section to a conference called under section 65 of 
this Act, were a reference to a conference held under this section; and 
(b) the reference in subsection (1)(b) of that section to a person to whom a proposed 
determination was sent under section 81(2) of this Act were a reference to the person by or 
on whose behalf a notice was given under section 59(1) or section 60(1) of this Act as the 
case may be; and 
(c) the reference in subsection (6) of that section to a determination in respect of an 
application, were a reference to a determination under section 59(3) or section 60(3) of this 
Act as the case may be. 
PART XI MONOPOLY 
65. Any person or body corporate who monopolises or attempts to monopolise or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolise any part of trade or commerce, 
commits an offence under this Act. 
          Monopoly. 
66.(1) For the purposes of this Part of this Act a monopoly situation shall be taken to exist 
in relation to the supply of goods of any description in the following cases, if              
 271
Monopoly situation in relation to supply of goods. 
(a) at least 51 per cent of all the goods of that description which are supplied in 
35 Nigeria are supplied by one and the same person, or are supplied to one and the same 
person; or 
(b) at least 51 per cent of all the goods of that description which are supplied in Nigeria are 
supplied by members of one and the same group of interconnected bodies corporate or are 
supplied to members of one and the same group of interconnected bodies corporate; or 
(c) at least 51 per cent of all the goods of that description which are supplied in Nigeria are 
supplied by members of one and the same group consisting of two or more of such persons 
as are mentioned in subsection(2) of this section, or are supplied to members of one and 
the same group consisting of two or more of such persons; or (d) one or more agreements 
are in operation, the result or collective result of which is that goods of that description are 
not supplied in Nigeria at all. 
(2) The two or more persons referred to in subsection (1) of this section, in relation to 
goods of any description are any two or more persons (not being a group of interconnected 
bodies corporate) who whether voluntarily or not, and whether by agreement or not so 
conduct their respective affairs in any way to prevent, restrict or distort competition in 
connection with the supply of goods of that description, whether or not they are affected by 
the competition and whether the competition is between persons interested as producers or 
suppliers or between persons interested as customers of producers or suppliers. 
67.( 1) For the purposes of this Part of this Act, a monopoly situation shall be taken to exist 
in relation to the supply of services of any description in the following cases, that is, if   
Monopoly  situation in relation to supply of services.   
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(a) the supply of services of that description in Nigeria is, to the extent of at least 
onequarter, supplied by one and the same person, or supply for one and the same person; or 
(b) the supply of services of that description in Nigeria is, to the extent of at least 
onequarter, supplied by one and the same group of interconnected bodies corporate, or 
supplied for members of one and the same group of interconnected bodies corporate; or  
(c) the supply of services of that description in Nigeria is, to the extent of at least one 
quarter, supplied by members of one and the same group constituting two or more of such 
persons as are mentioned in subsection (2) of this section or supplied for members of one 
and the same group consisting of two or more such persons; 
or 
(d) one or more agreements are in operation, the result of which is that services of that 
description are not supplied in Nigeria at all. 36 
(2) The two or more persons referred to in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section, in 
relation to services of any description are any two or more persons (not being a group of 
interconnected bodies corporate) who whether voluntary or not and whether by agreement 
or not conduct their respective affairs as in any way to prevent, restrict or distort 
competition in connection with the supply of services of that description, whether or not 
they are affected by the competition and whether the competition is between persons 
interested as persons by whom or as persons for whom services are supplied. 
(3) In the application of this section for the purposes of a monopoly reference, the 
Commission or the person or persons making the reference may, to such extent as the 
Commission or that person or those persons think appropriate in the circumstances, treat 
services as supplied in Nigeria, if the person supplying the service 
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(a) has a place of business in Nigeria; or 
(b) controls the relevant activities from Nigeria; or 
(c) being a body corporate, is incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act. 
Cap. C 20 LFN. 
68.(1) For the purposes of this Part of this Act, a monopoly situation shall be taken to exist 
in relation to exports of goods of any description from Nigeria in the following cases, that 
is,  if Monopoly situation in relation to export. 
(a) at least one quarter 
of all the goods of that description which are produced in Nigeria are produced by one and 
the same person, or 
(b) at least one quarter 
of all the goods of that description which are produced in Nigeria are produced by 
members of one and the same group of interconnected bodies corporate, and in these cases, 
a monopoly situation shall, for the purposes of this Act, be taken to exist both in relation to 
exports of goods of that description from Nigeria generally and in relation to exports of 
goods of that description from Nigeria to each market taken separately. 
(2) In relation to exports of goods of any description from Nigeria generally, a monopoly 
situation shall, for the purposes of this Act, be taken to exist, if (a) one or more agreements 
are in operation which in any way prevent, restrict or distort competition in relation to the 
export of goods of that description from Nigeria; and 
(b) that agreement is or those agreements collectively are operative with respect to at least 
one quarter 
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of all the goods of that description which are produced in Nigeria. 
(3) In relation to export of goods of any description from Nigeria to any particular market, 
a monopoly situation shall, for the purposes of this Part of this Act, be taken to exist, if  
(a) one or more agreements are in operation which in any way prevent or 
37 
restrict or distort competition in relation to the supply of goods of that description (whether 
from Nigeria or not) to that market; and (b) that agreement is or those agreements 
collectively are operative with respect to at least onequarter of all the goods of that 
description which are produced in Nigeria. 
69.(1) Where it appears to the Commission that there are grounds for believing that               
General powers of the Commission to require information 
(a) a monopoly situation may exist in relation to the supply of goods or services of any 
description or in relation to exports of goods of any description from Nigeria; and 
(b) in accordance with the provisions of this Part of this Act, a person is not precluded 
from making a monopoly reference to the Commission with respect to the existence or 
possible existence of that situation, the Commission may, for the purposes of determining 
whether to make a monopoly reference with respect to the existence or possible existence 
of that situation, exercise the powers conferred on it by subsection (2) of this section. 
(2) For the purposes of the provision of subsection (1) of this section, the Commission may 
require any person who supplies or produces goods of the description in question in 
Nigeria or to whom any such goods are supplied in Nigeria or any person who supplies 
services of any description in Nigeria or for whom any such services are so supplied, to 
furnish to the Commission such information as the Commission may consider necessary 
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with regard to  
(a) the value, cost, price or quantity of goods of that description supplied or produced by 
that person, or of goods of that value, cost, price or extent of the services of that 
description supplied to him or the value, cost, price or extent of the services of that 
description supplied by the person or of the services of that description supplied for him; or 
(b) the capacity of any undertaking carried on by that person to supply, produce or make 
use of goods of that description or to supply or make use 38 of services of that description; 
or 
(c) the number of persons employed by that person wholly or partly on any work related to 
supply, production or use of goods of that description, or the supply or use of services of 
that description. 
70.(1) Any power conferred on the Commission by the provisions of this Act to require a 
person to furnish information shall be exercisable by notice in writing served on that 
person. 
Supplementary provision as to the requirement to furnish informant 
(2) Any person who refuses or wilfully neglects to furnish to the Commission information 
required under this section, commits an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine 
of not exceeding N100,000. 
(3) Any person who, in furnishing information required by the Commission under this 
section, makes a statement which he knows to be false in any material particular or 
recklessly makes a statement which is false in any material particular, commits an offence 
and shall be liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years or to a 
fine not exceeding _100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine. 
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71.(1) A monopoly reference (a) shall specify the description of goods or services to which 
it relates; 
     General provision as to monopoly references. 
(b) in the case of a reference relating to goods, shall state whether it relates to the supply of 
goods or to exports of goods from Nigeria or both; and 
(c) for the purposes of which the reference consideration is to be limited to a part of 
Nigeria shall specify the part of Nigeria, to which the consideration is to be limited, and 
(subject to subsection (2) of this section) shall be framed in accordance with the provisions 
of section 76 or 77 of this Act. 
(2) A monopoly reference may be so framed as to require the Commission to exclude from 
consideration or to limit consideration to such agreements and practices as are mentioned 
in or falling within  
(a) paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of section 66 or paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of 
section 67 of this Act (or in either of those paragraphs as modified in this Act); or 
(b) subsection (2) or (3) of section 68 of this Act; or 
(c) paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) of this section as are specified in the reference. 
72. A monopoly reference may be so framed as to require the Commission only 
to investigate and report on the questions whether a monopoly situation exists in relation to 
the matters set out in the reference in accordance with section 71 of this Act and, if so, 
whether  Monopoly reference limited to the facts. 
(a) by virtue of which provisions of sections 66 to 68 of this Act, that monopoly situation is 
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to be taken to exist; 
(b) in favour of which person or persons, that monopoly situation exists; 
(c) any steps (by way of uncompetitive practices or otherwise) are being taken by that 
person or those persons for the purpose of exploiting or maintaining the monopoly 
situation and, if so, by what uncompetitive practices or in what other way; and 
(d) any action or omission on the part of that person or those persons is attributable to the 
existence of the monopoly situation and, if so, what action or omission and in what way it 
is so attributable. 
73.(1) On making a monopoly reference or a variation of a monopoly reference, the 
Commission shall arrange for the reference or variation to be published in the Federal 
Gazette or a national newspaper widely in circulation in Nigeria. 
Publication of monopoly references and variations, and of directions relating to them. 
(2) Where the Commission gives a direction under this Act with respect to a monopoly 
reference or a variation of a monopoly reference, the Commission shall arrange for the 
direction to be published in the Federal Gazette or in a national newspaper widely in 
circulation in Nigeria. 
74.(1) The Commission shall make a report on a monopoly reference to the Minister. 
     Report of Commission on monopoly reference. 
(2) In making the report on a monopoly reference mentioned in subsection (1) of this 
section, the Commission shall include in it, definite conclusions on the questions 
comprised in the reference, together with  
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(a) an account of its reasons for those conclusions; and 
(b) a survey of the general position with respect to the subject matter of the reference and 
of the development which led to that position, as in its opinion are expedient for facilitating 
a proper understanding of those questions and of their conclusions. 
(3) Where, on a monopoly reference, the Commission finds that a monopoly situation 
exists and that facts found by the Commission in pursuance of their investigations operate 
or may be expected to operate, against the public interest, its report shall specify those 
facts and the conclusions to be included in the report, in so far as they relate to the 
operation of those facts and shall also specify the particular effects, adverse to the public 
interest, which in their opinion those facts have or may be expected to have. 
(4) The Commission (a) shall, as part of their investigations, consider what action (if any) 
shall be taken for the purpose of remedying or preventing those adverse effects; and 
(b) may, if it thinks fit, include in its report, recommendation as to such action. 
(5) In paragraph (a) of subsection (4) of this section, the reference to action to be taken for 
the purpose mentioned in that paragraph, is a reference to be taken for that  purpose either 
(a) by one or more Ministers or other public authorities; or 
(b) by one or more persons in whose favour the monopoly situation in question exists. 
75.(1) A monopoly reference shall specify a period within which the Commission is to 
report on the reference and if a report of the Commission on the reference is not made 
before the end of the period so specified or if one or more extended periods allowed under 
subsection (2) of this section is not made before the end of that extended period or of the 
last of those extended periods, as the case may be, the reference shall cease to have effect 
and no action or, if action has already been taken, no further action shall be taken in 
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relation to that reference under this Act. 
     Time limit for report on monopoly reference. 
(2) Any direction may be given in the case of a monopoly reference made by the Minister 
with one or more other Ministers and that Minister or those Ministers acting jointly, 
allowing the Commission such extended period for the purpose of reporting on the 
reference as may be specified in the direction if the period has already been extended once 
or more than once by any direction under this subsection, allowing the Commission such 
further extended period for that purpose as may be so specified. 
76.(1) The provisions of this section shall have effect where a report of the Commission on 
a monopoly reference has been sent to the Minister and the conclusions of the Commission 
set out in the report    
    Order of the Minister on report of monopoly  reference 
.(a) include conclusions to the effect that a monopoly situation exists and that facts found 
by the Commission in pursuance of their investigations under the relevant sections of this 
Act operate or may be expected to operate, against the public interest; and 
(b) specify particular effects adverse to the public interest.(2) In the circumstances 
mentioned in subsection (1) of this section, the Minister may exercise such one or more of 
the powers specified in Parts I and II of the Schedule to this Act as he considers necessary 
for the purpose of remedying or preventing the adverse effects specified in the report 
mentioned in subsection (1) of this section and those powers may be so exercised to such 
extent and in such manner as the Minister considers appropriate for that purpose. 
        Schedule. Parts I and II. 
(3) In determining whether or not and what extent or in what manner, to exercise any of 
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those powers mentioned in subsection (2) of this section, the Minister shall take into 
account any recommendations included in the report of the Commission in pursuance of 
subsection (3) of section 74 of this Act. 
 (4) Where, in any such report as is mentioned in subsection (1) of this section, the person 
or one of the persons specified as being the person or persons in whose favour the 
monopoly situation in question exists is a body corporate fulfilling the following 
conditions, that is (a) that the affairs of the body corporate are managed by its members; 
and (b) that by virtue of any enactment, those members are appointed by a Minister. 
(5) The appropriate Minister to make any order under this section in relation to that body 
corporate (but not for the purpose of making any such order in relation to any other person) 
in this section shall be the Minister who appointed the members of that body corporate. 
(6) In relation to any such body corporate as is mentioned in subsection (5) of this section, 
the powers exercisable by virtue of subsection 
(2) of this section shall not include the powers specified in Part II of the Schedule to this 
Act. 
         Schedule. Part II. 
77.(1) This section applies to an order under section 76 of this Act. 
(2) Any order under this section declaring anything to be unlawful may declare it to be 
unlawful either for all persons or for such persons as may be specified or described in the 
order. 
       General provisions as to orders. 
(3) Nothing in the order shall have effect so as to apply to any person in relation to his 
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conduct outside Nigeria, unless that person is (a) a citizen of Nigeria; or 
(b) a body corporate which is incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act; 
Cap. C 20 LFN.  or  
(c) carrying on business in Nigeria, either alone or in partnership with one or more other 
persons. 
(4) In the case of a person falling within paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (3) of this 
section, any such order may extend to acts or omissions outside Nigeria.  
(5) An order to which this section applies may be extended so as to prohibit the carrying 
out of agreements already in existence on the date on which the Order is made. 
(6) Nothing in any order to which this section applies shall have effect as to restrict the 
doing of anything for the purpose of restraining an infringement of Nigerian patent or so as 
to restrict any person as to the conditions which he attaches to a licence to do anything the 
doing of which would, but for the licence, be an infringement of a Nigerian patent. 
(7) An order to which this section applies may authorise the Minister making the order to 
give any directive to a person specified in the directive, or in any company or association  
(a) to take such steps within his competence as may be specified or described in the 
direction for the purpose of carrying out, or securing compliance with the order; or 
(b) to do or refrain from doing anything so specified or described which he may be 
required by the order to do or refrain from doing, and may authorise the Minister to vary or 
revoke any directives so given. (8) Before making any order under section 76 of this Act, 
the Minister proposing to make the order shall publish, in such manner as appropriate, a 
notice 
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(a) stating his intention to make the order; 
(b) indicating the nature of the provisions to be embodied in the order; and (c) stating that 
any person whose interest are likely to be affected by the order and who is desirous of 
making representations in respect of it, shall do so in writing (stating his interest and the 
grounds on which he wishes to make the representations) before a date specified in the 
notice (that date being not earlier than the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the 
day on which publication of the notice is completed), and the Minister shall not make the 
order on the date specified in the notice in accordance with paragraph (c) of this subsection 
and shall consider any representation duly made to him in accordance with the notice 
before that date. 
PART XII AUTHORISATION AND CLEARANCE 
78.(1) Any person who proposes to enter into or carry out an agreement or to engage in a 
business practice affected or prohibited by this Act, may, subject to subsection (2) of this 
section apply to the Commission for an authorisation to do so. 
        Grant of authorizations. 
(2) The Commission shall in relation to an application for authorisation under subsection 
(1)(a) if it is satisfied that the agreement or practice as the case may be,is likely to promote 
the public benefit, grant an authorisation subject to such terms and conditions as it thinks 
fit and for such time as the Commission after consultation with the Minister may specify; 
or (b) refuse to grant an authorisation and shall inform the applicant in writing of the 
reasons for refusal. 
79. While an authorisation under section 78 remains in force, nothing in this Act shall 
prevent the person to whom it is granted from giving effect to any agreement or any 
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provision thereof or from engaging in any practice to which the authorisation relates. 
        Effect of authorisation. 
80.(1) Every application for an authorisation under section 78 of this Act which shall be 
made in the prescribed form, shall contain such particulars as may be specified in the form 
and be accompanied by payment of such fees as may be prescribed. 
(2) On receipt of an application that complies with subsection (1) of this section, the 
Commission shall:  
   Procedure for application for authorisation of agreements and 
   restrictive practices substantially lessening competition.  
                                       
(a) record the application in the register to be kept by the Commission for that purpose; 
(b) give written notice of the date of registration to the person by whom or on whose behalf 
the application was made; 
(c) give notice of the application to any other person who, in the Commission’s opinion, is 
likely to have an interest in the application; and 
(d) give public notice of the application in such manner as the Commission may think fit. 
(3) Any person who has an interest in any application in respect of which a notice is given 
under subsection (2)(d) of this section may, give written notice to the Commission of that 
person’s interest and the reason/s thereof. 
(4) On receipt of an application that does not comply with subsection 
(1) of this section, the Commission may, at its discretion, either: 
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(a) accept the application and take the steps referred to in subsection 
(2) of this section in respect of that application; or 
(b) return the application to the person by whom or on whose behalf it was made; or 
(c) decline to register the application until it complies with subsection 
(1) of this section. 
(5) Where the Commission declines to register an application under subsection (4)(c) of 
this section, it shall forthwith notify the person by whom or on whose behalf the 
application was made. 
(6) The person making the application under subsection (1) of this section, and any person 
on whose behalf it was made, and any person to whom the application relates, shall from 
time to time produce, or, as the case may be, furnish to the Commission, within such time 
as it may specify, such further documents or information in relation to the application as 
may be required by the Commission for the purpose of enabling it to exercise its functions 
under this Part of this Act. 
(7) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (2) or subsection (4) of this section, where the 
Commission is of the opinion that the matters to which an application relates are, for 
reasons other than arising from the application of any provision of this Act, unlikely to be 
proceeded with, the Commission may, in its discretion, return the application to the person 
by or on whose behalf the application was made; provided that, the person by or on whose 
behalf the application was made shall have the right to apply to the Court for a review of 
such determination. 
81.(1) Before deciding an application for an authorisation under section 78 of this Act, the 
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Commission shall prepare a proposed determination in relation to the application. 
(2) The Commission shall send a copy of the proposed determination and a summary of the 
reasons therefore to: 
Commission to prepare proposed determination in relation to contracts, 
arrangements and restrictive practices substantially lessening competition. 
(a) the applicant; 
(b) any person to whom a notice has been given pursuant to section 80(2)(c) of this Act; 
(c) any person who has given a notice pursuant to section 80(3) of this Act and who in the 
opinion of the Commission has such an interest in the application as to justify the 
Commission sending a copy of the proposed determination to that person; and 
(d) any other person who in the opinion of the Commission may assist the Commission in 
its determination of the application. 
(3) The applicant and each other person to whom a copy of the proposed determination is 
sent shall notify the Commission within fourteen days after a date fixed by the 
Commission (not being a date earlier than the day on which the notice is sent) whether the 
applicant or other person wishes the Commission to hold a conference in relation to the 
proposed determination. 
(4) If every person to whom a proposed determination was sent under subsection (2) of this 
section: 
(a) Notifies the Commission within the period of fourteen days prescribed in subsection (3) 
of this section that such person does not wish the Commission to hold a conference in 
relation to the proposed determination; or 
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(b) Does not notify the Commission within that period that such person wishes the 
Commission to hold such a conference, the Commission may make a final determination at 
any time after the expiration of that period.  
(5) If any person to whom a proposed determination was sent under subsection (2) of this 
section notifies the Commission, in writing, within the period of fourteen days prescribed 
in subsection (3) of this section that he wishes the Commission to hold a conference in 
relation to the proposed determination, the Commission shall appoint a date (not being a 
date later than twentyone days after the expiration of that period), time, and place for the 
holding of the conference and give notice of the date, time, and place so appointed to each 
person to whom a proposed determination was sent under subsection (2) of this section. 45 
(6) The Commission may, of its own motion, determine to hold a conference in relation to 
the proposed determination and shall appoint a date (not being a date later than twentyone 
days after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (3) of this section), time, 
and place for the holding of the conference and give notice of the date, time, and place so 
appointed to the person to whom the proposed determination was sent under subsection (2) 
of this section. 
(7) Where the Commission is of the opinion that two or more applications for 
authorisations that are made by the same person, or by bodies corporate that are affiliated 
with each other, involve the same or substantially similar issues, the Commission may 
consolidate the applications and treat same as if they constitute a single application, and 
may prepare a single proposed determination in relation to the applications and hold a 
single conference in relation to that proposed determination. 
82.(1) At every conference called under section 81 of this Act: 
Procedure for holding a conference. 
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(a) the Commission shall be represented by the Executive Chairman or a member or 
members thereof nominated by the Executive Chairman; 
(b) each person to whom a proposed determination was sent under section 81(2) of this 
Act, and any other person whose presence at the conference is considered by the 
Commission to be desirable, is entitled to attend and participate personally or, in the case 
of a company or a firm, be represented by a person who, or by persons each of whom, is a 
director, officer, or employee of the company or firm; 
(c) a person participating in the conference in accordance with paragraph (b) of this 
subsection is entitled to have another person, who may be a legal practitioner, or other 
persons present to assist him; 
(d) no other person is entitled to be present. 
(2) The Commission may require any officer or officers of the Commission to attend a 
conference called under section 81 of this Act where in the opinion of the Commission that 
officer or those officers may assist the Commission in the determination of the application 
and the member of the Commission or the officer (or one of the officers) of the 
Commission, as the case may be, in attendance, shall preside over the conference. 
(3) At every conference called under section 81 of this Act, the Commission shall provide 
for as little formality and technicality as the requirements of this Act and a proper 
consideration of the application may permit. 
(4) The Commission shall cause such record of the conference to be made as is sufficient 
to set out the matters raised by the persons participating in 46 the conference. 
(5) Any member of the Commission or officer thereof, as the case may be, presiding over 
the conference may terminate the conference when that member or officer is of the opinion 
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that a reasonable opportunity has been given for the expression of the views of persons 
participating in the conference. 
(6) The Commission shall have regard to all matters raised at the conference, and may at 
any time after the termination of the conference make a final determination in respect of 
the application. 
83.(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, if at any time after the Commission has 
granted an authorisation under section 78 of this Act the Commission is satisfied that: 
    The Commission may vary or revoke authorisations. 
(a) the authorisation was granted on information that was false or misleading in a material 
particular; 
(b) there has been a material change of circumstances since the authorisation was granted; 
or 
(c) a condition upon which the authorisation was granted has not been complied with; 
the Commission may revoke or amend the authorisation or revoke the authorisation and 
grant another authorisation in substitution therefor. 
(2) The Commission shall not revoke or amend an authorisation or revoke an authorisation 
and substitute a further authorisation pursuant to subsection (1) of this section unless the 
person to whom the authorisation was granted, and any other person who in the opinion of 
the Commission is likely to have an interest in the matter, is given a reasonable opportunity 
to make submissions to the Commission and the Commission has considered those 
submissions. 
PART XI11 – PROVISIONS RELATING TO REGULATED INDUSTRIES 
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84.(1) For the purpose of avoiding any confusion between the provisions of this Act 
relating to the powers and functions of the Commission and the provisions of any other law 
in force providing for the powers and functions of any other government agency, the 
Commission may, from time to time, by a ruling, declare that the industries specified in the 
ruling shall be treated as regulated industries. 
      Designation of Regulated Industries. 
(2) The Commission shall not make a ruling under subsection (1) of this section unless it is 
satisfied that: 
(a) the industries to which the ruling relates are or will be subject to regulations made by a 
government agency with authority to regulate the activities of 47 persons operating in such 
industries or the terms under which goods or services are supplied in such industries; 
(b) it is necessary or desirable for such industries to be designated as regulated industries in 
the interests of users, consumers, or, as the case may be, suppliers;  
(c) any such ruling is designed in a manner necessary to minimize confusion as to the 
powers of the Commission and those of other regulatory agencies; and 
(d) any such ruling shall be published by the Commission in the Gazette. 
85.(1) Whenever it is alleged that a provision of this Act has been contravened by a person 
or firm acting or operating within any regulated industry designated pursuant to section 84 
of this Act, the person or firm against which such allegation is made may show that the 
relevant conducts were ordered or required by any regulatory agency possessing 
jurisdiction over the relevant industry.) 
      Exemption of Regulated Industries. 
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(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, on all matters relating to competition, 
the provisions of this Act shall override the provisions of any other law. 
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of this Part recognising regulated industries, nothing 
shall preclude a person dissatisfied with a decision for a regulatory agency from appealing 
to the Federal Competition Commission. 
(4) The fact that a firm operates in an industry affected by an order relating to price 
regulation pursuant to Part X of this Act is sufficient to make such firm a member of a 
regulated industry for the purpose of this Part of this Act during the period that the order is 
in effect. 
 PART XIV OFFENCES AGAINST COMPETITION 
86.(1) A person who is engaged in the business of producing or supplying products shall 
not directly or indirectly  Price fixing. 
(a) by agreement, threat or promise or any like means, attempt to influence upward or 
discourage the reduction of, the price at which any other person supplies or offers to supply 
or advertises products; 
(b) refuse to supply products to or otherwise discriminate against any other person engaged 
in business because of the low pricing policy of that person. 
(2) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply if the person attempting to influence the conduct of 
another person and that other person are interconnected companies or, as the case may be, 
principal and agent. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, the publication by a supplier of products, other than a 
retailer, of an advertisement that mentions a resale price for the products is an attempt to 
influence upward the selling price of any person into whose hands the products come for 
 291
48 resale unless the price is so expressed as to make it clear to any person who becomes 
aware of the advertisement that the goods may be sold at a lower price. 
87.(1) No person shall conspire, combine, agree or arrange with another person to               
Conspiracy. 
(a) limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing, manufacturing, storing or dealing 
in or supplying any products; 
(b) prevent, limit or lesson unduly, the manufacture or production of any products or to 
enhance unreasonably the price thereof; 
(c) lesson unduly, competition in the production, manufacture, purchase, barter, sale, 
supply, rental or transportation of any products or in the price of insurance on persons or 
property; 
(d) otherwise unduly restrain or injure competition. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) applies to a conspiracy, combination, agreement or 
arrangement which relates only to a service and to standards of competence and integrity 
that are reasonably necessary for the protection of the public 
(a) in the practice of a trade or profession relating to the service; or 
(b) in the collection and dissemination of information relating to the service. 
88.(1) Subject to subsection (2), it is unlawful for two or more 
persons to enter into an agreement whereby  Bid rigging. 
(a) one or more of them agree to undertake not to submit a bid in response to a call or 
request for bids or tenders; or 
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(b) as bidders or tenders they submit, in response to a call or request, bids or tenders that 
are arrived at by agreement between or among themselves. 
(2) This section shall not apply in respect of an agreement that is entered into or a 
submission that is arrived at only by companies each of which is, in respect of every one of 
the others, an affiliate. 
89.(1) A person shall not, in pursuance of trade and for the purpose of promoting, directly 
or indirectly, the supply or use of products of any business interest, by any means               
Misleading advertising.  
(a) make a representation to the public 
(i) that is false or misleading or likely to be misleading in a material respect; 
(ii) in the form of a statement, warranty or guarantee of performance, efficacy or length of 
life of products, that is not based on an adequate and proper test thereof, the proof of which 
lies on the person making the representation; 
(iii) in a form that purports to be a warranty or a guarantee of any 
49 products of a promise to replace, maintain or repeat an article or any part thereof or to 
repeat or continue service until it has achieved a specified result, if the form of purported 
warranty, guarantee or promise is materially misleading or there is no  reasonable prospect 
that it will be carried out; 
(b) falsely represent to the public in the form of a statement, warranty or guarantee that 
services are of a particular kind, standard, quality or quantity, or are supplied by any 
particular person or any person of a particular trade, qualification or skill; 
(c) make a materially misleading representation to the public concerning the price at which 
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any products or like products have been , are or will be ordinarily supplied. 
(2) For the purposes of this section and section 95, the following types of representation 
shall be deemed to be made to the public by and only by the person who caused it to be 
expressed, made or contained, that is(a) expressed on a product offered or displayed for 
sale; 
(b) expressed on anything attached to, inserted in or accompanying a product offered or 
displayed for sale, its wrapper or container, or anything on which the product is mounted 
for display or sale; 
(c) expressed on a display in the place where the product is sold; 
(d) made in the course of selling the product to the ultimate consumer; 
(e) contained in or on anything that is sold, sent, delivered, transmitted or in any other 
manner made available to a member of the public. 
(3) Where the person referred to in subsection (2) is outside of Nigeria, the representation 
shall be deemed to be made. 
(a) in a case described in subsection (2)(a),(b) or (e), by the person who imported the 
product; and 
(b) in a case described in subsection (2)(c), by the person who imported the display into 
Nigeria. 
(4) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), every person who, for the purpose of promoting, 
directly or indirectly, the supply or use of any products or any business interest, supplies to 
a wholesaler, retailer or other distributor of products, any material or thing that contains a 
representation of a kind referred to in subsection (1) shall be deemed to have made that 
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representation to the public. 
90.(1) A person shall not, for the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, the supply or 
use of any products or any business interest, make a representation to the public that a test 
as to the performance, efficacy or length of life of the products has been made by any 
person or publish a testimonial with respect to the products, unless he can establish the 
matters specified in subsection (2). 
   Representation as to test and publication of testimonials. 
   
(2) The matters mentioned in subsection (1) are that 
(a) the representation or testimonial was previously made or published 50 by the person by 
whom the test was made or the testimonial was given, as the case may be; or 
(b) before the representation or testimonial was made or published, it was approved and 
permission to make or publish it was given in writing by the person who made the test or 
gave the testimonial, as the case may be, and it accords with the representation or 
testimonial previously made, published o approved. 
91. A person shall not supply any product at a price that exceeds the lowest of two or more 
prices clearly expressed by him or on his behalf, in respect of the product in the quantity in 
which it is so supplied at the time of supply  
Double ticketing. 
(a) on the product, its wrapper or container; 
(b) on anything attached to, inserted in or accompanying the product, its wrapper or 
container or anything on which the product is mounted for display or sale; or 
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(c) on a display or advertisement at the place at which the product is purchased. 
92.(1) For the purposes of this section, ”bargain price” means a price  
Sale at bargain price. 
(a) that is represented in an advertisement to be a bargain price by reference to an ordinary 
price or otherwise; 
(b) so represented in an advertisement, that a person who reads, hears or sees the 
advertisement would reasonably understand to be a bargain price by reason of the prices at 
which the products advertised or like products are ordinarily sold. 
(2) A person shall not advertise at a bargain price, products which he does not supply in 
reasonable quantities having regard to the nature of the market in which he carries on 
business, the nature and size of the business and the nature of the advertisement. 
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the person who is advertising proves that (a) he took 
reasonable steps to obtain in adequate time, a quantity of the product that would have been 
reasonable having regard to the nature of the advertisement, but was unable to obtain such 
a quantity by reason of events beyond his control that he could not reasonably have 
anticipated; 
(b) he obtained a quantity of the product that was reasonable having regard to the nature of 
the advertisement, but was unable to meet the demand thereof because the demand 
surpassed his reasonable expectations; or 
(c) after he became unable to supply the product in accordance with the advertisement, he 
undertook to supply the same product or an equivalent product of equal or better quality at 
the bargain price and within a reasonable time to all persons who requested the product and 
who were not supplied therewith during the time when the bargain price applied and that 
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the undertakin 51 g was fulfilled. 
93.(1) A person who advertises products for sale or rent in a market shall not, during the 
period and in the market to which the advertisement relates, supply products at a price that 
is higher than that advertised. 
        Sale above advertised price. 
(2) This section shall not apply in respect of (a) an advertisement that appears in a 
catalogue or other publication in which it is prominently stated that the prices contained 
therein are subject to error if the person establishes that the price advertised is in error; 
(b) an advertisement that is immediately followed by another advertisement correcting the 
price mentioned in the first advertisement. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, the market to which an advertisement relates shall be 
deemed to be the market to which it could reasonably be expected to reach, unless the 
advertisement defines market specifically by reference to a geographical area, store, sale 
by catalogue or otherwise. 
94. Any person who, in any manner, impedes, prevents or obstructs any investigation or 
inquiry by the Commission under this Act commits an offence and is liable on summary 
conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to a fine not exceeding 
_200,000 or to both such imprisonment and fine. 
      Obstruction of Investigation or Inquiry. 
95. A person who Offence against records. 
(a) refuses to produce any document or to supply any information 
when required to do so by the Commission under this Act; or (b) destroys or alters any 
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such document or causes it to be destroyed or altered, commits an offence and is liable on 
summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to a fine not 
exceeding _200,000 or to both imprisonment and fine.  
96. A person who gives to the Commission or an authorized officer, any information which 
he knows to be false or misleading commits an offence and is liable on summary 
conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or to a fine not exceeding 
N150,000 or both imprisonment and fine. 
      Giving of false or misleading information. 
97. A person who (a) refuses or fails to comply with a requirement of the Commission 
under this Act; 
      Failure to attend and give evidence. 
(b) having been required to appear before the Commission  
(i) without reasonable excuse, refuses or fails to appear and give evidence; or 
(ii) refuses to take an oath or to make an affirmation as a witness or to answer question put 
to him, commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a 
term not 52 exceeding 3years or a fine not exceeding _200,000 or both imprisonment and 
fine. 
98. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this Act with intention to make or 
actually makes illicit profit shall be guilty of an offence and liable to conviction to a fine 6 
(six) times of the value of the transactions.  
        Penalty for illicit profit. 
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PART XV ENFORCEMENT, REMEDIES, AND APPEALS 
99.(1) Any person who alleges that he has suffered, or is likely to suffer, an injury as a 
result of a violation or likely violation of any provision of this Act may file a complaint 
with the Commission. 
     The Commission may hear complaints of persons. 
(2) Every complaint pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall be made in such form, 
contain such particulars, and be accompanied by payment of such fee as the Commission 
may prescribe. 
(3) On receipt of a complaint that complies with subsection (2) of this section, the 
Commission shall: 
(a) record the complaint in the register to be kept by the Commission for that purpose; 
(b) give written notice of the date of registration to the person by or on whose behalf the 
complaint was filed; 
(c) give notice of the complaint to the person against whom the complaint was filed and 
any other person who, in the Commission's opinion, is likely to have an interest in the 
complaint. 
(4) Any person who has an interest in any complaint filed with the Commission may give 
written notice to the Commission of that person's interest and the reason therefor. 
(5) On receipt of a complaint that does not comply with subsection 
(2) of this section, the Commission may, at its discretion, either: 
(a) accept the complaint and take the steps referred to in subsection 
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(3) of this section pertaining to that complaint; or 
(b) decline to register the complaint until it complies with subsection 
(2) of this section. 
(6) Where the Commission declines to register a complaint pursuant to subsection (5) (b) 
of this section, it shall forthwith notify the person by or on whose behalf the complaint was 
made and shall state clearly the basis for its decision. 
(7) The person filing a complaint under this section, and any person on whose behalf it was 
made, and any person against whom the complaint relates, and any person who has either 
received a notice from the Commission or who has filed a notice of interest with the 
Commission shall from time to time produce, or, as the case may be, furnish to the 53 
Commission, within such time as it may specify, such further documents or information in 
relation to the complaint or defences to allegation contained therein, as may be required by 
the Commission for the purpose of enabling it to reach a final determination regarding the 
merits of the complaint. 
(8) Notwithstanding anything in this section, where the Commission is of the opinion that 
the matters to which a complaint relates are not covered by any provision of this Act, the 
Commission shall decline to entertain such complaint. 
100.(1) If the Commission is of the view that the matter raised in the complaint are those 
over which any provision of this Act applies, the Commission shall set the complaint for 
administrative hearing before a hearing officer, who shall be appointed by the Executive 
Chairman and shall be of a status to be designated by the Commission. 
      Procedure for  administrative hearing. 
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(2) At every hearing called pursuant to subsection (1) of this section: 
(a) the person who filed the complaint, or in whose behalf it was filed, and each person to 
whom a notice was sent or who has filed a notice of interest under section 99 of this Act, 
and any other person whose presence at the hearing is considered by the Commission to be 
desirable, is entitled to attend and participate personally or, in the case of a company or a 
firm, be represented by a person who, or by persons each of whom, is a director, officer, or 
employee of the company or firm; (b) a person participating in the conference in 
accordance with paragraph (b) of this subsection is entitled to have another person, who 
may be a legal practitioner, or other persons present to assist him; 
(c) no other person is entitled to be present. 
(3) At every hearing held under this section, the Commission shall provide for as little 
formality and technicality as the requirements of this Act and a proper consideration of the 
application may permit. 
(4) The Commission shall cause such record of the hearing to be made as is sufficient to 
set out the matters raised by the persons participating in the hearing. 
(5) The hearing officer presiding over the hearing may terminate the hearing when he is of 
the opinion that every person participating in the hearing has been given a reasonable 
opportunity to state or explain his or its position.  
(6) The Commission shall have regard to all matters raised at the hearing and the records, 
and shall make a determination within fortyfive days after the termination of the hearing.  
(7) Where the hearing officer is of the opinion that no provision of this Act has been 
violated by the person against whom the complaint was filed, the hearing officer shall 
make a determination to that effect. 
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(8) Where the hearing officer is of the opinion that any provision of this Act has been 
violated, the hearing officer shall make a determination to that effect and make 54 
recommendations as he deems fit and reasonable to ensure that the violation ceases and 
that the injured party is accorded a reasonable remedy for his injury. 
(9) Where the Commission declines to entertain a complaint duly filed, or finds that no 
violation of this Act has occurred or that there has been a violation, as the case may be, any 
party not satisfied with the determination of the Commission may file an application for 
review with the Court. 
(10) Where, in the opinion of the hearing officer, the interest of justice demands that the 
person whose complaint is pending before the Commission should be granted leave to file 
an application promptly with the Court prior to the termination of the administrative 
hearing, the hearing officer may, in writing, grant such leave. 
(11) Where a leave is granted pursuant to subsection (10) of this section, the hearing 
officer shall suspend the administrative hearing pending the outcome of the application 
before the Court, and shall terminate same when and if all the issues raised in the 
complaint are fully resolved by the Court. 
(12) Any person who has filed a complaint with the Commission may, at any time before 
the termination of the hearing, by notice in writing to the Commission, withdraw the 
complaint. (13) No person shall file an application for review with the Court or otherwise 
invoke the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of a violation of any provision of this Act, 
unless such person has complied with the provisions of this section. 
101. The following persons may exercise the right of application for review pursuant to the 
provisions of this Act: 
     Persons entitled to file applications  for review. 
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(a) in the case of an application against a determination of the Commission in relation to an 
application for an authorisation under section 78 of this Act, the applicant and any person 
who participated in any conference held by the Commission under section 81 of this Act in 
relation to the authorisation; (b) in the case of an application against a determination of the 
Commission revoking or amending an authorisation pursuant to section (1) of this Act or 
revoking an authorisation and substituting a further authorisation pursuant to that 
subsection, the person to whom the authorisation was granted; 
(c) in the case of an application against a determination of the Commission under section 
59 or section 60 of this Act in relation to a notice seeking a clearance or an authorisation, 
as the case may be:(i) the person who sought the clearance or the authorisation; and 
(ii) any person whose assets or the shares in a company are proposed to be acquired 
pursuant to the clearance or authorisation; and  
(iii) any person who participated in any conference held by the 55 Commission under 
section 81 of this Act in relation to the clearance or authorisation. (d) in the case of an 
application against a determination of the Commission under section 81 of this Act made 
on the application of any person who is a supplier of regulated goods or services, the 
applicant and any person who in the opinion of the Court is a substantial consumer or 
purchaser of the regulated goods or services to which the determination relates or who 
represents a substantial group of consumers or purchasers of those goods or services; 
(e) in the case of an application against a determination of the Commission under section 
81 of this Act made by the Commission on its own motion, any person who is a supplier of 
regulated goods or services to which the determination relates and any person who in the 
opinion of the Court is a substantial consumer or purchaser of the regulated goods or 
 303
services to which the determination relates or who represents a substantial group of 
consumers or purchasers of those goods or services. 
102.(1) In its decision on any application for review, the Court may do any one or more of 
the following things: 
      Determination of applications for review. 
(a) confirm, modify, or reverse the determination or any part of it; 
(b) exercise any of the powers that could have been exercised by the Commission in 
relation to the matter to which the application relates. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in this section, the Court may, in any case, instead of 
determining any application under that section, direct the Commission to reconsider, either 
generally or in respect of any specified matters, the whole or any specified part of the 
matter to which the application relates. 
(3) In giving any direction under this section, the Court shall: 
(a) advise the Commission of its reasons for doing so; and 
(b) give to the Commission such directions as it deems just concerning the reconsideration 
of the whole or any part of the matter that is referred back for reconsideration.(4) In 
reconsidering the matter so referred back, the Commission shall have regard to the Court’s 
reasons for giving a direction under subsection (1)of this section, and the Court’s directions 
under subsection (2) of this section. 
(5) Where an application for review is filed under any provision of this Part of this Act 
against any determination of the Commission, the determination to which the application 
relates shall remain in full force pending the determination of the application for review, 
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unless the Court makes an order to the contrary. 
103.(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of subsection (2) of section 48 of this Act, in 
any case where the Court, on the application of the Commission, is satisfied that any 
person has violated section 48 of this Act, or has been found in any other proceedings 
under this Act to have violated section 48 of this Act, the Court may, by order give 
directions for the 56 disposal by that person of such assets or shares as shall be specified in 
the order; or Court may order divestiture of assets or shares of a company in  certain cases. 
(2) An application under subsection (1) of this section may be made at any time within two 
years from the date on which the violation occurred.  
104. Where the Commission determines that any provision of Parts VI, VIII or V of this 
Act has been violated, the Commission may refer the matter to the office of the Attorney 
General of the Federation for the institution of criminal proceedings against the violator or 
prosecution thereof or otherwise obtain a fiat from the Attorney General for the institution 
of such criminal proceedings or prosecution thereof. 
         Prosecution for offences. 
PART XVI MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
105.(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Public Officers 
Protection Act shall apply in relation to any suit instituted against any officer or employee 
of the Commission. 
 Limitations of suit against the Commission, etc. Cap. P41 LFN.                   
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment or law, no suit shall lie or 
be instituted in any court against any member of the Commission, the Secretary or any 
other officer or employee of the Commission for any act done in pursuance or execution of 
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this Act or any other enactment or law, or of any public duty or authority in respect of any 
alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act or such enactment or law, duty or 
authority unless(a) it is commenced within 3 months next after the act, neglect or default 
complained of, or (b) in the case of a continuation of damage or injury, within 6 months 
next after the cessation thereof. 
(3) No suit shall be commenced against a member of the Commission, the Secretary, 
officer or employee of the Commission before the expiration of a period of one month after 
written notice of intention to commence the suit shall have been served upon the 
Commission by the intending plaintiff or his agent. 
(4) The notice referred to in subsection (3) of this section shall clearly and explicitly state 
(a) the cause of action; 
(b) the particulars of the claim; 
(c) the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff; and 
(d) the relief which he claims. 
106.(1) Any notice given by the Commission under or for the purpose of this Act shall be 
sufficiently given if it is in writing, under the seal of the Commission or is signed by the 
Executive Chairman, or by one or more of the members of the Commission, or by 57 any 
person purporting to act by direction of the Commission, and is served in accordance with 
section 107 of this Act on the person or persons primarily concerned therewith or on any 
person or organisation deemed by the Commission to represent the person or persons 
primarily concerned therewith. 
          Notices. 
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(2)All documents purporting to be signed by or on behalf of the Commission or to be 
sealed with the seal of the Commission shall, in all courts and in all proceedings under this 
Act, be deemed to have been so signed or sealed with due authority unless the contrary is 
established. 
107.(1) Any notice or other document required or authorised to be served on or given to 
any person for the purpose of this Act may be served or given by delivering it to that 
person, or by leaving it at his usual or last known place of residence or business or at the 
address specified by him in any notice, application, or other document made, given or 
tendered to the Commission under this Act, or by posting it by registered mail to him at 
that place of residence or business or at that address. 
         Service of Notices. 
(2) If any such notice or other document is sent to any person by registered mail, then, 
unless the contrary is shown, it shall be deemed to have been delivered to him when it 
would have been delivered in the ordinary course of posting a mail unless the contrary is 
established; and in proving the delivery it shall be sufficient to prove that there is return 
post office slip showing actual delivery. 
(3) Where for any purpose under this Act, a notice or document is required to be served on 
a firm or company, the notice or document may be served on the secretary, executive 
officer, manager, or other officer holding a similar position in the association or body, and 
for the purpose of this Act, service on the association or body shall, unless otherwise 
directed by the Commission, be deemed to be service on all persons who are members of 
the association or body or who are represented on the association or body by those 
members. 
108.(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, no person shall: 
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          Offences. 
(a) without reasonable excuse, refuse or fail to comply with a notice under section 106 and 
section 107 of this Act; or 
(b) in purported compliance with such a notice, furnish information, or produce a 
document, or give evidence, knowing it to be false or misleading; or 
(c) resist, obstruct, or delay an employee of the Commission acting pursuant to a warrant 
issued under section 11 of this Act. 
(2) No person shall attempt to deceive or knowingly mislead the Commission in relation to 
any matter before it. 
(3) No person, having been required to appear before the Commission pursuant to section 
10 of this Act, shall: 58 
(a) without reasonable excuse, refuse or fail to appear before the Commission to give 
evidence; 
(b) refuse to take an oath or make an affirmation as a witness; or 
(c) refuse to produce to the Commission any book or document that person is required to 
produce. 
(4) Any person who violates any provision of this section commits an offence and is liable 
on summary conviction, in the case of an individual, to a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding three months or to a fine not exceeding N1,000,000 or to both imprisonment and 
fine, and in the case of a company, to a fine not exceeding _10,000,000.00.  
109.(1) Any determination, clearance, authorisation, or decision given by the Commission 
under or for the purpose of this Act shall, be sufficiently given, if it is in writing under the 
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seal of the Commission or is signed by one or more members of the Commission or by an 
officer of the Commission authorised for that purpose. 
       Determinations of the Commission. 
(2) A copy of a determination, clearance, authorisation or decision of the Commission, 
certified to be a true copy by an officer of the Commission authorised in that behalf to 
certify copies of determinations, clearances, authorisations or decisions of the 
Commission, shall be received in all courts as evidence of the determination, clearance, 
authorisation or decision. (3) A document purporting to be a copy of a determination, 
clearance, authorisation or decision of the Commission and to be certified to be a true copy 
in accordance with subsection (2) of this section shall, unless the contrary is established, be 
deemed to be such a copy and to be so certified. 
110.(1) The Commission may delegate its powers subject to such conditions and 
restrictions as it may think fit, and the delegation may be made either generally or in 
relation to any particular matter or class of matters and a person to whom such power is 
delegated shall be either a member of the Commission or an officer thereof. 
       Delegation by the Commission. 
(2) Subject to any general or special directions given or conditions or restrictions imposed 
by the Commission, any person to whom any powers or functions are delegated may, 
exercise those powers or functions in the same manner and with the same effect as if they 
had been conferred directly by this Act. (3) Every person purporting to act pursuant to any 
delegation shall, be presumed to be acting in accordance with the terms of the delegation, 
in the absence of proof to the contrary. 
(4) The delegation of any power or function shall not prevent the exercise of that power or 
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function by the Commission. 
(5) Until it is revoked or amended, every delegation shall continue in force according to its 
terms. 
111.(1) No proceedings, civil or criminal, shall lie against the Commission for anything it 
may do or fail to do in the course of the exercise or intended exercise of its 59 functions, 
unless it is shown that the Commission acted without reasonable care or in bad faith or 
with malice.  
      Proceedings of the Commission privileged. 
(2) No civil proceedings shall lie against any member of the Commission, or any officer of 
the Commission, for anything that person may do or say or fail to do or say in the course of 
the operations of the Commission, unless it is shown that person acted without reasonable 
care or in bad faith or with malice. 
(3) A person shall not be excused from complying with any requirement to furnish 
information, produce documents, or give evidence under this Act, or, on appearing before 
the Commission, from answering any question or producing any document, on the ground 
that to do so might tend to incriminate that person or another person. 
(4) A statement made by a person in answer to a question put by or before the Commission 
shall not in criminal proceedings, be admissible against that person, or that person's 
spouse. 
(5) Nothing in subsection (4) of this section shall apply in respect of: (a) Proceedings on a 
charge of perjury against the maker of the statement; or (b) Proceedings on a charge of an 
offence against section 111(1)(b) of this Act. (6) No court or person shall be entitled to 
require any member of the Commission, or any officer of the Commission or any other 
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person present at any meeting of the Commission, to divulge or communicate any 
information furnished or obtained, documents produced, obtained or tendered, or evidence 
given, in connection with the operations of the Commission. 
(7) Nothing in subsection (6) of this section shall apply in respect of: 
(a) any proceedings referred to in subsection (5) of this section; or 
(b) any proceedings to which the Commission is a party. 
(8) Anything said, or any information furnished, or any document produced or tendered, or 
any evidence given by any person to the Commission, shall be privileged in the same 
manner as if that statement, information, document, or evidence were made, furnished, 
produced, or given in proceedings in a court. 
112. The Commission may, make regulations generally, for the effective implementation 
and operation of this Act, and in particular prescribing Power to make regulations.  
(a) the procedures to be followed under this Act with regard to applications, notices to and 
proceedings of the Commission; (b) forms of applications, notices and other documents 
required for the purposes of this Act; (c) fees, penalties, charges or levies and such other 
related matters; 
(d) how information required can be obtained and access to confidential information. 
113. Nothing in this section shall be construed to imply the validity of the provisions of the 
following or any enactment, where such enactment is inconsistent with any of the 60 
provisions of this Act:                                               
          Validity. 
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(a) National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria Act; Cap 263 LFN. 
(b) the Investments and Securities Act; and 1999 No 45. 
(c) any other enactment created by law which is inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Act. 
114.(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:           
“Agreement” includes contracts, arrangement or understanding (written or oral) and 
concerted practices; "Authorisation" means an authorisation granted by the Commission 
under Part XIII of this Act, or by the Court on application for review or appeal under Part 
XVI of this Act against a determination of the Commission; “Authorised officer” means 
any person appointed as such by the Commission for the purposes of this Act; "Business" 
means any undertaking that is carried on for gain or reward; or in the course of which 
goods or services are acquired or supplied; or any interest in land is acquired or disposed 
of, otherwise than free of charge; "Clearance" means a clearance given by the Commission 
under Part XIII of this Act, or by the Court on application for review or appeal under Part 
XIV of this Act against a determination of the Commission; “Company” means company 
registered under Cap. 59, Laws of the Federation, 1990; "Commission" means the Federal 
Competition Commission established by section 1 of this Act; and includes a member of 
the Commission, performing any function of the Commission; “Concerted practice” means 
a practice involving direct or indirect contacts between competitors falling short of an 
actual agreement; "Court" means the Federal High Court of Nigeria; "Document" means a 
document in any form whether signed or otherwise authenticated by its maker or not; and 
includes: 
(a) any writing on any material; 
(b) any information recorded or stored by means of any tape recorder, computer, or other 
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device; and any material subsequently derived from information so recorded or stored; 
(c) any label, marking, or other writing that identifies or describes any thing of which it 
forms part, or to which it is attached by any means; 
(d) any book, map, plan, graph, or drawing; 
(e) any photograph, film, negative, tape, or other device in which one or more visual 
images are embodied so as to be capable (with or without the aid of some other equipment) 
of being reproduced; “enterprise” means any person involved in business; “Executive 
Chairman” means the Executive Chairman of the Commission; “Federal” refers to the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria; “Function” includes powers and duties; "Give effect to", in 
relation to a provision of a contract, arrangement, or understanding, includes:  
(a) do an act or thing in pursuance of or in accordance with that provision; 
(b) enforce or purport to enforce that provision; 
"Goods" includes 
(a) ships, aircraft, and vehicles; 
(b) minerals, trees, and crops, whether on, under, or attached to land or not; 
(c) gas and electricity; “Judge” means Judge of the Federal High Court; “member” means a 
member of the Commission, which shall include the Executive Chairman; “Mergers, 
Takeovers and Acquisitions” means “mergers” or “takeovers” or “acquisitions” or 
“mergers, takeovers and acquisitions” and “merger, takeovers and acquisitions” have 
corresponding meanings; “President” means the President and Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; "Person", includes an individual and any 
association of persons whether incorporated or not; “Prescribed" means prescribed by 
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regulations under this Act or by the Commission; "Price", includes any charge or fee or 
valuable consideration in any form, whether direct or indirect; and includes any 
consideration that in effect relates to the acquisition or supply of goods or services or the 
acquisition or disposition of any interest in land, although ostensibly relating to any other 
matter or thing; “Restrictive practices” means practices in restraint of trade or which 
otherwise hinders competition; "Sale" includes advertisement for sale, display for sale, and 
offer for sale, and "sell", "selling", and "sold" have corresponding meanings; "Services" 
means a service of any description, whether industrial, trade, professional or otherwise; 
"Share" means a share in the share capital of a company or other body corporate, whether 
or not it carries the right to vote at general meetings; and includes: 
62 
(a) a beneficial interest in any such share;  
(b) a power to exercise, or control the exercise of, a right to vote attaching to any such 
share that carries the right to vote at meetings of the company; 
(c) a power to acquire or dispose of, or control the acquisition or disposition of, any such 
share; 
(d) a perpetual debenture and perpetual debenture stock; "Supply", in relation to goods, 
includes supply (or resupply) by way of gift, sale, exchange, rent, lease, hire, or hire 
purchase; and in relation to services, includes provision, grant, or confer and "supply" as a 
noun, "supplied", and "supplier" have corresponding meanings; and "Trade" means any 
trade, business, industry, profession, occupation, activity of commerce, or undertaking 
relating to the supply or acquisition of goods or services or to the disposition or acquisition 
of any interest in land; 
(2) In this Act, a reference to engaging in conduct shall be read as a reference to doing or 
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refusing to do any act, including the entering into, or the giving effect to a provision of, a 
contract or arrangement. 
(3) In this Act: 
(a) a reference to the acquisition of goods includes a reference to the acquisition of 
property in, or rights in relation to, goods in pursuance of a supply of the goods; 
(b) a reference to the supply or acquisition of goods or services includes a reference to 
agreeing to supply or acquire goods or services; 
(c) a reference to the supply or acquisition of goods includes a reference to the supply or 
acquisition of goods together with other property or services or both; 
(d) a reference to the supply or acquisition of services includes a reference to the supply or 
acquisition of services together with property or other services or both. 
(4) For the purposes of this Act, any two companies, persons and association of persons are 
to be treated as affiliated if: 
(a) one of them is a company of which the other is a subsidiary as such subsidiary is 
understood pursuant to the provisions of Cap. 59, Laws of the Federation, 1990; 
(b) both of them are subsidiaries (within the meaning of those sections) of the same 
company; or 
(c) both of them are affiliated with companies that, in accordance with paragraph (a) or 
paragraph (b) of this subsection, are affiliated; 
(5) In this Act, "competition" means workable or effective competition in relation to the 
supply and demand of goods in any given market and unless the context otherwise 
requires, references to the lessening of competition include references to the hindering or 
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preventing of competition. 
63 
(6) For the purposes of this Act, the effect on competition in a market shall be determined 
by reference to all factors that affect competition in that market including competition from 
goods or services supplied or likely to be supplied by persons not resident or not carrying 
on business in Nigeria. 
(7) For the purposes of this Act: 
(a) a provision of a contract or arrangement shall be deemed to have had, or to have, a 
particular purpose if; 
(i) the provision was or is included in the contract or arrangement or is required to be 
given, for that purpose or purposes that included or include that purpose; and 
(ii) that purpose was or is a substantial purpose; 
(b) a person shall be deemed to have engaged, or to engage, in conduct for a particular 
purpose or a particular reason if that person engaged or engages in that conduct for that 
purpose or reason or for purposes or reasons that included or include that purpose or 
reason, and that purpose or reason was or is a substantial purpose or reason. 
(8) In this Act: 
(a) a reference to a contract shall be construed as including a reference to a lease of, or a 
license in respect of, any land or a building or part of a building, and shall be so construed 
notwithstanding any express reference in this Act to any such lease or license, but shall not 
mean a reference to the memorandum of association or articles of association of a 
company; 
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(b) a reference to making or entering into a contract, in relation to such a lease or license, 
shall be read as a reference to granting or taking the lease or license; (c) a reference to a 
party to a contract, in relation to such a lease or license, shall be read as including a 
reference to any person bound by, or entitled to the benefit of, any provision contained in 
the lease or license. 
(9) For the purposes of this Act, any contract or arrangement entered into shall be deemed 
to have been entered into by all the persons who are members of the association or body; 
(10) Nothing in subsection (9) of this section shall apply to: 
(a) any member of an firm or company who expressly notifies the 
association or body in writing that he disassociates himself from the contract, or 
arrangement or any provision thereof and who does so disassociate himself; 
(b) any member of a firm or company who establishes that he had no knowledge and could 
not reasonably have been expected to have had knowledge of the contract, arrangement, or 
understanding. 
(11) In this Act, reference to: 
64 
(a) Federal Government means the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; 
(b) State Government means the Government of one or any of the States that constitute the 
territories of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as recognized by the Constitution of Nigeria, 
1999; 
(c) Local Government means the authority and the territories relating to one or any of the 
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local government recognized by the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999. 
(12) Every reference in this Act to the term 'market' is a reference to a “relevant market” in 
Nigeria for goods or services as well as other goods or services that, as a matter of fact and 
commercial common sense, are substitutable for them and the meaning of the term 
“relevant market” shall be based on examination of demand substitutability, supply 
substitutability and potential competition. 
(13) For the purpose of this Act, the term: 
(a) “Regulatory Agency” shall mean any government agency established to regulate the 
terms and conditions for demand and supply of goods and services in any given industry 
and in this respect, the regulatory agency in question is one established either by Federal or 
any State Government; 
(b) “Regulated Industry” shall mean an industry which is designated as such by the 
Commission and which is under the regulatory authority of a regulatory agency. 
(14) For the purpose of this Act, the term “Professional Association” shall mean 
associations mentioned in Schedule 1 of this Act. 
115. This Act shall be cited as the Federal Competition Act 2005. Short title. 
SCHEDULE I section 11(3) 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
The following associations and their governing bodies as established by relevant laws are 
professional associations for the purposes of this Act: 
(a) Architects: Architects (Registration, Etc) Act, Cap. 20, Laws of the Federation of 
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Nigeria, 1990; 
(b) Chartered Accountants: Institute of Chartered Accountants Act, Cap. 185, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 1990; 
(c) Dental Technologists: Dental Technologists (Registration, Etc) Act, Cap. 96, Laws of 
the Federation of Nigeria, 1990; 
(d) Engineers: Engineers (Registration, Etc) Act, Cap. 110, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 1990; 
(e) Estate Agents: Estate Surveyors and Valuers (Registration, Etc) Act, Cap. 111, Laws of 
the Federation of Nigeria, 1990;65 
(f) Legal Practitioners: Legal Practitioners Act, Cap. 207, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 1990; 
(g) Medical Practitioners: Medical and Dental Practitioners Act, Cap. 221, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 1990; 
(h) Nigerian Institute of Marketing Act; 
(i) Nurses and Midwives: Nursing and Midwifery (Registration, Etc) Act, Cap. 332, Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990; 
(j) Pharmacists: Pharmacists Act, Cap. 357, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990; 
(k) Quantity Surveyors: Quantity Surveyors (Registration, Etc) Act, Cap. 383, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 1990; 
(l) Surveyors: Surveyors’ Registration Council of Nigeria Act, Cap. 425, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 1990; Cap. I 23 LFN 
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(m) Town Planners: Town Planners (Registration, Etc) Act, Cap. 431, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria; 1990. 
(n) Veterinary Surgeons: Veterinary Surgeons Act, Cap. 464, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 1990; 
(o) Builders: Builders (Registration, Etc.) Act, Cap 40 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
2004; 
(p) any other professional association created by any law and designated as such by the 
Commission, provided that, any designation of an association as a professional association 
pursuant to section 16(2) shall be published by the Commission in the Gazette. 
SCHEDULE II Section 4(10) 
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE COMMISSION 
Proceedings of the Commission 
1.(1) Subject to this Act and section 27 of the Interpretation Act, the Commission may 
make standing orders regulating its proceedings or those of any of its committees. 
(2) The quorum of the Commission shall be the Chairman, or the person presiding at the 
meeting and 4 other members of the Commission, and the quorum of any committee of the 
Commission shall be determined by the 
Commission. 
2.(1) The Commission shall meet not less than four times in each year and subject thereto, 
the Commission shall meet whenever it is summoned by the Chairman and if the Chairman 
is required to do so by notice given to him by not less than 4 other members, he shall 
summon a meeting of the Commission to be held within 28 days from the date on which 
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the notice is given. 66 
(2) At any meeting of the Commission, the Chairman shall preside 
but if he is absent, the members present shall appoint one of their number 
to preside at that meeting. 
(3) Where the Commission desires to obtain the advice of any person on a particular 
matter, the Commission may co-opt him to the Commission for such period as it deems fit, 
but a person who is in attendance by virtue of this subsection shall not be entitled to vote at 
any meeting of the Commission and shall not count towards a quorum. 
Committees 
3.(1) The Commission may appoint one or more committees to carry out, on behalf of the 
Commission, such functions as the Commission may determine. 
(2) A committee appointed under this paragraph shall consist of such number of persons as 
may be determined by the Commission and a person shall hold office on the committee in 
accordance with the terms of his appointment.(3) A decision of a committee shall be of no 
effect until it is confirmed by the Commission. 
Miscellaneous 
4.(1) The fixing of the seal of the Commission shall be authenticated by the signatures of 
the Chairman or any person generally or specifically authorised by the Commission to act 
for that purpose and the Secretary. 
(2) Any contract or instrument which, if made or executed by a person not being a body 
corporate, would not be required to be under seal, may be made or executed on behalf of 
the Commission by the Secretary or any person generally or specifically authorised by the 
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Commission to act for that purpose. 
(3) Any document purporting to be a document duly executed under the seal of the 
Commission shall be received in evidence and shall, unless and until the contrary is 
proved, be presumed to be so executed. 
5. The validity of any proceedings of the Commission or of a committee shall not be 
adversely affected by (a) a vacancy in the membership of the Commission or committee; or 
(b) a defect in the appointment of a member of the Commission or committee; or 
(c) reason that a person not entitled to do so took part in the proceedings of the 
Commission or committee. 
6. Any member of the Commission and any person sitting on the Commission or 
committee, who has a personal interest in any contract, arrangement or matter to be 
considered by the Commission or committee thereof shall forthwith disclose his interest to 
the Commission or committee and shall not vote on any question relating to the contract, 
arrangement or matter. 67 
SCHEDULE III Sections 76(2) & (5) and 54(2) & 55(1) 
POWERS EXERCISABLE BY ORDERS 
PART I 
Powers Exercisable in all Cases 
1. An order made under section 76 or 77 of this Act (in this Schedule referred to as an 
“order”) may declare it to be unlawful, except to such extent and in such circumstances as 
may be provided by or under the order, to make or to carry out any such agreement as may 
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be specified or described in the order. 
2. An order may require any party to any such agreement as may be specified or described 
in the order, to terminate the agreement within such time as may be so specified, either 
wholly or to such extent as may be so specified. 
3. An order may declare it to be unlawful, except to such extent and in such circumstances 
as may be provided by or under the order, to withhold or to agree to withhold or to threaten 
to withhold, or to withhold, from any such persons as may be specified or described in the 
order, any supplies or services so specified or described or any such supplies or services 
(whether the withholding is absolute or is to be effectual only in particular circumstances). 
4. An order may declare it to be unlawful, except to such extent and in such circumstances 
as may be provided by or under the order, to require, as a condition for the supplying of 
goods or services to any person ( a) the buying of any goods; or 
(b) the making of any payment in respect of services other than the goods or services 
supplied; or (c) the doing of any other such thing as may be specified or described in the 
order. 
5. An order may declare it to be unlawful, except to such extent and in such circumstances 
as may be provided by or under the order (a) to discriminate in any manner specified or 
described in the order between any persons in the prices charged for goods or services so 
specified or described; or (b) to do anything so specified or described which appears to the 
Minister to amount to such discrimination, or to procure others to do any of the things 
mentioned in subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph. 
6. An order may declare it to be unlawful, except to such extent and in such circumstances 
as may be provided by or under the order (a) to give or agree to give in other ways any 
such preference in respect of the supply of goods or services or the giving of orders for 
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goods or services, as may be specified or described in the order; or 
(b) to do anything so specified or described which appears to the Minister to amount to 
giving such preference or to procure or to do any of the things 68 mentioned in 
subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph. 
7. An order may declare it to be unlawful, except to such extent and in such circumstances 
as may be provided by or under the order, to charge for goods or services supplied with 
prices differing from those in any published list or notification or to do anything to amount 
to charging such prices. 8. An order may require a person supplying goods or services to 
publish a list of or otherwise notify prices, with or without such further information as may 
be specified or described in the order. 
9.(1) Subject to the following provisions of this paragraph, an order may, to such extent 
and in such circumstances as may be provided by or under the order, regulate the prices to 
be charged for any goods or services specified or described in the order. 
(2) The power conferred by subparagraph 
(1) of this paragraph shall not be exercised in respect of goods or services of any 
description, unless the matters specified in the relevant report as being those which in the 
opinion of the Commission operate or may be expected to operate against the public 
interest relate or include matters relating to the prices charged for goods or services of that 
description. 
(3) In this paragraph, “the relevant report” in relations to an order, means the report of the 
Commission in consequence of which the order is made, in the form in which it is made. 
10. An order may declare it to be unlawful, except to such extent and in such 
circumstances as may be provided by or under the order, for any persons, by publication or 
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otherwise, to notify to persons supplying goods or services, prices recommended or 
suggested as appropriate to be charged by those persons for those goods or services. 
11.(1) An order may prohibit or restrict the acquisition by any person of the whole or part 
of the undertaking or assets of another person’s business or the doing of anything which 
shall or may have a result to which this paragraph applies or may require that if such an 
acquisition is made or anything is done which has such a result, the persons concerned or 
any of them shall thereafter observe any prohibition or restrictions imposed by or under the 
order. 
(2) This paragraph applies to any result which consists in two or more bodies corporate 
becoming interconnected bodies corporate. 
(3) This paragraph applies to where an order is made in consequence of a report of the 
Commission under section 57 or 58 of this Act to any result (other than the one specified in 
subparagraph 
(2) of this paragraph) which, in accordance with section 55 of this Act consists in two or 
more enterprises ceasing to be distinct enterprises. 
PART 69 
Powers Exercisable Except in Cases falling within Section 76 (6) of this Act 
 
12. An order may provide for the division of any business by the sale of any part of the 
undertaking or assets or otherwise (for which purpose all the activities carried on by way 
of business by any one person or by any two or more interconnected bodies corporate may 
be treated as a single business) or for the division of any group of interconnected bodies 
corporate and for all such matters as may be necessary to effect or take account of the 
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division, including  
a) the transfer or vesting of property rights, liabilities or obligation; 
(b) the adjustment of contracts, whether by discharge or reduction of any liability or 
obligation or otherwise; 
(c) the creation, allotment, surrender or cancellation of shares, stock or securities; 
(d) the formation or winding up of a company or other association, corporate or 
unincorporated or the amendment of the memorandum and articles or other instruments 
regulating any company or association; 
(e) the extent to which and the circumstances in which provisions of the order affecting a 
company or association in its share capital, constitution or other matters may be altered by 
the company or association and the registration under any enactment of the order by 
companies or associations so affected;  
(f) the continuation with any necessary change of parties of any legal proceedings. 
 
13. In relation to an order under section 54 of this Act, the reference in paragraph 12 of this 
Schedule to the division of a business as mentioned in that paragraph shall be construed as 
including a reference to the separation by the sale or any part of any undertaking or assets 
concerned or other means of enterprises which are under common control otherwise than 
by reason of their being enterprises of interconnected bodies corporate. 
 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
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This Bill seeks to provide, among other things, for the establishment of Federal 
Competition Commission, promote competition in trade and commerce among the several 
States of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and with foreign nations by controlling existing 
monopolies, discouraging the abuse of dominant market position and other restrictive trade  
and business practices.                                       
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